Quantum Information Promises new insights Anthony J

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Presentation transcript:

Quantum Information Promises new insights Anthony J Quantum Information Promises new insights Anthony J. Leggett Department of Physics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

PHOTON POLARIZATION— THE ULTIMATE “QUANTUM 2-STATE SYSTEM” Some possible polarization states of light (photons) propagating towards screen: |↑ |→ |↗ |↘ “ |V ” “ |H ” “ |+ ” “ |− ” Polarizer: unpolarized light (classical) “V/H” setting |+ |− “+/-” setting |↑ |→ D2 D2

What happens at quantum level? |↑ |→ single photon “V/H” setting click D1 click D2

Classically, resolve |+ into |H and |V components: But what if |+ D1 I0 “V/H” setting D2 ? Classically, resolve |+ into |H and |V components: E + = 1 2 ( E H + E V ) EV is transmitted, EH is reflected, so I 1 = I 2 = 1 2 I o electric field (Malus’s law) output of D1 output of D2

(quantum version of Malus’s law) But what happens at the quantum level? “A single photon cannot be split!”, so for each photon either D1 clicks (“photon is |V ”) or D2 clicks (“photon is |H ”) P1 = P2 = ½ So: is each individual photon indeed either |V or |H ? (ensemble is “mixture” of |V and |H ) (experimentally observed)  (quantum version of Malus’s law) prob. of click in D1 prob. of click in D2

Is the original |+ beam a “mixture” of |V and |H. (i. e Is the original |+ beam a “mixture” of |V and |H ? (i.e. is each individual photon either |V or |H ?) If so: by symmetry |V D1 single photon D2 “+/-” setting P1 = P2 = ½ output of D1 output of D2

superposition principle Similarly for |H . So P(−|V) = P(−|H) = ½ . But |+ is mixture of |V and |H , so P(−|+) = ½ i.e. P1 = P2 = ½ |+ D1 single photon D2 “+/-” setting in contradiction to experiment! Conclusion: |+ is a quantum superposition of |V and |H , and this is not equivalent to a mixture: each |+ photon is not “either” |V “or” |H superposition principle

POLARIZATION OF PHOTON PAIRS For photon propagating into page, denote states of circular polarization by |↻ ≡ |R |↺ ≡ |L The conservation of total angular momentum is consistent with either |R 1 R 2 or |L 1 L 2 parity O+ 1 spin 2 O+ right-circularly polarized left-circularly polarized (“product” states)

But if we don’t know (and can’t find out But if we don’t know (and can’t find out!) which if these occurred, must describe polarization state of photons by quantum superposition: Ψ 𝑌 = 1 2 ( |R 1 R 2 + e iϕ |L 1 L 2 ) (actually, parity conservation ⇒ e iϕ =1 so (not obvious!) can equally well write Ψ 𝑌 = 1 2 ( |H 1 H 2 + |V 1 V 2 )). This is not equivalent to a “classical mixture” of |R 1 R 2 and |L 1 L 2 ! In fact, (Bell, 1964): If we assume local causality and the standard “arrow of time,” then the experimental predictions of Ψ 𝑌 are inconsistent with the assignation of any properties (not just polarization) to the individual photons 1 and 2! (and subsequent experiment unambiguously favors predictions of Ψ 𝑌 ). Ψ 𝑌 is an entangled state – a quantum superposition of product states of more than one system. Quantum information exploits (inter alia) the bizarre properties of entangled states.

ENTANGLEMENT AS A RESOURCE The state of a 2-state system (e. g ENTANGLEMENT AS A RESOURCE The state of a 2-state system (e.g. photon polarization) is uniquely specified by (<) 2 complex numbers (e.g. the amplitudes for |H and |V ). So if we have N 2-state systems in a product state, we need ~2N complex numbers. However, to specify a general entangled state of N systems we need not ~2N but 2N complex numbers! e.g. for N = 4, we need to specify separately amplitudes for |HHHH , |HHHV , |HHVH , |HHVV … (16 = 24 states in all). Thus, possibility of massively parallel processing … (“quantum computing”) Alas, a snag: measurement will “reveal” only one of the 2N states ⇒ we lose all information on the 2N −1 others.

Solution (Deutsch 1984, Shor 1995): devise algorithm such that at end system is in just one of the 2N states, the particular one depending one the answer to our problem. Application: prime-factoring of large numbers (Shor 1995). (For N binary digits, time taken by classical computer exponential in N, for quantum computer polynomial in N). Interesting primarily for application to (classical) cryptography. Practical difficulties in building quantum computer: “ideal” 2-state system scalability decoherence … Systems: nuclear spins, trapped ions, superconducting devices … at present, not practically competitive with classical computing, but …

“Key distribution problem”: QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (Bennett + Brassard 1984, Ekert 1990) “Key distribution problem”: In classical (and quantum) cryptography, Alice and Bob can’t prevent Eve from listening in. But can they tell whether she is listening in? In classical cryptography, no (as far as as known); Eve can intercept message and pass it on without detection. Quantum cryptography: exploits no-cloning theorem (direct consequence of superposition principle):/ it is impossible to build a device guaranteed to detect and pass on unaltered a photon of arbitrary (unknown) polarization./ Info (code) A B E

Protocol: ↑ → ↗ ↘ “ |V ” “ |H ” “ |+ ” “ |− ” A emits photons at random, 50% of the time either |H or |V and 50% of the time either |+ or |− . Bob also measures at random, 50% of the time with setting H/V, 50% with +/-. At end of (say) 10,000 runs, Alice and Bob compare notes (they can use a classical (insecure) phone line) on “settings,” throw away those runs for which they have used different settings and compare notes on the rest. If Eve is not listening in, then whenever Alice sent |H ( |V ) Bob should detect |H ( |V ): similarly for |+ ( |− ). If Eve is listening in on each run, she has to decide how to set her polarizer! But Eve does not know whether Alice emitted ( |H or |V ) or rather ( |+ or |− ).

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (continued) Suppose e.g. she chooses a +/− setting. Then if Alice in fact emitted |+ or |− , she can measure it and pass it on undetected. But what if Alice emitted |H or |V ? Then she (Eve) has 50% chance if passing it on wrong, and Alice and Bob will fail to agree and thus detect her eavesdropping.