Mediation: possibilities and limits Recent experiences in the pursuit of peace by Nina Tsikhistavi-Khutsishvili, Chair of the Board, ICCN Caucasus Regional Representative, GPPAC 14th of February, 2017 Brussels

Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdniestria. Content approach The term of ‘protracted or frozen conflicts’ has come to mean 4 of the ongoing separatist conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union: Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdniestria.

profiling the regional dimension of conflict management among all post-soviet territorial conflicts two main challenging issues are making different a case of Georgia for the mediation: First issue is the meaning of mediation between Georgia and RF. Second issue is how to identify the scope for mediation while having of 2 economical roofs above the one region of South Caucasus.

features of mediation between Georgia and RF This is a process between parties where one of them has already unilaterally recognized the territory of another - as an independent. This very fact is converting the whole process of mediation/negotiation into a specific deadlock thus making it different from other processes related to all post-soviet territorial conflicts. This kind of incompatibility of parties is a serious challenge for the mediation.

having 2 economical roofs above the one region of South Caucasus Radically different, geo-political and economic ties are set in one region. In fact the South Caucasus is under the two polarized roofs of different economic ties. The anticipated inconsistency and incompatibility between European and Eurasian Trade spaces is influencing the region, stimulating fragmentation of regional market, isolation of secessioned and divided societies. Is the role for the third party actors mediation to: mediate between 6 entities of the region (3 recognized and 3 not recognized states), run negotiations and find possibilities of any complementarity of different trade standards (e.g. incompatible tariff and non-tariff barriers) that will be set (fixed) in upcoming 5-7 years overcome political barriers to assist de-isolation through economic cooperation.

Complementarity issues between various mediation: Complementarity and synergy between various mediation and or dialogue processes is unrealistic yet. They are granted with different levels of trust and respect from the third neutral parties. Usually evaluation results depend on diverse power and amount of resources spent for it.

Limited involvement of CS: Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian Civil Societies, as well as representatives from secessioned territories, are very critical towards the Geneva International Talks and Minsk Group results as well. CS is not involved in any stage of official negotiations (like preparation, selection of topics, debriefing etc), CS is kept in an informative vacuum, thus is giving a huge chance to the Government(s) not to feel any need in responsibility and accountability for non-implementation of a peace agreements, reached after successful mediation process.

influence of political dead-lock The very influence is caused by the limits in division of political agenda with donor’s mandate to assist CS participation in a dialogue. In fact parties or stakeholders are labelled under ‘Safe’ and ‘Suspicious’ ones due to existing political sanctions against some countries (to be assisted with CS participation dialogue). At the end the silence or ‘zero assistance’ tendency shown among the donors community towards the potential or existing mediation processes is stimulating soft power replacement of direct CS negotiations. If not for GPPAC the Geo-Ru Dialogue as well as CS dialogue on peace and security on Korean Peninsula would never be started.

thank you for your interest