Effect of Risk Orientation in a Real-time Public Goods Dilemma Jane M. Y. Fung, Winton W. T. Au, Weipeng Hu, Kan Shi The Chinese University of Hong Kong 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Risk preference and cooperation Risk-seekers cooperate more frequently than risk-averse in a repeated 5-person prisoner’s dilemma (Parks, 2004) Cooperation is a risky choice in PGD because it may have the player end up with a loss The effect is more salient when the chance of losing is more likely (i.e. in the “tough” condition) 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Risk orientation and SVO in PGD Prosocials are likely to cooperate while proselfs are likely to defect (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009) Since cooperation in PGD are risky… Risk orientation affects prosocials’ but not proselfs’ cooperative behaviors In a simultaneous multi-trial linear PGD, risk-seeking prosocials cooperate more than their risk-averse counterparts 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Risk orientation and SVO in Real-time PGD When players can observe preceding players’ decisions before making their own… Decisions are still risky for prosocials, but not for proselfs, at the beginning of the game Risk-orientation affects prosocials but not proselfs Time 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Risk orientation and SVO in Real-time PGD When choice is risky, and information is available, people tend to defer decision and seek additional information (Tversky & Shafir, 1992) In real-time PGD, this implies… Prosocial risk-averse wait longer and see more of others’ decisions before making their own 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Consequence of waiting in Linear Real-time PGD Longer wait means more likely to see others’ cooperative moves In a linear real-time or sequential PGD, more preceding cooperation could increase the incentive to defect because of greed Risk-averse prosocials are more likely to defect than their risk-seeking counterparts in linear real-time PGD 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Summary of predictions In a simultaneous multi-trial linear PGD, risk-seeking prosocials cooperate more than their risk-averse counterparts Risk-averse prosocials are more likely to defect than their risk-seeking counterparts in linear real-time PGD This effect is mediated by the number of cooperative choices the player perceives before making the decision 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas Experiment 240 college students Randomly assigned to a group of 4 to 8 in each of the 35 trials Real-time public good game (30 sec decision time) All-or-none contribution Linear payoff 60 participants per condition Cooperation Displayed Not Displayed Defection Full info Personal info only Joint info only No info 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Real-time PDG – Full info Participant ID: Trial number: Group ID: Personal account: Joint account: Personal account: Joint account: 60 participants per condition Cooperation Displayed Not Displayed Defection Full info Personal info only Joint info only No info 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Real-time PDG – Joint info Participant ID: Trial number: Group ID: Personal account: Joint account: Joint account: 60 participants per condition Cooperation Displayed Not Displayed Defection Full info Personal info only Joint info only No info 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Real-time PDG – Personal info Participant ID: Trial number: Group ID: Personal account: Joint account: Personal account: 60 participants per condition Cooperation Displayed Not Displayed Defection Full info Personal info only Joint info only No info 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas Real-time PDG – No info Participant ID: Trial number: Group ID: Personal account: Joint account: 60 participants per condition Cooperation Displayed Not Displayed Defection Full info Personal info only Joint info only No info 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Measures of individual differences Social value orientation (SVO) was measured by Ring Measure (Liebrand, 1984) Risk orientation (RO) was measured by Risk Orientation Scale (Rohrmann, 2004) Scale of 1 (risk-averse) – 7 (risk-seeking) 12 items 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas SVO distribution Prosocial – 32.3% Cooperator – 92% Altruist – 8% Proself – 67.7% Individualist – 93% Competitors – 7% 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Risk orientation distribution Less risk-seeking More risk-seeking 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Result – % of cooperative choices Significant 4-way RO X SVO X Joint info X Personal info Joint Info Personal Info No Info Full Info 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas Result – No Info Less risk-seeking More risk-seeking 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas Result – Full info Prosocials who are more risk-seeking are more likely to cooperate Proselfs’ cooperation behaviors are not affected by their risk orientations Regression of RO, SVO on % of cooperative choices Less risk-seeking More risk-seeking 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Mediator – Number of cooperators perceived Prosocials who are less risk-seeking are more likely to delay their decisions and see more cooperators Regression of RO, SVO on number of perceived cooperators 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

Mediator – Number of cooperators perceived Less risk-seeking More risk-seeking 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas Mediation Number of cooperators perceived fully mediates the effect of SVO and risk orientation on cooperation when full information is provided # of cooperators -ve p < .001 -ve p < .05 risk-seeking X prosocial cooperation p = .232 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas Conclusion Risk orientation affects prosocials, but not proselfs, in PGD The more risk-seeking is a prosocial, the more he/she cooperates Same effect is also found in real-time linear PGD both cooperation and defection information is available This effect is fully mediated by the number of cooperative decisions made by preceding players 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas References Balliet, D., Parks, C., & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Group Processes Intergroup Relations, 12, 533-547. Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behavior in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239-264. Parks, C. D. (2004). Risk preference as a predictor of cooperation in a social dilemma. In R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Contemporary research on social dilemmas (pp. 71-98). New York: Cambridge University Press. Tversky, A. & Shafir, E. (1992). Choice under conflict: The dynamics of deferred decision. Psychological Science, 3, 358-361. 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas