The Ethics of Animal Use

Animal use: some preliminaries *What are some varieties of animal use? *Human use of animals for food is perfectly natural. Does its being natural make it morally permissible? *Are some forms of use mutually beneficially? *Are some uses practically necessary? *What are some examples of animal use that are prima facie morally wrong/unjust/exploitative?

The Catholic Tradition Following St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas claimed that animals and plants exist for our use and consequently have no moral standing. Anything goes? Not quite. Cruelty towards animals is morally problematic insofar as it is likely to encourage morally problematic character traits like viciousness. It is not wrong in itself. *Worries?

Beyond inter-personal ethics: the need for ethical theory Which of our practices of using animals are morally justified (if any)? To answer this question effectively, we need to know what counts as a good moral justification. That is, we need the correct ethical theory. Further, we need to apply the theory correctly to the matter at hand.

Moral standing When does a creature have a moral status or standing? That is, when is a creature such that it can be morally wronged? The project: to settle this issue in a principled, non-arbitrary, non-biased manner. We will limit ourselves to the classic utilitarian (Bentham, Mill, Singer) and deontological (Kant, Regan) discussions of these issues.

The utilitarian tradition (Bentham) “The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs…are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse? …the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

Bentham’s criterion *Does Bentham’s criterion for moral standing seem arbitrary/contrived? Or does his inclusion of (at least some) animals seem principled given his understanding of what morality is all about? *Do you worry at all that Bentham has set the bar too low for moral standing? *Do you think we sometimes have enough evidence to make reasonable judgments about whether an animal is suffering?

What is it to suffer? Plausibly the capacity for suffering requires more than the capacity to detect & respond to bodily damage. (Plants have that!) And more than just failure to satisfy a want/need. *Does it require a negative attitude in the form of an evaluative judgment? *Does it require phenomenal consciousness?

The deontological tradition (Kant) “The fact that the human being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By this he is a person....that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion.” “If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog… but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.”

Two readings of Kant Kant’s emphasis on autonomy/personhood/rational agency can be interpreted in at least two ways: Objective worth interpretation. The moral standing of persons is due to their having a special type of worth/dignity/value. (cf. Regan) Constructivist/contractualist interpretation. The moral standing of persons is due to their capacity to reflectively endorse and conform to rules for coordinating the actions of rational agents.

Contractualism and animals *How might the contractualist defend the idea that animals still have an indirect moral standing?

Bentham & Kant on moral standing *Why are the following not required? Being a member of the human species. Having a soul. *Why are the following not sufficient? Being alive. Having a capacity to reason.

Worries about the classic positions *Why might Kant’s autonomy requirement seem problematic? (Does it rule out creatures we commonsensically agree have moral standing?) And why might it be problematic to suppose that our duties to animals are only indirect? *Does Bentham’s view have the consequence that animals have an equal moral standing? Why might that be an unhappy consequence of his view?

The worries illustrated The case of the turtle torturer. Ivan loves all living beings and treats them with great compassion—with one exception. He despises turtles, and tortures them in private whenever his schedule allows. There is no reason to worry that Ivan’s character will be further corrupted: he is an old man with a firm and settled character. *Why is this case worrisome for the Kantian? The case of the indiscriminate torturer. Igor has a torture chamber with a variety of animals trapped in cages, including both turtles and humans. You only have time to rescue a few of the captives. *Why is this case worrisome for the utilitarian?

A philosophical puzzle Is there no principled middle ground between these extremes of no direct duties & equal moral standing?

Regan on rights “[W]e are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death—all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As the same is true of those animals that concern us (the ones that are eaten and trapped, for example), they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.”

Regan on rights *How does Regan avoid the problems facing Kant and contractualists more generally (i.e. that animals, babies, and the senile have merely an indirect moral standing)? *Of course, Regan is still a deontologist, so his view is importantly different from Bentham’s utilitarianism. How might his view differ from utilitarianism with respect to treatment of animals? *Worries about Regan’s view?

Worries facing Regan In avoiding the worries facing Kant (i.e. that animals and babies will have merely an indirect moral standing), Regan has fallen into the same problem facing Bentham! Even worse, Regan does not seem to allow for animal use when it is a practical necessity. How can Regan block the move, made by Swiss legislators, of extending rights to plants? We seem to have nothing more than intuition to go on in determining what has dignity/objective value!

The problem of equal standing Utilitarians Mill and Singer want to avoid the consequence that animals have an equal moral standing. So does Regan, a deontologist. *How might we do so?

Higher and lower pleasures A classic response going back to Mill is to claim that human beings have greater moral standing because they are capable of greater happiness. Greater by what measure? Mill’s intersubjective standard: the better of two sorts of pleasures are the ones subjects typically prefer, upon having experienced both types. *How might we exploit this measure to show that humans have a greater moral standing? Does this look like a promising strategy?

A related suggestion When forced to decide between the interests of humans and animals, we might reasonably prefer humans because humans are capable of meaningful activities (e.g. pursuits aimed Truth, Beauty, and Goodness). *Does this seem like a promising strategy?

Is death a harm to an animal, to anyone? Why does death seem like a bad thing for the one who dies? What reason do you have for fearing death, setting aside the impact on others. Let’s assume that death is the annihilation of the self. A painful process of dying could be a harm, but how could the event of passing into non-existence (death) be a harm? That moment you cease to exist is also the beginning of a time when nothing good or bad can happen to you, right? You don’t exist!

Deprivation account of death’s badness does not extend to chickens The event of dying (understood as passing into non- existence) is bad for the one who dies to the extent that her life as a whole would have been more desirable to her had she survived. A chicken cannot conceive of its life as a whole. If a chicken cannot conceive of its life as a whole, she cannot care about how her life as a whole goes. Hence, untimely death cannot deprive a chicken of anything she cares about and so cannot be bad for her.