DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR TSO

THE ROLE OF TSOs IN THE NATIONAL SAFETY ORGANIZATION (French example) KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR THE QUALITY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY TSO FOR EXISTING FACILITIES AND FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR FUTURE FACILITIES

MAIN TECHNICAL SUPPORTS IN FRANCE INSTITUTE FOR RADIATION PROTECTION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY (IRSN) Public expert body in charge of the technical assessment and research related to nuclear and radiological risks Supporting the French Public Authorities in the field of safety, security and radiation protection NO PROMOTION OF NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS (Technical Safety Organization) ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CEA) National organization in charge of technical assessment and research related to nuclear and radiological applications Supporting the French Government (Energy Policy) and the Industry PROMOTION OF NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS (Technical Support Organization)

Designers, Constructors POSITION OF IRSN IN THE FRENCH SAFETY ORGANIZATION (Technical Safety Organization) Technical assessments to support regulatory decisions Authorizations Controls Safety Authorities Utilities IRSN Designers, Constructors Research on - process - risk Research on risks Technical relations

POSITION OF IRSN IN THE FRENCH SAFETY AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION Safety Authority for civil application Safety Authority for civil applications Safety Authority for Defense Applications Safety Authority for Defense applications Security Authorithy Security Authority Civil Security Administration (Emergency preparedness) Civil Security Administration (Emergency Preparedness) Labor Authority Food Agency Food Agency Drugs Agency Drugs Agency Food Agency IRSN IRSN Consistency Memory Civil installations Defense installations Sources Industrial applications Medical applications Workers Food Environment Environment Civil installations Defense installations Sources

IRSN RESEARCH (1) IRSN responsible for the research needed for the quality of its assessments (Regulatory research) Research performed by IRSN itself External institutions under IRSN financial support Part of the research performed in cooperation with Industry. Respect of : Independence of IRSN Responsibility of operator

Interest of research performed by TSO : IRSN RESEARCH (2) Interest of research performed by TSO : Easier to focus research on assessment needs and to reach a good appropriation of results Helps to understand research processes in general and to manage external research adequately Enhance scientific credibility of the TSO and its position with respect to he Industry and the public Provides opportunity to hire high level young people and to offer them a career within the TSO

FACILITIES AND FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR THE QUALITY OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY TSO FOR EXISTING FACILITIES AND FACILITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

ASSESSMENT PROCESS (Technical Safety Organization) Objective of assessment = provide authority with a technical advice about a practical decision to be made in a limited time scale ANALYTICAL PROCESS INTEGRATION PROCESS Knowledge of installations Design Modifications Operating Experience Feedback Specialized knowledge Final advice Thermohydraulics Mechanics Metallurgy Fire Neutronics Criticality Fuel Radiation protection Human factors Environment …

CONDITIONS FOR QUALITY OF ASSESSMENTS (ANALYTICAL PROCESS) TSO should be in close contact with installations and aware of Operating Experience Feedback (National and International) TSO should be aware of latest technical and scientific results Strong connection with R and D TSO should have efficient data bases (installations, sites, events, previous assessments, technical data, regulation …) with efficient knowledge management systems

NECESSITY TO EXTEND PRESENT KNOWLEDGE BASE Initiatives from Industry ex : Fuel Reduction of uncertainties Sump clogging, source term Aging ex : cables, materials Human and organizational factures ex : assessment of organizations New requirements ex : severe accidents for generation III reactors Public expectations ex : effect of chronic exposures IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (NEA)

CONDITIONS FOR QUALITY OF ASSESSMENTS (INTEGRATION PROCESS) Appropriation of Safety Fundamentals (as defined by IAEA) Working procedures and strong common culture allowing : Discussion between experts having different backgrounds and specialties Proper weighting of the different aspects Technical basis for the integration process : Defense in depth Operating experience feedback Probabilistic Safety Assessment Radiation protection principles

KNOWLEDGE BASE NECESSARY FOR FUTURE FACILITIES

GENERAL APPROACH TO PREPARE THE ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE INSTALLATIONS BEFORE THE CONCEPTS ARE DEFINED Follow-up of orientations and concepts discussed at national and international levels (ex : GEN IV) Gathering of existing knowledge, particularly on installations which were already built Design experience Operational experience R and D Follow-up and participation to the efforts devoted to the definition of safety and security of future installations as well as assessment methods (INPRO, MDEP,…) Difficult to perform efficient work if no choice of type of installation Huge domain Limited resources

FOURTH GENERATION REACTORS FRENCH DECISIONS (1) Engage conception of fourth generation of nuclear reactors with possible industrial operation in 2040 Requirements : Reduction of wastes Saving of uranium Increase of safety and security Reduction of proliferation risks Three steps defined : Experimental reactor ( ± 50 MW) Prototype reactor Industrial reactor

FOURTH GENERATION REACTORS FRENCH DECISIONS (2) Main option SFR 2012 : definition of design options decision to construct a prototype 2020 : start of prototype Second option GFR 2012 : possible decision to construct experimental reactor 2020 : start of experimental reactor Possible development of HTR or VHTR by Industry

TASKS OF TSO AFTER CONCEPTS ARE DEFINED Follow-up of development of concepts by Industry Support the Safety Authority to define the safety requirements for new installations Discuss with Industry on potential and proposed orientations for safety demonstration (with preservation of independence of TSO) Complement or develop the necessary knowledge base inside TSO Identify the critical subjects needing knowledge development and possibly research performed by TSO Participate to international exchanges

EXAMPLES OF NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BASE Core Neutronics (SFR and GFR) In-service inspection of internal structures (SFR) Management of loss of coolant accidents (GFR) Accidental behavior of high temperature fuels (GFR and possibly SFR) Risk of propagation of a local fusion in the core (SFR and possibly GFR) Radioactive transfers within the circuits in case of an accident (GFR)  Schedule might be very tight !

Underground waste repository Tightness of seals Fusion reactors EXAMPLES OF NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR OTHER FACILITIES Underground waste repository Tightness of seals Fusion reactors Solicitation of structures due to plasma disruption

CONCLUSIONS Difference exists between Technical Safety Organization Support to Regulatory Authority No promotion of nuclear applications Technical Support Organization Support to Government (Energy Policy) and Industry Promotion of nuclear applications Existing facilities and facilities under construction Necessary knowledge base for TSO Installations High level technical subjects Working methods and concepts to perform integration of the different aspects of the assessments Further development of knowledge base and research still necessary Future facilities Choice of concepts allows to start to define the necessary knowledge base developments Research will be necessary Schedule might be tight