ATS2840 Philosophy of Mind Semester 1, 2017 Dr Ron Gallagher ron.gallagher@monash.edu Tutorial 12 (that’s it) Other Minds & Kinds of Minds Office Hours: Caulfield: Wed 2.30-3.30 (RoomS908) Please email for an appointment. To revise for the Exam read through all the PDF Chapters on Moodle & listen to lectures. Lecturer and Unit Coordinator: Dr Jennifer Windt (Jennifer.Windt@monash.edu) Phone:03 9905 1519

(5) According to functionalism, for a system s to instantiate a mental property M is for s to: a. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to sensory inputs and other internal states, irrespective of its relations to behavioural outputs. b. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to other internal states and behavioural outputs, irrespective of its relations to sensory inputs. c. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs, irrespective of its relations to other internal states. d. Be in an internal state which stands in appropriate causal/functional relations to sensory inputs, other internal states, and behavioural outputs. (6) Zombies, as envisaged by David Chalmers, are: a. Creatures physically, functionally, and phenomenally exactly like us, but lacking beliefs and desires. b. Creatures physically and functionally exactly like us, but lacking phenomenal consciousness. c. Creatures physically exactly like us, but functionally different, and thus lacking phenomenal consciousness. d. Creatures functionally exactly like us, but physically different, and thus lacking phenomenal consciousness.

SHORT-ANSWER As in the expository assignments, make sure you answer all parts of the question and define all technical terms. 1. Machine state functionalists like Putnam maintain that the mind can be identified with a suitably programmed computer. Explain this position, as well as one main motivation for it. How does Block’s homunculi-headed robot objection raise problems for this view? Do you think that Block’s objection is successful, and why / why not? 2. How exactly does the Armstrong/Lewis approach differ from classical identity theory? Do you believe Lewis can capture something like multiple realizability in a way that Smart couldn’t? Defend your answer as best you can. 3. What is Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism? (Note that you will need to explain what physicalism is in addition to the argument.) What is Lewis’s ‘ability hypothesis’ and how does it respond to this argument? And why, briefly, might Raffman’s argument on ineffability spell trouble for the ability hypothesis? 4. What is Chalmers’s Zombie Argument, and how exactly does it spell trouble for supervenience physicalism? Briefly explain what you take to be the strongest of Patricia Churchland’s replies to this argument. 5. What exactly is panpsychism, and how does it aim to offer an alternative to emergentism? Why might one, according to Nagel, support a panpsychist view? And how, briefly, might a panpsychist go about arguing that the view is empirically plausible? 6. What is the Intentional Systems Theory and what does it take, according to Dennett, to be a true believer? (Make sure you make reference to the intentional stance and how it is different from the other stances Dennett discusses.) Which basic dilemma, according to Baker, does Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory face?

1. Machine state functionalists like Putnam maintain that the mind can be identified with a suitably programmed computer. Explain this position, as well as one main motivation for it. How does Block’s homunculi-headed robot objection raise problems for this view? Do you think that Block’s objection is successful, and why / why not?

2. How exactly does the Armstrong/Lewis approach differ from classical identity theory? Do you believe Lewis can capture something like multiple realizability in a way that Smart couldn’t? Defend your answer as best you can. The realiser-functionalism of Armstrong and Lewis defines a mental state according to its typical physical realiser for the appropriate population of the creature in that state. Lewis thinks that this hybrid theory should accommodate two ends of spectrum - Martians and madmen (not just normal people). Armstrong/Lewis attempt to reconcile functionalism and identity theory through an argument involving the type/token distinction (which is related to rigid and non-rigid designators) and the idea that the causal role of pain is specific to the appropriate populations. You will need to define what you understand to be ‘multiple realizability’ and Smart’s ‘identity theory’ and formulate Lewis’s argument for ‘causal theory’. You will need to say whether Lewis trying to do too much by trying to support identity theory and muliple realisability?

3. What is Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism 3. What is Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism? (Note that you will need to explain what physicalism is in addition to the argument.) What is Lewis’s ‘ability hypothesis’ and how does it respond to this argument? And why, briefly, might Raffman’s argument on ineffability spell trouble for the ability hypothesis? Jackson’s Mary / Fred cases Raffman’s argument on the persistence of phenomenology Define what you understand to be ‘physicalism’; mention the Mary thought experiment and formulate Jackson’s argument into premises and conclusion(s); explain exactly what Mary didn’t ‘know’ in the black & white room; describe Lewis’s ability argument, summarise Raffman’s differentiation objection to identifying colours relate it to Lewis’ claim that Mary learns to remember and identify colours.

4. What is Chalmers’s Zombie Argument, and how exactly does it spell trouble for supervenience physicalism? Briefly explain what you take to be the strongest of Patricia Churchland’s replies to this argument. Define what you understand to be ‘physicalism’ and ‘supervenience’; formulate Chalmers’ argument into premises and conclusion(s) [A philosophical zombie has all the physical and psychological attributes of a normal person but no Qualia - there is nothing it is like to be that zombie. Chalmers argues that if it is not logically necessary that the mental supervenes on the physical, then the onus is on the physicalist to show how the mental can be reduced to the physical in the case of qualia. Churchland’s objection - The Hornswoggle Problem] “Actually, the easy problems are very hard. In fact, they are so hard that for all we know about the brain today (and can imagine) we have no idea how it might solve the easy problems. In what way is the hard problem of consciousness then different? We are ignorant about the brain. So what we can imagine (or conceive) about the brain is based on ignorance. Ignorance is not a good basis for rational belief!

5. What exactly is panpsychism, and how does it aim to offer an alternative to emergentism? Why might one, according to Nagel, support a panpsychist view? And how, briefly, might a panpsychist go about arguing that the view is empirically plausible? Present Nagel’s argument in detail(ie his four premises which, if true, lead to conclusion that the basic constituents of the universe have mental properties.) Is his argument valid and/or sound? Nagel says: “there are no truly emergent properties of complex systems. All properties of complex systems that are not relations between it and something else derive from the properties of its constituents and their effects on each other when so combined” (p. 182). Thus the only coherent form of emergentism is an epistemological doctrine about the limits of our understanding of the behavior of complex systems

SHORT-ANSWER As in the expository assignments, make sure you answer all parts of the question and define all technical terms. 1. Machine state functionalists like Putnam maintain that the mind can be identified with a suitably programmed computer. Explain this position, as well as one main motivation for it. How does Block’s homunculi-headed robot objection raise problems for this view? Do you think that Block’s objection is successful, and why / why not? 2. How exactly does the Armstrong/Lewis approach differ from classical identity theory? Do you believe Lewis can capture something like multiple realizability in a way that Smart couldn’t? Defend your answer as best you can. 3. What is Jackson’s Knowledge Argument against physicalism? (Note that you will need to explain what physicalism is in addition to the argument.) What is Lewis’s ‘ability hypothesis’ and how does it respond to this argument? And why, briefly, might Raffman’s argument on ineffability spell trouble for the ability hypothesis? 4. What is Chalmers’s Zombie Argument, and how exactly does it spell trouble for supervenience physicalism? Briefly explain what you take to be the strongest of Patricia Churchland’s replies to this argument. 5. What exactly is panpsychism, and how does it aim to offer an alternative to emergentism? Why might one, according to Nagel, support a panpsychist view? And how, briefly, might a panpsychist go about arguing that the view is empirically plausible? 6. What is the Intentional Systems Theory and what does it take, according to Dennett, to be a true believer? (Make sure you make reference to the intentional stance and how it is different from the other stances Dennett discusses.) Which basic dilemma, according to Baker, does Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory face?

6. What is the Intentional Systems Theory and what does it take, according to Dennett, to be a true believer? (Make sure you make reference to the intentional stance and how it is different from the other stances Dennett discusses.) Which basic dilemma, according to Baker, does Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory face? Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. — Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance, p. 17