Security Measures for ESS PSS Software Development

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Presentation transcript:

Security Measures for ESS PSS Software Development 6th Control System Cyber-Security Workshop (CS)2/HEP Security Measures for ESS PSS Software Development   Denis Paulic Deputy Group Leader, Protection and Safety Systems ESS/ICS/PS Date: 2017-10-08

Contents ESS Overview Personnel Safety Systems Governance PSS Software Decisions System Integrity Measures for PSS

ESS Linac Overview The European Spallation Source (ESS) will house the most powerful proton LINAC ever built. Parameter Value Units Max energy 2 GeV Peak current 62.5 mA Repetition rate 14 Hz Pulse length 2.86 ms Average power 5 MW RF frequency 352/704 MHz Maximum losses 1 W/m Target station Neutron science instruments Linear proton accelerator (600 m) 75 keV 3.6 MeV 90 MeV 216 MeV 571 MeV 2 GeV H+ source LEBT RFQ MEBT DTL Spoke β=0.5 Medium β β=0.67 High β β=0.86 HEBT & contingency 352.21 MHz 704.42 MHz *N. Gazis X 13 X 30

Personnel Safety Systems Safety interlock system If the Beam is ON  No Access If Access is allowed  No Beam permit If Emergency  Hard switch-off all hazardous equipment Access control system Authorisation and authentication Entry stations Access point sub-systems ODH detection system If oxygen level is below treshold  No Access, activate lights and sounders ODH = Oxygen Deficiency Hazard

Governance IEC 61508 : 2010 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems IEC 61511 : 2016 Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector PSS application program The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) Radiation risk analysis will be carried out before the facility is taken into operation. A formalised search of each PSS controlled area will be carried out before the facility is operated. Two independent technical design solutions will be used in each system. External events Single failure Common cause failure Redundancy Diversity Separation

Governance for Software Security IEC 61511 : 2016 Part 1, Clause 8.2.4. A security risk assessment shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS. It shall result in: A description of devices covered by this assessment (SIS, BPCS, any device connected to SIS) A description of identified threats that could exploit vulnerabilities and result in security events A description of potential consequences resulting from security events and likelihood of these events occurring. Consideration of various phases, such as design, implementation, commissioning, operation, and maintenance The determination of requirements for additional risk reduction A description of, or references to information on, the measures taken to reduce the… threats. IEC 61508 : 2010 Part 1, Clause 7.4.2.3 If the hazard analysis identifies the malevolent or unauthorised action, constituting a security threat,…, then a security threats analysis should be carried out IEC 62443 - Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems NIST Special publication 800-82: Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology SIS = Safety Instrumented System

Cyber Security Study Defence-in-Depth – applying multiple countermeasures in a layered manner. Network security layer: In-kind partner from Estonia: Cyber security risk assessment and mitigation plan for the ICS, based on IEC 62443. Initial meeting: 2016-10-17 PSS planned actions: IEC 61511:2016 HSE operational guidance (based on IEC 62443) NIST framework (NIST SP 800-82) Plant security Network security System integrity HSE = Health and Safety Executive NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology SP = Special Publication

HSE Operational Guidance HSE Guidance Appendix 1 – Process for the management of cybersecurity on IACS Appendix 2 – Example of simple network drawings Appendix 3 – Risk Assessment (based on IEC 62443 high level one) Appendix 4 – Security Contermeasures Appendix 5 – Additional SIS Considerations HSE Operational Guidance

HSE Guidance - Example Example of proposed risk assessment scheme from HSE: Consequence Category Major Accident A (High) Failure of or unauthorised access to a high integrity layer of protection (PFD < 0.1), including systems that are capable of manipulating this LOP B (Medium) Failure of or unauthorised access to a low integrity layer of protection (PFD ≥ 0.1), including systems that are capable of manipulating this LOP C (Low) Failure of or unauthorised access to a system that doesn’t have a safety function. Security risk = Likelihood * Consequence category LOP = Layer of Protection

PSS Software Decisions Latest version of Siemens SIMATIC STEP 7 V13 SP1  V14 SP1, TIA Portal including: Safety Advanced: Safety checks are automatically performed in the software; Fail-safe blocks for error detection and error reaction are inserted automatically when the safety program is compiled; WinCC Comfort for HMI programming. 2-train fail-safe PLC system Siemens fail-safe CPUs allow the processing of standard and safety programs on a single CPU. Certified to satisfy the Safety Integrity Level SIL3 in accordance with IEC 61508:2010. Integrated system diagnostics; 4-level security concept. Siemens fail-safe CPUs allow the processing of standard and safety programs on a single CPU. This allows fail-safe data to be evaluated in the standard user program and thus, this integration provides the system advantages and the extensive functionality of SIMATIC also for fail-safe applications. Besides this, Siemens fail-safe CPUs (and SIMATIC Safety F-systems in general) are certified to satisfy the Safety Integrity Level SIL3 in accordance with IEC 61508:2010, which means it is suitable for the SIL required by each SIF it services in PSS accelerator system Verification tests that the system was built right (according to the requirements). Validation checks that the right system was built (truly meets the needs and intent of the customer). V&V primarily involve testing of the software system, though it encompasses analyses, inspections, and reviews as well. The amount of testing can be tailored, with safety critical units and subsystems receiving the majority of the test effort. Traceability from the requirements, through design and coding, and into test is an important part of V&V.

