Joseph T. Kelley Walter A. Anderson The Maine Shore and the Army Corps: A Tale of Two Harbors, Wells and Saco Maine Joseph T. Kelley Walter A. Anderson

“Rather, it is our intention to demonstrate how the single-minded, engineering approach of the army to complex, interdisciplinary coastal issues can create bigger problems on the coast than existed in the first place”

Camp Ellis, Saco, Maine Small, recreational and fishing community at the mouth of the Saco river, southern end of Saco Bay Economic importance of navigating the Saco River 1866 USACOE removed river shoals and build a rock jetty on N side of river Built a 2nd jetty, continued expanding and raising them Loss of beach growth, houses and roads USACOE studies said no harmful influence Saco River channel super narrow USACOE studies said no linkage b/w saco and pine point, also more studies, no conclusions

Wells Harbor and Wells and Drakes Island Beaches, Wells, Maine Wells and Drakes Island Beaches separated by small tidal channel, no development on dunes Wells Harbor behind channel, traditionally access at high tide WWII, houses built on seaward sand dunes Bigger boats, needed expanded anchorage Area behind wells beach behind channel is what was dredged

USACOE Action 1962 created rock jetties at the end of Drakes Island and Wells Beach Prevent sand from moving into navigation channel from the beaches Dredgers quit because of gear loss and lots of shoaling Extended jetties and re-dredged the area 186 mooring harbor to 40 from 1976- 1980 Continue dredging Harbor or beach? Began 1962 --> continued forever Sand stripped from other parts of the beach, collected around jetties Harbor filled in at much faster rate than expected

Discussion Construction of harbor created beach erosion that was not originally an issue No economic analysis by USACOE Costs not inferred by local communities USACOE didn’t consider all factors Sand from Saco River as beach source Value of a harbor over beaches Camp Ellis had more economic consideration Erosion continues

“As an organization, the army has exhibited a pattern of behavior that involves initial denial of responsibility, followed up (when political pressure is brought to bear) by technical studies that repeat old, untested assumptions and conclusions”