Towards End-to-End Data Protection in Low-Powered Networks

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Efficient Public Key Infrastructure Implementation in Wireless Sensor Networks Wireless Communication and Sensor Computing, ICWCSC International.
Advertisements

IP Security IPSec 2 * Essential Network Security Book Slides. IT352 | Network Security |Najwa AlGhamdi 1.
Wireless ABS system By: Srej Balázs Pereira Raymond Alejandro Escalada Arto Toppinen Anssi Suhonen Savonia Polytechnic.
TinySec: A Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks C. Karlof, N. Sastry, D. Wagner SPINS: Security Protocol for Sensor Networks A.
1 CS 577 “TinySec: A Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks” Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, David Wagner UC Berkeley Summary presented.
Symmetric Key Distribution Protocol with Hybrid Crypto Systems Tony Nguyen.
Chapter 15 – Part 2 Networks The Internal Operating System The Architecture of Computer Hardware and Systems Software: An Information Technology Approach.
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, David Culler, J.D. Tygar Research Topics in Security in the context.
TinySec: Link Layer Security Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, David Wagner University of California, Berkeley Presenter: Todd Fielder.
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, Victor Wen, David Culler, and J.D. Tygar – University of California, Berkeley.
Wireless Sensor Network Security Anuj Nagar CS 590.
An Overview of the Smart Grid David K. Owens Chair, AABE Legislative Issues and Public Policy Committee AABE Smart Grid Working Group Webinar September.
Chapter 15 – Part 2 Networks The Internal Operating System The Architecture of Computer Hardware and Systems Software: An Information Technology Approach.
TinySec: A Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks Chris Karlof :: Naveen Sastry :: David Wagner Presented by Roh, Yohan October.
TinySec : Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless Sensor Networks Chris Karlof :: Naveen Sastry :: David Wagner Presented by Anil Karamchandani 10/01/2007.
Wireless Security Rick Anderson Pat Demko. Wireless Medium Open medium Broadcast in every direction Anyone within range can listen in No Privacy Weak.
Azam Supervisor : Prof. Raj Jain
Monitoreo y Administración de Infraestructura Fisica (DCIM). StruxureWare for Data Centers 2.0 Arturo Maqueo Business Development Data Centers LAM.
1 draft-minaburo-lpwan-gap-analysis-00 Ana Minaburo Laurent Toutain.
Technische Universität München WISTP 2007 Mobile Phones as Secure Gateways for Message-Based Ubiquitous Communication 10 th May 2007 W. Bamberger, O. Welter.
Chapters 3 and 5 Possible questions
© 2016 Global Market Insights, Inc. USA. All Rights Reserved IoT Infrastructure Market Price, Trends, Industry Outlook & Forecast
Presented by Meghana Ananth Gad and Archita Pathak
Message Authentication Code
Chapter 5 Network Security Protocols in Practice Part I
IPSecurity.
Smart Building Solution
Symmetric Cryptography
CS408/533 Computer Networks Text: William Stallings Data and Computer Communications, 6th edition Chapter 1 - Introduction.
Encryption and Network Security
Bruno Saba DCT/TV/IN 26/04/2010
TASHKENT UNIVERSITY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES NAMED AFTER MUHAMMAD AL-KHWARIZMI THE SMART HOME IS A BASIC OF SMART CITIES: SECURITY AND METHODS OF.
Cryptography Why Cryptography Symmetric Encryption
Chapter 18 IP Security  IP Security (IPSec)
IT443 – Network Security Administration Instructor: Bo Sheng
e-Health Platform End 2 End encryption
SIGFOX System Description
Smart Building Solution
What's the buzz about HORNET?
IPSec IPSec is communication security provided at the network layer.
Understanding the OSI Reference Model
Title of presentation Name(s) of author / presenter / co-authors
Cryptography Basics and Symmetric Cryptography
January 15th Project: IEEE P Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) Submission Title: [Security protocol for Body area networks]
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
Project: IEEE P Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) Submission Title: [Smart Grid Overview] Date Submitted: [13.
Consideration on Wake-Up Receiver Security
Uplink Broadcast Service
Path key establishment using multiple secured paths in wireless sensor networks CoNEXT’05 Guanfeng Li  University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA Hui Ling.
Security Of Wireless Sensor Networks
Chapter 15 – Part 2 Networks The Internal Operating System
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
Workshop on algorithms and parameters for Electronic Signatures draft ETSI TS V ( ) November 25, Brussels.
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
Security of Wireless Sensor Networks
Rekeying Protocol Fix Date: Authors: Month Year
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
Protocols.
CSCE 715: Network Systems Security
CSCE 715: Network Systems Security
Global megatrends (relevant for our business)
Outline A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. D. Tygar. SPINS: Security protocols for sensor networks. In Proceedings of MOBICOM, 2001 Sensor.
One-way Hash Function Network Security.
Counter With Cipher Block Chaining-MAC
Message Authentication
Water’s Digital Future Jablanka Uzelac, Managing Director
Protocols.
CSE 5/7349 – February 15th 2006 IPSec.
OU BATTLECARD: Oracle Utilities Learning Subscription
Iserve – Bulk Cash Deposit Kiosk
Presentation transcript:

Towards End-to-End Data Protection in Low-Powered Networks 1University of Mannheim, 2SAP Product Security Research, 3SAP IoT & Industrie 4.0 Presented at 3rd Workshop On The Security Of Industrial Control Systems & Of Cyber-Physical Systems (CyberICPS 2017) In Conjunction With ESORICS 2017