Integrated Access Protection Measures Components with integrated security features S7-1500 controller with activated ”Protection level” The access to PSS safety software will be protected by two password prompts: one for the safety program and another for the safety CPU! Checking the collective signature of the safety program (Checksum test): In case of the software misuse, the system goes to Alarm mode; PSS system administrator shall be informed immediately; Checksum will change after any error-free safety software re-generation. HMI panels in ”Secure mode” Managed network switches (password protected) Firewalls passwords/certificates Central user administration user accounts and policies Enforcing of security guidelines password validity, incorrect logging on monitoring, etc. Harden PC Up-to-date; 2x anti-virus; Remove: Acrobat, Flash, Java, Office, no internet, no intranet (no browsing), no Internet Explorer, no wireless connection. Locked cabinets On-line (automatic) patching not possible Physical protection of the PC/ES New USB stick every time Password change procedures

Checksum Test - F-runtime Group Information DB

PSS Software - System Integrity Layer Application Level - Authentication and use administration - Detection of attacks - Integrated access protection - Passwords management - System hardening - Recovery procedures Database Level - Database authentication and permissions - Data management (logging, storing, retrieving…) - Data encryption and encryption keys management Update Management Level - Patch management – software and firmware updating Hardware Replacement Level System Integrity

System Hardening and Antivirus Software Measures Engineering workstation requirements: No Internet/Intranet connection, disabled WLAN and Bluetooth. Most of the activated services disabled: Booting and auto-start mechanisms, Flash, Java, Webserver, FTP, Remote Desktop, Adobe, Internet Explorer… Unused interfaces will be deactivated or mechanically blocked: Ethernet/Profinet ports; USB, Firewire, etc.; Configured / activated user accounts will be reduced to the necessary minimum. Regular checks, particularly of locally configured user accounts are planned. Siemens supports compatibility tests with: Trend Micro Office Scan, Symantec Endpoint Protection, McAfee VirusScan Enterprise (+ McAfee Application Control as a whitelisting mechanism). Safety and availability must generally be assured even in the case of infection with malware. This means that the virus scanner must under no circumstances execute the following actions without permission: Remove files or block access thereto; Place files in quarantine; Block communication; Shut systems down.

Patch Management and Firmware Updates Measures / Options Siemens supports with compatibility tests of Microsoft security patches. Recommendation from Siemens: Patch distribution via central patch server in DMZ and Windows Server Update Services (WSUS). Set up the update groups and processes for online updates to simplify patch distribution. Firmware updates might be needed to fix security related vulnerabilities Modifications included in Configuration management As soon as information on a vulnerability becomes available, the weak point will be evaluated for relevance to the application concerned.

Requirements For Operator Interface SIS status information critical to maintaining the SIL shall be available as part of the operator interface: where the process is in its sequence indication that SIS protective action has occurred indication that a protective function is bypassed information about automatic actions from PSS system status of sensors and final elements the loss of energy where that energy loss impacts safety the results of diagnostics SIS operator interface shall prevent changes to SIS application software. Any writing from standard to safety part of the SW shall be documented and tested to make sure it cannot lead the system to an unsafe state. It is essential to provide access protection in operation mode for the access to the safety part of the software. The access to PSS safety software shall be protected by two password prompts: one for the safety program and another for the safety CPU. To optimise the access protection, the passwords for safety CPU and safety program shall be different. More information about password protection of safety related software can be found in ESS-0058389. Initially, no access protection is necessary for test purposes, commissioning, etc. That is, it is allowed to execute all offline and online actions without access protection, but the safety of the system shall be guaranteed through other organizational measures, for example, restricted access to certain areas. To prevent the misuse, the system shall automatically check the collective signature of the safety program (Checksum test) and in case of the software misuse; the system shall go to Alarm mode and PSS system administrator must be informed immediately. Note that checksum will change after any error-free safety software re-generation. In Siemens S7-1500 series, the F-runtime group information DB is used for that purpose, where data about F-signature of the safety program, safety program’s compilation date and F-runtime group collective signature can be found and used for checking. Note that these are standard program data and should not be part of the safety program. SIS = Safety Instrumented System

PSS Configuration Management Objective: To describe the generic configuration management process during the development of Personnel Safety Systems; To ensure procedures to be used for uniquely identifying all constituent parts of hardware and software items. To specify procedures for preventing unauthorized items from entering the process. In addition to IEC 61508: ISO 9001 Quality management systems – Requirements ISO 10007:2004 Quality managements systems – Guidelines for configuration management

Thank you for your attention! Questions? Thank you for your attention!