Church & Schools The role of the State (the schools) and Religion is governed by the First Amendment of the Constitution. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”

General Framework: First Amendment bans the “…establishment of religion…” by the state or any arm of the state or anyone acting “under color of state authority”. Non-establishment clause also applies to the endorsement of religion by any public agency.

General Framework: Under this framework schools, and their employees individually may not engage in any action that would establish or endorse any particular religion or religion in general. This restriction also applies to indicating a preference for religion in general versus no religion. Furthermore, it would prevent any sectarian criticism of specific religious doctrines and dogmas, including those related to atheism and agnosticism. With regard to religion the state must be neutral.

General Framework: Religious topics and themes may be discussed where appropriate to the secular curriculum. For example, some detailed discussion of theology is appropriate when lecturing about the Reformation or the Puritan influence in Early New England. History, Music, Art, Civics, and Humanities are good examples of appropriate forums for a secular discussion of religious themes.

School Prayer: In Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curtlett, Supreme Court ruled that official prayers sponsored by the school district violated the Establishment Clause. In Abington and Murray the Court found that school districts in PA and MD had practices of beginning each school day with Bible recitation, the Lord’s Prayer, and the Pledge of Allegience. Parents protested claiming the practices violated the First Amendment. The Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the State from advancing religion. In Engel v. Vitale this restriction was clarified to include generic or non-sectarian prayers. In Lee v. Weisman, this restriction was expanded to include graduation prayers sponsored by the school district, even if offered by a third party.

School Prayer: Following Wallace v. Jaffree, in 1985, Supreme Court left open the question of allowing “moment of silence.” If moment is designated for prayer then it is unconstitutional. However, in Bown v. Gwinnett County School District (1997), the 11th Circuit upheld a Georgia law allowing a generic “moment of reflection” of 60 seconds at the beginning of the school day.

School Prayer: Although Lee v. Weisman originally left open the question of allowing student-initiated prayer at school functions (e.g., Graduation, Athletics), the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000), appears to indicate a complete ban on the use of school facilities or equipment, or the tacit approval of school authorities, for any religious expression.

Religion in the Classroom: Teachers are agents of the State when employed during instructional duties. They are also restricted from personal religious expression under the “Establishment Clause.” “Free Exercise” does not apply to government employees while on duty. (Roberts v. Madigan, 1990.)

Religion in the Classroom: However, students and teachers may be exempted from certain activities, notably the “Pledge of Allegiance,” to avoid offending their religious beliefs, if the activity is not deemed essential to the curriculum. (See, e.g., West Virginia v. Barnette [1943].)

Religion in the Classroom: According to Epperson v. Arkansas (1968), no reasonable secular justification exists to forbid or omit the teaching of Evolution. Schools may not restrict the teaching of Evolution where it is appropriate to the curriculum.

Religion in the Classroom: Conversely, in Edwards v. Aguillard (1987), no secular justification exists to require or allow the teaching of Creation Science or any related doctrine. No scientific theory may be taught if it has its “genesis” in religious doctrine. Teachers may not evade this restriction through either claims of free exercise of religion or academic freedom. Schools may not abdicate control of creationism/evolution issue to teachers.

Extramural Religious Activities: Equal access requires that schools which provide limited open access to non-curricular student organizations must permit access to all such groups, including religious organizations. Bd. of Educ. of Westside v. Mergens (1990); Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001). The Equal Access Act was passed to prevent schools from discriminating against student organizations with religious orientations. There are two sets of criteria that schools must abide by under Equal Access. The first is Equal Opportunity which requires: The meeting is voluntary and student initiated No sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the state, or its agents or employees. Employees/agents are present at religious meetings only in a non-particapatory capacity. Non-school persons may not direct, control, or regularly attend activities of student groups. The second area is “When is a club related to the curriculum?” Is the subject matter of the course taught in a regularly scheduled course? Does the subject matter of the club concern the body of courses as a whole? Is participation in the course required for a particular course? Does participation in the course result in academic credit (Pope V. E. Brunswick). Equal access applies to community use of facilities as well. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches (1993).

Extramural Religious Activities: Secular observation of certain well-recognized holidays is permissible, even if these holidays have a religious origin. However, these observances should emphasize the secular aspects of these holidays. For example: Christmas, Easter, Halloween.

Extramural Religious Activities: Students may be released, with parental permission, during the school day to attend off-campus religious activities and instruction (Zorach v. Clauson, 1952). However, release time for on-campus religious activities is unconstitutional (ex rel McCollum, 1948).

Aid to Students in Religious Schools: Justified under the “Child Benefit Theory.” (i.e., aiding the child, not the school.) General Rule found in the “Lemon Test” (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971): Statute must have a legitimate secular purpose; Principal or primary effect of statute must be to neither advance nor inhibit religion; Statute must not cause “excessive entanglement” of church and state.

Aid to Students in Religious Schools: Specific aid to students in sectarian schools such as basic transportation and secular textbooks allowed under “Child Benefit Theory.” See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. (1947); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen (1923). However, equipment and services which can be utilized to further sectarian instruction, such as loans of A/V equipment, transportation for field trips, etc., is not allowed (Grand Rapids v. Ball, 1985).

Aid to Students in Religious Schools: Auxiliary services are now permitted, and in some cases required, for private school services. Services such as Title I and IDEA may be provided on-site to non-public school students (Agostini v. Felton, 1997). In some cases such service may be required by LRE under IDEA (Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 1993) under the “child benefit theory.”