The Dynamics of Risk: Changing Technologies, Complex Systems and Collective Action in Uncertain Environments Louise K. Comfort, University of Pittsburgh, Center of Disaster Management Thomas W. Haase, Sam Houston State University Gunes Etran, Koc University

Agenda Policy Problem Literature Review Research Questions Data and Methods Findings and Discussion Policy Recommendations

Policy Problem Policy Problem: Communities are systems of systems, which are threated by risks, that if actualized, can become cascading failures (Perrow 1984) Policy Paradox: As size and scope of these risks increase, the capacity of the organizational systems charged to respond to such risks decrease Differences in terminology, training, expertise, resources and culture Confusion (and tensions) about roles and areas of responsibility Challenges of communication, collaboration and coordination Policy Challenge: To create a response system comprised of organizations from different backgrounds that has a sufficiently common set of skills, knowledge, and capacities to function collaboratively

Twin Streams of Relevant Literature Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework (Ostrom, 2005) Insights into how to build institutions whose interactions endure over time Considers “nested sets”: smaller units function within graduated sets of larger units Smaller units benefit from larger units and contribute to system performance Effective event response requires the mobilization of collective action: Organizations must manage transition from normal to response operations (Solé, 2011) Information infrastructure is critical for situational awareness (Comfort, 1988) Information access facilitates self-organization in artificial systems (Simon, 1962) Organizational networks can operate as complex adaptive systems (Newman, 2003)

Research Questions Research Proposition: Adjustments to the processes and policies that guide organizational activities and interactions within a disaster response network can affect that network’s capacity to self-organize. Research Questions: Focusing on two sets of real-world response networks that emerged at two different points in time: What was the organizational composition of the response networks? How quickly did organizations in the response networks become active? To what extent did the structure of the response networks change during the time that passed between two disaster events? To what extent did adjustments to process and policy after the first disaster event explain the changes detected in the network structures of the response system after the second disaster event?

Comparative Case Studies State of Louisiana State of Texas Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005, Category 5 $108b damages; ~1500 fatalities Response failure Hurricane Gustav September 1, 2008, Category 4 $6.6b damages; ~112 fatalities Successful, Katrina lessons learned Hurricane Rita September 24, 2005, Category 5 $12b damages; ~125 fatalities Coordination and evacuation failure Hurricane Ike September 13, 2008, Category 4 $37b damages; ~103 fatalities Organized and Responsive

Data Collection and Coding Articles pushed in Times Picayune, LA and Houston Chronicle, TX Represented daily local record of events within each response system Three week period (4 days prior to landfall; ~22 days after landfall) Also collected SITREPS and after action reports; and Legal and budget data about disaster management in LA and TX Network Data Coding Identified response system organizations and their interactions ESF Classifications used to determine relevance (FEMA 2004) Organizations coded by level of jurisdiction and source of funding Interactions coded as binary, non-directional links

Louisiana Response Networks Hurricane Katrina, 2005 Hurricane Gustav, 2008

Texas Response Networks Hurricane Rita, 2005 Hurricane Ike, 2008

Q1 Findings: Network Composition Total Number of Interacting Organizations LA: decrease from 372 to 222 TX: increase from 214 to 372 Jurisdictional Involvement (% of total) LA: increase in county from 16% to 28% TX: increase in city from 26% to 43% SOF Involvement (% of total) – not shown LA: Nonprofit increase, private decrease TX: Nonprofit increase, public decrease

Q2 Findings: Network Activation Louisiana: Possible improvement detected Katrina: Landfall: 24.5% active Full Activation: 20 days after landfall Gustav: Landfall: 25.2% active Full Activation: 17 days after landfall Texas: Improvement not detected Rita: Landfall: 36.9% active Ike: Landfall: 12.6% active Full Activation: 22 days after landfall

Q3 Findings: Network Structure Louisiana: Possible improvement Both networks increasingly connected Katrina network more connected at landfall Gustav then more connected and stable Gustav demonstrated change earlier Fire fighting, debris removal, service distribution Texas: Improvement unknown Rita network more connected at landfall Ike then became much more connected Ike demonstrated several points of change Ike network less stable than Rita network

Q4 Findings: Policy Change Federal Government: amended Homeland Security Act of 2002 in 2006 Restored FEMA’s status, and created the National Integration Center (NIC) Promoted collaboration through training, credentialing and common standards Office of Emergency Communications created National Emergency Communications Plan modified Louisiana: amended Homeland Security & Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act in 2006 Placed GOHSEP under Governor’s office; to coordinate activities among jurisdictions EOP required to identify agency responsibilities and priorities needed for coordinated response Invested +$180 million dollars in the development of the Louisiana Wireless Information Network Texas: amended the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 in 2007 Required appointment of emergency management directors and mandatory training Established statewide mutual aid system (formal written agreements not needed) Many provisions did not become active until several months before Hurricane Ike

Discussion / Implications Although our findings are preliminary, this study detected structural change in Louisiana and Texas response networks Louisiana: possible improvement (faster activation / bigger change at earlier time) Texas: improvement unknown (slower activation / less stability over time) While both states initiated policy changes, there are critical differences: Louisiana’s legal changes were much more extensive Louisiana’s legal change were enacted earlier than in Texas These differences likely encouraged a significant transition in emergency preparedness investment and training, particularly at the sub-state levels Louisiana’s investment in a statewide wireless communications network appears to have improved communications among actors in the network

Policy Recommendations Common recognition of risk is essential for policy change Must avoid our dependence on focusing events (Birkland 1997; 1998). System capacity requires learning and adaptation at all levels Critical to include actors from all jurisdictions and all sectors Organizational design and training matter Need both structure (clarity of role) and flexibility (mutual assistance) Continued investment in information infrastructure is essential Information collection and dissemination critical, as evidenced in Louisiana

Thank You This research made possible due to the financial support of: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh Center for Disaster Management, University of Pittsburgh