An efficient threshold RSA digital signature scheme Source:Applied Mathematics and Computation, Volume 166, Issue 1, 6 July 2005, Pages 25-34 Author:Qiu-Liang Xu, Tzer-Shyong Chen Speaker:李士勳 Date:2005,12,14
Outline Introduction Descriptions of the scheme Analysis of security and efficiency Conclusions
Introduction Resisting conspiracy attack (t,n) threshold signature scheme
Introduction 1991:Desmedt and Frankel fist proposed the threshold signature scheme 1994:Li et al. presented two (t,n) threshold signature schemes 1997:Michels and Horster proved them insecure 1998:Wang et al. presented two (t,n)
Descriptions of the scheme p and q are large primes
Descriptions of the scheme represent the set of all members in the system
Initialization phase Key Dealing Center(KDC) must establish four parameters RSA parameters Lagrange interpolation parameters Parameters used in modulus convention Parameters used in partial signature verification
RSA parameters p,q,n,e and d to generatethe group signature, where n=p*q, p and p are two safe primes, (n,e) is the public key, and d is the private key P,Q,N,E and D which is used by the signature generator(SG), where N=P*Q>n, P and Q are also two safe primes, (N,E) is the public key, and D is the private key
Lagrange interpolation parameters Select a large public prime r>n Select a random polynomial f(x), d=f(0)
Parameters used in modulus convention Consider a sample message , so that the order of in group is Compute Make public
Parameters used in partial signature verification Select randomly an element of order compute i=1,2,…,n and send publicly v and to the signature generator SG
Signature phase Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge protocol
Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge protocol One-way hash function H(), and a random number u, compute z=xc+u (z,c) proves , the verifier acepts the proof if and only if Clearly, when ,the proof holds
Signature phase denotes the t shareholders who participate in signing
Signature phase Select a random number Compute , Send to SG , , , , (m,s(m),S(m)) is the signature on message m
Signature phase If then (m,s(m),S(m)) is appetped as a valid signature
Analysis of security and efficiency The fist step of the initialization phase builds only the RSA cryptosystem, without providing any extra information The second step is to establish a (t,n) threshold system based on Lagrange interpolation The third and forth step is hard to slove the discrete logarithm problem
Conclusions Resisting conspiracy attack