Contents Problem Solution Evaluation and Deployment Conclusion 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Problem 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Smart City Water Distribution Network The city of Antibes owns and operates its water & gas distribution network instrumented with 2000 sensors for water flow, temperature, pressure for 315 kms of water pipeline, storages and maintenance points. The most mature segment of the emerging market for IoT applications is enterprise asset management. SAP has developed two applications to address opportunities in this space: SAP Predictive Maintenance and Service SAP Asset Intelligence Network As an example, we will look at a real customer situation of an owner and operator of around 2,000 electric trains, 2,000 locomotives, and 30,000 wagons. This company spends in excess of €1bn in annual maintenance, thereof 40% for corrective maintenance. The business case not only envisions to reduce corrective maintenance cost by at least 5%, but also to extend the lifetime of replacement parts, increase asset availability, and increase passenger satisfaction (e.g. by detecting issues with heating, cooling, or sanitary systems early and reducing train cancelations due to corrective action). The main business process transformation is to move from time- and mileage-based maintenance to dynamically optimized maintenance schedules. @ 2016 SAP SE or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. Internal 4

Smart City Water Distribution Network Need to ensure the continuous provisioning of utilities for the population. Predictive maintenance has been identified as one aspect of the city digital transformation. The most mature segment of the emerging market for IoT applications is enterprise asset management. SAP has developed two applications to address opportunities in this space: SAP Predictive Maintenance and Service SAP Asset Intelligence Network As an example, we will look at a real customer situation of an owner and operator of around 2,000 electric trains, 2,000 locomotives, and 30,000 wagons. This company spends in excess of €1bn in annual maintenance, thereof 40% for corrective maintenance. The business case not only envisions to reduce corrective maintenance cost by at least 5%, but also to extend the lifetime of replacement parts, increase asset availability, and increase passenger satisfaction (e.g. by detecting issues with heating, cooling, or sanitary systems early and reducing train cancelations due to corrective action). The main business process transformation is to move from time- and mileage-based maintenance to dynamically optimized maintenance schedules. @ 2016 SAP SE or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. Internal 5

Retro fit on Physical Assets Low-Power Wide-Area Networks Reliable and cost effective, meeting industrial needs Powered Wide Area Networks (LPWAN) Reduced packet size High latency Low throughput. Low-Powered Devices Don’t consume much power to work & communicate Do not require a continuous communication link. 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Security Requirements End-to-end security Confidentiality Authenticity Integrity Follow standards (e.g. NIST) Applicable to different existing low-power networks Deployable on the low-power devices When bidirectional communication not supported Low communication complexity Low payload size (e.g. 12 bytes SIGFOX) Compliant with different encryption algorithms (e.g. AES in Counter mode, FF1) 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

State of the Art Industrial Solutions Proposals from Academia No confidentiality (e.g. SigFox) Single keys (e.g. LoRaWan) Rely on the security of gateway (e.g. WirelessHART) Proposals from Academia Need asymmetric algorithms Rely on third party Use group keys High communication complexity Long computation time 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Solution 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Our Contribution Guarantee Secure End-to-End Communication over LPWAN’s from the device to the SAP backend, regardless of the provider & protocol. 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Ideas Key Management Data Protection Pre-shared master keys Intermediate keys for synchronization One-time keys for encryption and authentication Data Protection Independent encryption and authentication First encrypt then authenticate Preserving size AES in counter mode Format preserving encryption 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Key management … … … Master key Kmaster Intermediate keys Ki = CMAC(Kmaster; i) K0 Ki Ki+1 … … Encryption and Authentication keys KEnc = CMAC(Ki , SN ||DeviceID|| 0) KMac= CMAC(Ki, SN ||DeviceID|| 1) KEnci,0 KMaci,0 KEnci,j KMaci,j KEnci,j+1 KMaci,j+1 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Device Keys derivation 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Device Message Encryption 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Device Authentication Tag Authent. tag 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Device Send Message Authent. tag SN||DeviceID 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection - Device 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Back-end Keys Derivation Authent. tag SN||DeviceID 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Back-end Integrity Check Authent. tag SN||DeviceID Are equal? Authent. tag 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Back-end Message Decryption Authent. tag SN||DeviceID Are equal Authent. tag 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Data Protection – Back-end 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Security Analysis Authentication of the Sender Data integrity 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 2 −𝐿 𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝐿 - length of MAC, 𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑥 - max number of attempts Data integrity 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 2 −𝐿 Data confidentiality Co𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑂( 2 128 ) Replay attacks Excluded by using sequence numbers Generic Side-channel attacks Countermeasures implemented in TinyCrypt library 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Evaluation and Deployment 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Architecture 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Low-end MCUs Intel® Quark™ microcontrollers equipped with LoRaWan modules D2000 C1000 32-bit address bus 8 KB of cache, 32 MHz clock speed 80 KB SRAM 384 KB integrated Flash 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Evaluation Results Energy holds for 12 years when data is sent every minute 190 years if sent every 15 minutes 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Conclusion 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Conclusion Scheme providing E2E security Confidentiality, Integrity Authenticity Feasible in most existing LPW technologies Follows NIST recommendations Supports format preserving encryption Deployed on the water distribution network of the City of Antibes 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev

Thank you! Vasily Mikhalev mikhalev@uni-mannheim.de 2017-09-15 | CyberICPS2017 Towards End-To-End Data Protection in Low-Power Networks | Vasily Mikhalev