Software Verification 2 Automated Verification

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Verification by Model Checking. 2 Part 1 : Motivation.
Advertisements

Information Security of Embedded Systems : Design of Secure Systems Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik und Fraunhofer FIRST.
Information Security of Embedded Systems : Embedded Systems Design Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik und Fraunhofer FIRST.
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Metodi formali dello sviluppo software a.a.2013/2014 Prof.Anna Labella.
M ODEL CHECKING -Vasvi Kakkad University of Sydney.
Temporal Logic and the NuSMV Model Checker CS 680 Formal Methods Jeremy Johnson.
CS6133 Software Specification and Verification
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
SAT and Model Checking. Bounded Model Checking (BMC) A.I. Planning problems: can we reach a desired state in k steps? Verification of safety properties:
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der.
© Katz, 2007CS Formal SpecificationsLecture - Temporal logic 1 Temporal Logic Formal Specifications CS Shmuel Katz The Technion.
Discrete Abstractions of Hybrid Systems Rajeev Alur, Thomas A. Henzinger, Gerardo Lafferriere and George J. Pappas.
Information Security of Embedded Systems : Public Key Cryptosystems, Communication Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik und Fraunhofer.
Formal Methods of Systems Specification Logical Specification of Hard- and Software Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Information Security of Embedded Systems : Logics and Proof Methods, Wrap-Up Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik und Fraunhofer.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für.
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für.
Copyright 2001, Matt Dwyer, John Hatcliff, and Radu Iosif. The syllabus and all lectures for this course are copyrighted materials and may not be used.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer.
6/12/20161 a.a.2015/2016 Prof. Anna Labella Formal Methods in software development.
Software Verification 1 Deductive Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität und Fraunhofer Institut.
Complexity of Compositional Model Checking of Computation Tree Logic on Simple Structures Krishnendu Chatterjee Pallab Dasgupta P.P. Chakrabarti IWDC 2004,
SS 2017 Software Verification Timed Automata
SS 2017 Software Verification Automated Verification
SS 2017 Software Verification Bounded Model Checking, Outlook
SS 2017 Software Verification SMT Solving, Partial Order Methods
SS 2017 Software Verification Probabilistic modelling – DTMC / MDP
Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff 1,2 Dr. Esteban Pavese 1
Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff 1,2 Dr. Esteban Pavese 1
SS 2017 Software Verification LTL monitoring
SS 2017 Software Verification Software Model Checking 2 - Parallelism
SS 2018 Software Verification FOL to ML
SS 2018 Software Verification LTL Satisfiability applied
SS 2018 Software Verification ML, state machines
SS 2017 Software Verification CTL model checking, BDDs
SS 2017 Software Verification Tableaus, CTL model checking
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification
SS 2018 Software Verification Strategic Reasoning
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification
SS 2017 Software Verification Modal Logics
Formal Methods in software development
Software Verification 2 Automated Verification
Formal Methods in software development
Formal Methods in software development
Formal Methods in software development
Program correctness Branching-time temporal logics
Presentation transcript:

Software Verification 2 Automated Verification Prof. Dr. Holger Schlingloff Institut für Informatik der Humboldt Universität and Fraunhofer Institut für Rechnerarchitektur und Softwaretechnik

Recap: LTL and CTL Kripke models = LTS Expressively equivalent to FOL (<) on linear orders Arguably more intuitive to use Kripke models = LTS branching time – possibility properties linear time – fairness properties CTL* subsumes both CTL and LTL 24.5.2012

Safety and Liveness 24.5.2012

Some Theorems Every LTL formula can be written in one of these forms (where p is a pure past formula) Every LTL safety property is expressible as G*φ (where φ is pure past) Every LTL formula can be written as reactivity ⋀(G*F*φ  F*G*ψ) All the inclusions are strict All the non-inclusions are provable (dualities) e.g. F*G*p cannot be expressed as G*F*φ Conjunction and disjunction of a recurrence is a recurrence G*F*p  G*F*q = G*F*(p  -p U-q) G*F*p  G*F*q = G*F*(p  q) Obligations can be expressed as recurrences and persistences G*p = G*F*H*p, F*p = G*F*P*p , where H*p = ¬P*¬p 12.4.2012

Safety and Liveness Properties Proof of decomposition theorem: φs={w0w1... | for every i, w0w1... wi is a prefix of φ} φl= φ{w0w1... | for some i, w0w1... wi is not a prefix of φ} show: φs is safety, φl is liveness, φ = φs  φl 24.5.2012

Examples (p U+ q) = ((p W+ q)  F+ q) G*(p  F*q) = (G*p  G*F*q) G*p  G*q = G*(H*p  H*q) (gilt nur initial, im Anfangspunkt!) Total program correctness = invariance  termination other direction does not hold 24.5.2012