(BOUNDARY CONDITIONS)

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Power Blackout of 2003: Lessons Learned Verizon Technical Support Services-Power Systems Charlie Romano-Director
Advertisements

Generic Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR): Safety Systems Overview
CHAPTER 40 Probability.
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory SCWR Preliminary Safety Considerations Cliff Davis, Jacopo Buongiorno, INEEL Luca Oriani, Westinghouse.
Fault Tree Analysis Part 8 - Probability Calculation.
UL/FM Fire Pump Systems Lunch & Learn 04/18/05
Stats for Engineers Lecture 11. Acceptance Sampling Summary One stage plan: can use table to find number of samples and criterion Two stage plan: more.
RELIABILITY IN A HIERARCHICAL MANAGEMENT. 1 LITERATURE REVIEW & METHODS THE RESULTS OF THE PRESENTATION CONTENT 2 3 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE.
“ Building Strong “ Delivering Integrated, Sustainable, Water Resources Solutions Expert-Opinion Elicitation Robert C. Patev North Atlantic Division –
ACADs (08-006) Covered Keywords Components, functions, operation, Auxiliary feedwater, Startup, hot standby, plant cooldown, emergency. Description Supporting.
Marine Auxiliary Machinery
MIS 5241 Three Mile Island What Happened, What Worked, What Didn’t.
1 Software Testing and Quality Assurance Lecture 38 – Software Quality Assurance.
Event Trees Quantitative Risk Analysis. Event Trees - Overview Definitions Steps Occurrence frequency Mean Time between Shutdown Mean Time Between Runaway.
Basics of Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis Supplement to Fire Hazard Assessment for Nuclear Engineering Professionals Icove and Ruggles (2011) Funded.
CHAPTER 4 CPB 20004: Plant Utility n Maintenance
People Fractions. Problem 1 of 20 Answer 1 = 10 Problem 2 of 20 Answer 2 = 5.
Risk Assessment and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Mario. H. Fontana PhD.,PE Research Professor Arthur E. Ruggles PhD Professor The University of.
Fault Tree Analysis Part 3: Digraph-Based Fault Tree Synthesis Procedure (Tree and NFBL)
MHI 1 Development of Quantitative Reliability Centered Maintenance Method April 27-28,1999 by Shinya Kamata (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd) Hiroshi.
ERT 312 SAFETY & LOSS PREVENTION IN BIOPROCESS RISK ASSESSMENT Prepared by: Miss Hairul Nazirah Abdul Halim.
ERT 322 SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION RISK ASSESSMENT
Frankfurt (Germany), 6-9 June 2011 EL-HADIDY – EG – S5 – 0690 Mohamed EL-HADIDY Dalal HELMI Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company Egypt EXAMPLES OF.
Lesson 8 SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA). QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS Some of the commonly used quantitative risk assessment methods are; 1.Fault tree analysis (FTA)
By Matt Douglass.  The Three Mile Island accident was a partial nuclear meltdown which occurred in one of the two Three Mile Island nuclear reactors.
BINOMIALDISTRIBUTION AND ITS APPLICATION. Binomial Distribution  The binomial probability density function –f(x) = n C x p x q n-x for x=0,1,2,3…,n for.
Sullivan – Fundamentals of Statistics – 2 nd Edition – Chapter 7 Section 5 – Slide 1 of 21 Chapter 7 Section 5 The Normal Approximation to the Binomial.
1 Failures and fault classification Jørn Vatn NTNU
TACIS Project: R8.01/98 – TRANSLATION, EDITING AND DIFFUSION OF DOCUMENTS (Result Dissemination) Probabilistic Safety Analysis Technology (PSA) TACIS R3.1/91.
Futron Corporation 400 Virginia Avenue,SW Suite 340 Washington, DC Phone Fax NASA PRA Practices.
Cost Impacts of Cycling Coal-Fired Power Plants
R ISK A NALYSIS & M ANAGEMENT. Risk – possibility that an undesirable event (called the risk event) could happen – Involve uncertainty and loss – Events.
IAEA Training Course on Safety Assessment of NPPs to Assist Decision Making System Analysis Workshop Information IAEA Workshop City, Country XX - XX Month,
THE SET OF RATIONAL NUMBERS. 1. How can I use Rational Numbers in my every- day life? 2. How can I do basic operations with rational numbers? 3. How can.
Probability “The Study of Chance.”. Probability P(Red ball) = 4 out of 7 = 4/7.
Wind Turbine Power Plant. Sources ●
Course 2 Probability Basics 7.9 and Theoretical Probability Theoretical Probability is the ratio of the number of ways an event can occur to the.
Cryogenics Fault Tree A. Niemi & E. Rogova. Contents 1.Introduction of the current tree structure 2.Failure rates observed in 2015 failure data 3.Unsure.
Fault Tree Analysis for the BLEDP Student meeting Vegard Joa Moseng.
Prof. Enrico Zio Event tree analysis Prof. Enrico Zio Politecnico di Milano Dipartimento di Energia.
Reactive to Proactive Maintenance through LEAN. What is Reactive, Proactive and Lean?
DATA ANALYSIS: THEORY AND PRACTICE by Vicki M. Bier.
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS. NOTATION Series system System fails when either component fails Pump Failure Valve Failure P(system failure) = P(pump failure  valve.
Version 1.0, July 2015 BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module VII Probabilistic Safety Assessment Case Studies This material was prepared by the IAEA.
Gas Turbine Power Plant
Electromagnetic Devices
Date of download: 10/6/2017 Copyright © ASME. All rights reserved.
HYDRAULIC AND PNUEMATIC ACTUATION SYSTEMS
PRA: Validation versus Participation in Risk Analysis PRA as a Risk Informed Decision Making Tool Richard T. Banke– SAIC
Probability 100% 50% 0% ½ Will happen Won’t happen
HAZARD AND FRAGILITY ANALYSIS
Consultant for ARIES Project/UCSD/DOE
Module 3 Domestic Heating/MMA Welding
WIND TURBINE GENERATORS.
EQ programs at Mochovce NPP – Severe Accident Cases
Producing Electric Current
Control System Instrumentation
The Normal Probability Distribution Summary
By; Noor Azira binti Mohd Noor
A Model of Power Transmission Disturbances in Simple Systems
TPM Definitions Goals and Benefits Components GEOP 4316.
EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY AT KOEBERG
Introduction to Fire Ecology
BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module VII Probabilistic Safety Assessment Case Studies Version 1.0, July 2015 This material was prepared.
Introduction to Probability Distributions
Probability.
Probability Models 7. SP.7 Develop a probability model and use it to find probabilities of events. Compare probabilities from a model to observed frequencies;
Introduction to Probability Distributions
‘‘ BUILDING AUTOMATION’’
Presentation transcript:

