Desirable BCM Performance

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Construction Method, Material Selection & Building Services
Advertisements

WORKING WITH X-RAYS Dr D E Dugdale October 2012 KEELE UNIVERSITY.
2.2 STRUCTURAL ELEMENT Reinforced Concrete Slabs
1 Activation problems S.Agosteo (1), M.Magistris (1,2), Th.Otto (2), M.Silari (2) (1) Politecnico di Milano; (2) CERN.
F.G. Garcia X37981 chopper Linac cable tray Cable penetration Overall View from the Linac Bridge Beam direction.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Presentation to ASAC R. Casey Radiation Shielding: Assumption and Design April 24, 2007.
Fire protection – Combustible Shielding in Instrumental Buildings Daniel Rosberg - WSP AB Dan Madsen – Grontmij AB Fredrik Jörud – ESS AB.
PROBLEM: Radiation Dose Rate in IR2 When IR1 is Operating (and Vice Versa) Muon Dose Rate > 1 mRem/hr for 0.1% Collimated Halo.
G2p Safety Readiness Review January 17, 2012 Expected Radiation Exposure Levels from Activated Local Dump George Kharashvili, Radiation Control.
1 Status of infrastructure MICE Video Conference, August 17, 2005 Yury Ivanyushenkov Applied Science Division, Engineering and Instrumentation Department.
C. Theis, D. Forkel-Wirth, S. Roesler, H. Vincke.
UCN Phase 2 Design Status September 10, Design Components Bulk Shielding Target Crypt Cryogenic Insert Target Insert UCN Port Beam Window Cooling.
BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Radiological Design Considerations of Synchrotron Radiation Facilities P.K. Job Radiation Physicist National Synchrotron.
Broadway Street Viaduct Improvement, Pre-Load Testing and Geotech Report Workshop Consultant Presentation Iowa DOT 2 nd April 2007.
Plain & Reinforced Concrete-1 CE-313
20 Minute C-11, 10 Minute N-13 and 2 Minute O-15 Gas Emissions from BLIP Collider-Accelerator Department Take 5 for Safety.
SHMS Optics and Background Studies Tanja Horn Hall C Summer Meeting 5 August 2008.
October 13, 2006 Global Design Effort 1 International Linear Collider Machine Detector Interface Materials for discussion at Engineering Forum: experiences.
SEAN BEVILLE STRUCTURAL OPTION ADVISOR: PROF. BOOTHBY APRIL 13, 2009 TEMECULA MEDICAL CENTER “STRUCTURAL SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION” THE DEPARTMENT OF ARCHITECTURAL.
Thanks to Andrei for slides October 26, 一般報告 Hitoshi Yamamoto, Oct 26, 2006.
Nicole C. Drabousky Pennsylvania State University Architectural Engineering Structural Option Spring 2006 Senior Thesis Presentation.
Framing the House. Platform Framing Platform framing.
The Status of ESS Accelerator Shielding and Accident Scenarios Lali Tchelidze May 26, 2014.
HAPL Concrete Shielding Requirements Mohamed Sawan UW Fusion Technology Inst. HAPL Project Meeting UW-Madison October 22-23, 2008.
NLCTA Safety Audit Radiation Safety Review W. R. Nelson 9 November 2001.
D. Beavis (RSC) May 4, 2010 EBIS ARR Radiation Safety.
Status of Radiation Protection studies in support of ELENA R. Froeschl and J. Vollaire DGS-RP-AS.
Introduction From a neutron flux (> 20 MeV), with the Leaching model (Lessard) based on SBMS (Tables 1 and 2):
Progress on Remote Handling Systems TAC 12 Magnus Göhran – WPM 15 th October 2015.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES NSLS2 Bulk Shielding calculations Methodology P.K. Job Radiation Physicist Peer Review 2007 March 27, 2007.
Required Dimensions of HAPL Core System with Magnetic Intervention Mohamed Sawan Carol Aplin UW Fusion Technology Inst. Rene Raffray UCSD HAPL Project.
Overview of HINS Operations and Radiation Shielding Considerations in the Meson Detector Building Bob Webber August 16, 2006.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Summary of Shielding Calculations for NSLS2 Accelerators P.K. Job Radiation Physicist Peer Review 2007 March
Gamma Shielding Calculations
Radiation Protection studies for the Linac4 / Linac2 interface Joachim Vollaire, DGS-RP 28/09/2015 Linac4 Coordination Meeting.
1 Radiation Monitoring at CTF3 CTF3 Buildings – weak spots Radiation Monitoring system Monitoring results – First Lessons Idelette Floret, Thomas Otto,
Summary of radiation shielding studies for MTA Muon production at the MiniBooNE target Igor Rakhno August 24, 2006.
Booster bpm’s Jim Crisp 3/29/06. Plate width and linearity with the response linearized along the axis 60 and 20 degree plates become nonlinear in the.
UITF ODH Assessment UITF Safety Review May 10, 2016.
Layout and conventional facility N.Terunuma KEK. Conventional facility 1 Layout of beam line should be fixed until end of June We have to start.
Long-Baseline Neutrino Facility LBNF Beamline optimization schedule Vaia Papadimitriou LBNF Beamline Manager Accelerator and Beam Interface Group Meeting.
CHANGE OF ACCESS CONTROLS TO SERVICE BUILDINGS DURING BEAM PERMIT Vashek Vylet StayTreat, July 17, 2015.
Fermilab Limited Scope Accelerator Readiness Review (ARR) October 1 -3, 2013 Technical Breakout Session 2A Radiological Safety for 700 kW Operations.
Prompt dose upstream the 12-ft concrete shielding blocks Igor Rakhno May 4, 2007.
1 Target Station Design Dan Wilcox February 2012.
Radiation protection studies for the ESS Activation issues AD seminar Michał Jarosz , Lund.
Primary Radiation Calculation for Sun Yat-Sen Proton Hospital
Shielding Design for LCLS Injector Operation – Phase one
Introduction Used for covering spaces in the form of roof or floor
Radiation protection of Linac4 M. Silari Radiation Protection Group
C100 Activation Status and Projections JLab Ops Staytreat 2016
Radiation Physics requirements for the IR
Vashek Vylet RadCon Manager UITF Internal Safety Review May 10, 2016
Upgraded Injector Test Facility
Framing the House                                                                                                                   
Source term test in Hall C
Upgraded Injector Test Facility - UITF
Resident Physics Lectures
Andreas Jansson, Lali Tchelidze
Fassò, N. Nakao, H. Vincke Aug. 2, 2005
Upgraded Injector Test Facility
Photons centered on collimator
2.2 STRUCTURAL ELEMENT Reinforced Concrete Slabs
Masonry Bearing Walls.
Operations Section Leader
Upgraded Injector Test Facility
Maximum Credible Beam Event Paul Emma et al
Neutron guide Shielding Concept
UITF Conduct of Operations Review
Vashek Vylet, RadCon UITF Conduct of Operations Review April 24, 2019
Presentation transcript:

