Coordination with Linear Equations

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Coordination with Linear Equations Adjustment of Affine Incentive with Fixed-Point Iteration Mitri Kitti Audience: engineering economists, optimization theorists

Introduction Classical incentive problems Reward mechanisms, principal-agent games (Groves 1973) Incentive compatibility problems, e.g., nonlinear pricing Affine incentives for two-player dyn. games Existence and applications (Ehtamo & Hämäläinen 1986, 1993,1995) Adjustment and learning Price adjustment (Arrow et al. 1959) Naïve learning, Cournot adjustment (Cournot 1883)

Incentive problem Repeated incentive game The question Coordinator (leader) gives an incentive Agent (follower) reacts optimally Incomplete information The question How to adjust an incentive according to observations such that the follower finally chooses leader’s optimum?

Ideas Parameterization of the problem system of equations Adjustment with fixed-point iteration Convergence analysis Continuous time adjustment

Plans Mathematical analysis of two-player incentive game and adjustment (to JOTA) Application of affine incentives in nonlinear pricing (JEDC) Affine incentive design with several followers application: reward mechanisms Study of related coordination problems constraint proposal methods discrete time price adjustment (Econometrica)