BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XVI Emergency preparedness and response Case Studies Overall instructions - Case studies can be conducted.

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BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE Module XVI Emergency preparedness and response Case Studies Overall instructions - Case studies can be conducted frontally with instructor facilitating - Cases are initiating points for discussions - Or they can be conducted as work sessions depending on time constraints, number and profile of participants - Participants to be divided into smaller groups with leaders - Each group (lead) to present results at the end - Or a combination, some frontally and some in group sessions - It is strongly recommended to use experience and real world information, given by instructor or participants - Participants may refer the text book of Module 16 and their notes taken during lectures All graphics © Marjan Tkavc Version 1.0, November 2015 This material was prepared by the IAEA and co-funded by the European Union. 

Case 1: Responsibilities Determine level of responsibility (Operator, Off-site, International): Protect people on-site Notify IAEA Provide radiological monitoring Implement protective actions off-site Provide support to the facility Public communication Provide medical treatment Notify and exchange official information among international community Coordinate the inter-agency response Notify and keep off-site authorities informed Provide advice and assistance, if requested Perform assessment and prognosis Mitigate the emergency Objective - To make a recap of key activities and responsible organizations NOTES - Some activities, such as public information, may be covered by more than one organization - The list is taken from the text book of Module 16, Chapter 4, Table 4.2 - Off-site refers to off-site authorities

Case 2: Protective actions and pathways Which protective action protects against: Cloud shine Ground shine Inhalation Ingestion Inadvertent ingestion Skin contamination Objectives - To recap the protective actions - To make connection between protective actions and related exposure pathways

Case 3: The Blue NPP The Blue NPP is a 1000 MWe PWR, commissioned in the 1980s It is located in Neverland, near the town of Beehere - The Case 3 consists of a series of sub cases - After introductory slides, they can be used separately Instruction Points - Imaginary situation - An average Gen II NPP - Describe the map to provide background information - NPP on the river - Two towns - A highway and some local roads - Flat terrain and hills to the north and south

Case 3: The Blue NPP /Cont. Emergency planning zones and population: No early warning system PAZ 3 km 10.000 UPZ 10 km 40.000 EPD 25 km 100.000 ICPD 250 km 2 M Instruction Points - Are sizes of the planning zones in line with the IAEA recommendation? Possible reasons for not being in line? Any real world examples? - Explain early warning system (EWS) and its purpose NOTES - Population number is cumulative, e.g. UPZ = PAZ + 30.000

Case 3.1: Challenges in ITB arrangements For ITB there is a national stockpile of stable iodine pills located 100 km away There is no operational plan for distribution of the pills  Identify challenges authorities would face when implementing ITB Instruction Points - Repeat basics of ITB - Ask participants - Time is crucial for ITB to be effective - Shortly before exposure or as soon after as possible - Iodine uptake is blocked by 50% even after a delay of several hours - Make an estimation of time needed to implement ITB in this case - Conclusion: Pre-distribution is needed or at least stockpiles on location NOTES - KI = Potassium Iodide, chemical compound of iodine pills for ITB

Case 3.2: Challenges in Evacuation Evacuation plan not updated, no duration estimate Evacuation to be carried out by private vehicles The town of Beehere is split by the river, with only two bridges  Identify evacuation routes and challenges when implementing evacuation Instruction Points - Repeat basics of evacuation - Ask participants - Organized evacuation is crucial for safety and timeliness - Evacuation plan - Clear instructions what to do, where to go - Arrangements in place for reaching out to people with instructions - Information material provided in advance in preparedness phase - Evacuation routes signposted in advance in preparedness phase - Possible evacuation routes in this case? - The river - good or bad? (+ divides the town, physically dictates evacuation routes, - traffic jam on the bridges, if they are not controlled) - How far should reception points be? - Make an estimation of time needed to implement evacuation in this case - Conclusion: Plan is needed, including duration estimate NOTES Protection strategy used by Neverland: - Evacuation when General emergency -> Evacuate PAZ -> Evacuate UPZ, after completing PAZ - No evacuation is planned outside PAZ

Case 3.3: General Emergency An event and the Blue NPP declares General Emergency At 07:45 hours, working day, no release detected/reported yet  Outline major actions by the NPP and off-site authorities  Challenges? Instruction Points - Repeat concept of operations - Ask participants, refer to the Module 16 textbook, Chapter 4.3 - This can be as detail as time permits - Make sure to cover at least - Notification to off-site - Off-site activation - Ordering evacuation within PAZ + giving instructions - Public communication - Closing-off the area (transportation …), etc. - Challenges? - It is early in the morning on a working day! - Off-site authorities are reluctant to order evacuation (release is not expected), violating the plan

Case 3.4: Release Small release is reported by the NPP at 10:15 hours  Challenges? Evacuation on-going! Instruction Points - Where are we with evacuation? Delta t = 2.5 h - If it was not ordered this would be the trigger to finally order it, or NOT? - Since no EWS, no measurements off-site yet - Continue with evacuation? Refer to the EPR-NPP PPA NOTES - EPR-NPP PPA: „Evacuation at speeds greater than walking speed (about 5 km/h), even in the plume (i.e. during a release), is more effective than sheltering … „

Case 3.5: Large release Large release is reported by the NPP at 13:00 hours Release outside UPZ!  Challenges? Wind direction, precipitation … Instruction Points - Release outside UPZ - What protective action to take? - Given the weather? - Given evacuation was not planned beyond UPZ at all? - Change in wind direction – impact on actions? Evacuating in all directions. - Precipitation in one area – bad? Refer to Fukushima NOTES - In Fukushima precipitation resulted in exceeding OILs for evacuation in areas as far as 40 km away

Case 3.6: Actions after A few days after release, aerial survey is performed, ground dose rate map is shown; colours correspond to OILs  Identify further actions and challenges Instruction Points - Aerial monitoring is best to get an overview of situation quickly, but hot spots are not identified - Dose rate map shows contamination in line with the two releases and precipitation - Evacuation is warranted outside UPZ! - Did the survey cover big enough area? What about south east? - Conclusion: - Preparedness was not successful (zones too small, plans not updated, ITB no prepared for …) NOTES - OIL 1 Red: > 1000 micro Sv/h – evacuate - OIL 2 Orange: > 25 micro Sv/h – relocate - OIL 3 Yellow: > 1 micro Sv/h – stop consumption and distribution of local produce ... - NONE – normal levels, none action at this point See: GSG-2 or EPR-NPP PPA

Case 3.7: If national border is close Imagine now that the NPP is located close to national border What does this change?  Identify further challenges Instruction Points - Point our that such situation is surprisingly common - Notifying neighbouring country - Sharing event status data - Harmonization of implemented protective actions across the border - Harmonization of arrangements in preparedness stage – bilateral agreements - Evacuation routes of Neverland NOTES - Refer to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident The views expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.