(BOUNDARY CONDITIONS) SPLIT FRACTIONS (BOUNDARY CONDITIONS)

REASONS FOR FAILURE There are three primary reasons for component failure: Random failure (handled in fault tree) Planned maintenance unavailability (see last time) Lack of needed support (as the result of another failure earlier in the same event tree) Lack of needed support is handled in the event trees: Through the development of different split fractions or boundary conditions The methods are the same as for maintenance 2

BOUNDARY CONDITIONS Consider a system with two motor-driven pumps (MD) and one turbine-driven pump (TD) AFW MD1 MD2 TD3 Alignments: Normal Maint. on MD1 Maint. on MD2 Maint. on TD3 Boundary Condition No power to MD1 Probabilities based on product of maintenance frequency and duration Any one split fraction must consider all possible maintenance alignments: There is no way to know which alignment the plant will be in at the time of an accident! 3

GUARANTEED SUCCESS vs. GUARANTEED FAILURE Boundary conditions can involve either: Guaranteed failure (GF), or Guaranteed success (GS) GF generally means lack of needed support –e.g.: Loss of electric power (EP) Loss of service water GS usually means a system/component is not needed: Due to successes of other systems in the event tree 4

GF EXAMPLE: Start with Maintenance Model Normal Alignment 1∩3 1∩4 2∩3 2∩4 Maintenance on 1 3 4 on 3 1 2 Normal Alignment 1∩3 1∩4 2∩3 2∩4 Maintenance on 1 3 4 on 3 1 2 Normal Alignment 1∩3 1∩4 2∩3 2∩4 Maintenance on 1 3 4 on 3 1 2 Normal Alignment 1∩3 1∩4 2∩3 2∩4 Maintenance on 1 3 4 on 3 1 2 1 2 3 4 (P1P3 + P1P4 + P2P3 + P2P4) P(normal) + (P3 + P4) P(maintenance on 1) + (P1 + P2) P(maintenance on 3) Consider several sets of boundary conditions: GF of 1 GF of 3 GF of 1 and 3 (P3 + P4) [P(normal) + P(maintenance on 1)] + 1 P(maintenance on 3) (P1 + P2) [P(normal) + P(maintenance on 3)] + 1 P(maintenance on 1) 1 [P(normal) + P(maintenance on 1) + P(maintenance on 3)] = 1 5

GUARANTEED SUCCESS vs. GUARANTEED FAILURE Consider a plant in which either main feed water (MFW) or AFW can accomplish the same function Boundary conditions for AFW are: Success (or failure) of MFW (Success or) failure of EP to AFW EP to AFW MFW AFW GS Function is provided by MFW GS Function is provided by MFW (loss of EP to AFW is irrelevant) GF AFW is GF, due to loss of EP 6

GS EXAMPLE: Start with Maintenance Model Normal Alignment 1∩3 1∩4 2∩3 2∩4 Maintenance on 1 3 4 on 3 1 2 Normal Alignment 1∩3 1∩4 2∩3 2∩4 Maintenance on 1 3 4 on 3 1 2 1 2 3 4 (P1P3 + P1P4 + P2P3 + P2P4) P(normal) + (P3 + P4) P(maintenance on 1) + (P1 + P2) P(maintenance on 3) Boundary condition: GS of 2 (P1P3 + P1P4) P(normal) + (P3 + P4) P(maintenance on 1) + P1 P(maintenance on 3) 7

The answer depends on the reasons for GF and GS GS vs. GF What happens if GF due to maintenance combines with GS due to boundary conditions: Or vice versa? The answer depends on the reasons for GF and GS In general, GS will dominate—for example: GF due to maintenance, combined with GS because the function is not needed  GS GS because a valve is locked in desired position, combined with GF due to loss of EP  GS However, GF can dominate in some situations 8