Desirable BCM Performance Vashek Vylet UITF BCM discussion, October 21, 2016

Radiation Exposure Constraints Normal operation (per Shielding Policy) < 250 mrem/y in occupied RCAs < 100 mrem/y in other occupied areas (< 50 mrem/h) < 10 mrem/y at site boundary Max. credible accident: <15 rem per incident

Layout CAVE 1 CAVE 2

Shielding Design – Phase 1 CAVE 2 – HDIce operation at 10 MeV for 900 h/y Iav = 5 nA for 80% of time Iav = 100 nA for 20% of time (180 h) concrete shielding: 4 ft lateral and 1.75 ft roof CAVE 1 Iav = 100 mA when not running HDIce, beam terminated in FC before Cave 2 55”/27” lateral and 30” roof shielding

Cave 2 TOTAL BEAM LOSS D [mrem/h] Note Cave 2, 1 uA, side 0.44 RCA Cave 2, 1 uA, roof 55.21 RA Cave 2, 100 nA, side 0.044 just < RCA Cave 2, 100 nA, roof 5.52 If total losses above are very unlikely, how can we justify a lower loss assumption? A loss of 200 nA may be tollerated, considering HDIce will run only 900 h/y BCM should reliably catch Iav > 200 nA within ≤ 2 minutes

Cave 1 Cave 1 shielding as is; Iav = 100 mA is desired in cave 1 Cave 2 has 4 ft forward and lateral concrete shielding, with a 1.75 ft thick roof Beam ends in a well shielded FARC at 42” beam height

Cave 1 at 100 mA CAVE 1 Dose rate [mrem/h] Note Side 100% loss 41 RA   [mrem/h] Note Side 100% loss 41 RA Side 1% loss 0.4 RCA High Side 1% loss 26 Thinner wall may be an issue for stairs (and ground due to skyshine). Cable penetrations under west wall must be filled with grout or similar 28” 27” 30”

Cave 1 at 100 mA CAVE 1 Dose rate   [mrem/h] Roof 100% loss 2973 Roof 1% 30 Penet* 100% 40621 Penet* 1% 406 * with current 3.25" Fe shield 30” concrete 3” steel 7.8” steel Penetrations are above the beamline – about 8” of steel is needed for same attenuation as the 30” concrete slab. Roof will have to be inaccessible; Depending on results of measurements, full 100 mA may not be feasible at 10 MeV; Existing BCM would catch a 1% loss (1mA)

Summary Side shielding can (just) handle a full 100 nA loss continuously, if we forget skyshine Short episodes of higher beam loss can be tolerated as mis-stearing, providing they are reliably terminated in < 2 min Recommendation: BCM should reliably detect beam loss of 200 nA at most