Feasibility Study of FIA 2018/9/12 Jun 2010 Feasibility Study of FIA Authors: Date: 2010-07-12 Name Company Address Phone email Hitoshi MORIOKA ROOT Inc. #33 Ito Bldg. 2-14-38 Tenjin, Chuo-ku, Fukuoka 810-0001 JAPAN +81-92-771-7630 hmorioka@root-hq.com Hiroshi MANO 8F TOC2 Bldg. 7-21-11 Nishi-Gotanda, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 141-0031 JAPAN +81-3-5719-7630 hmano@root-hq.com Paul A Lambert Marvell Marvel lane, MS 2-201 Santa Clara, CA 95054 +1-408-222-9522 paul@marvell.com Marc Emmelmann TU Berlin Einsteinufer 25 10587 Berlin Germany +49-30-314 24580 emmelmann@ieee.org Hiroki Nakano Trans New Technology Sumitomo-Seimei Kyoto Bldg. 8F, 62 Tukiboko-cho Shimogyo-ku, Kyoto 600-8492 JAPAN +81-75-213-1200 cas.nakano@gmail.com cas@trans-nt.com Mineo Takai Space Time Engineering 609 Deep Valley Drive, Suite 200　Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274, USA +1-310-265-4441 mineo@ieee.org Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Hiroshi Mano, ROOT Inc.

Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 Abstract This presentation introduces a feasibility of FIA. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. July 2010 John Doe, Some Company

Use Case Scenario Walk Jun 2010 2018/9/12 Jun 2010 Use Case Scenario Large number of STAs are constantly entering and exiting the coverage area of an AP within an existing ESS at pedestrian speed. Every STA passes through the coverage area in a short time. The authentication process specified by IEEE 802.11 limits STAs to fully exploit the system capacity  A faster initial authentication is needed FIA aims at amending IEEE 802.11 with a fast initial authentication mechanisms which scales with a high number of users simultaneously entering a ESS supports a very small dwell time in coverage area of a ESS securely provides initial authentication Walk Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Hiroshi Mano, ROOT Inc.

Sequence of Establishing Connection Jun 2010 Sequence of Establishing Connection Discover an appropriate AP Channel Scanning, Probe, IEEE 802.11u… WLAN association Authentication, Association… Upper layer setup DHCP… Out of scope: It’s sufficient by current IEEE 802.11 specification. Channel scanning is an implementation Issue, so it does not need standardization. Our scope Out of scope: It’s out of scope of IEEE 802.11 Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

How to solve the issues Jun 2010 Transmit Rate 1Mbps (DSSS) 6Mbps (OFDM) DIFS 50us 34us CW Min 620us (ave. 310us) 135us (ave. 67us) CW Max 20,460us 9,207us Preamble Length 144us 16us PLCP Header 48us 4us MAC Header 256us 43us FCS 32us 5us SIFS 10us Ack 304us 39us Overhead 1,154us (59%) 224us (63%) Data (100byte) 800us (41%) 133us (37%) Each management frames needs overhead such as preamble, IFS, headers, ACK, etc… 60% of air-time is consumed by the overhead for each frame. Reducing overhead is difficult because of coexistence with existing system. Reducing number of frame exchanges is effective. Preamble FCS CW Ack Data DIFS SIFS PLCP Header MAC Header Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

November 2005 doc.: IEEE 802.11-05/1859r0 Jun 2010 Protocol Sequence to Establish a Connection to the Internet by IEEE802.11i ( PEAP/EAP-MSCHAPv2) and DHCP STA AP 14 round trip 2ms/oneway: 56ms Total: 166ms RADIUS Probe Authentication 11 round trip 5ms/oneway: 110ms Association PEAP /EAP-MSCAPv2 (11 round trip) DHCP is also slow. So we’ll propose a new protocol in IETF DHCP (2 round trip) DHCP Server Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Page 6 Hitoshi MORIOKA, ROOT Inc.

Protocol Sequence to Establish a Connection to the Internet by FIA Jun 2010 Protocol Sequence to Establish a Connection to the Internet by FIA STA AP Total: 14ms RADIUS 1 round trip 2ms/oneway: 4ms 1 round trip 5ms/oneway: 10ms Beacon FIA Connection established FIA functions Authentication Key exchange in one round trip time. Technical details were presented and discussed in WNG SC. (10/361r1) Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

Jun 2010 Security Feasibility An example FIA protocol was evaluated and compared with IEEE 802.11i by security experts. Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai, “Security Analysis of MIS Protocol on Wireless LAN comparison with IEEE802.11i,” Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile technology, applications & systems, 2006, ISBN:1-59593-519-3 http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1292344 Ilsun You, Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai, "Toward Formal Analysis of Wireless LAN Security with MIS protocol," International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing, accepted for publication Well-known Yahalom protocol is also evaluated. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Yahalom Protocol Yahalom protocol is an authentication and secure key sharing protocol. The protocol is originally introduced by M. Burrow, M. Abadi and R. Needham in 1989.[1] Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. July 2010

Yahalom Protocol Sequence A and B are identities of A and B respectively. KAS is a symmetric key known only to A and S. KBS is a symmetric key known only to B and S. NA and NB are nonces generated by A and B respectively. KAB is a symmetric generated key, which will be the session key of the session between A and B. A B S A, NA B, {A, NA, NB}KBS {B, KAB, NA, NB}KAS, {A, KAB}KBS {A, KAB}KBS, {NB}KAB Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. July 2010

Strengthened Yahalom Protocol Sequence A and B are identities of A and B respectively. KAS is a symmetric key known only to A and S. KBS is a symmetric key known only to B and S. NA and NB are nonces generated by A and B respectively. KAB is a symmetric generated key, which will be the session key of the session between A and B. A B S A, NA B, NB, {A, NA}KBS NB, {B, KAB, NA}KAS, {A, B, KAB, NB}KBS {A, B, KAB, NB}KBS, {NB}KAB Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. July 2010

Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Yahalom Evaluation Yahalom protocol is evaluated by many security experts.[2][3][4] L. C. Paulson proposed strengthened version.[4] Strengthened Yahalom protocol is also evaluated. [5][6] Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. July 2010

Jun 2010 Summary Technical feasibility of FIA has been shown in this presentation. Reducing frame exchanges Time Occupation Security Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC.

Questions & Comments Jun 2010 2018/9/12 Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. Hiroshi Mano, ROOT Inc.

Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. References M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. M. Needham. A logic of authentication. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 426:233–271, 1989. D. Basin, S. Mo ̈dersheim, and L. Vigano`. OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols. International Journal of Information Security, 2004. J. Guttman. Key compromise and the authentication tests. In Proc. MPFS, volume 17 of ENTCS, pages 1–21, 2001. L.Paulson. Relations between secrets: Two formal analyses of the yahalom protocol. Journal of Computer Security, 9(3):197–216, 2001. M. Backes, B. Pfitzmann. On the Cryptographic Key Secrecy of the Strengthened Yahalom Protocol. Proceedings of IFIP SEC 2006. Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. A Proof of Revised Yahalom Protocol in the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) Model. The Computer Journal 2007 50(5):591-601. Hitoshi Morioka, ROOT INC. July 2010