NS4053 Spring Term 2017 MENA Youth Marganilization Oxford Analytica, Middle East: Socioeconomic Trajectories are Negative, January 3, 2017

Overview I UNDP Report, Youth and Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality, November 2016 The Arab world’s large youth population (15-29-year-olds) faces an increasingly difficult transition to adulthood amid: Widening inequalities High levels of exclusion, and Rising conflict. Consequences include Conflicts over income distribution, jobs, and public services are likely to increase Pressure to migrate to the Gulf and the West will rise Regional disparities in living standards will increase, with smaller and more diversified states doing best

Overview II U.N. report notes today’s young Arabs have many advantages compared to previous generations they are: Better informed and educated More globally connected, and Live longer. Despite this, they: Have more limited opportunities than their parents’ generation and Are less satisfied with their lives

Marginalization I UNDP report shows Arab living standards are failing to keep pace with the rest of the world The average annual growth rate of living standards in Arab states fell by more than half in 2010-14 relative to growth in 2000 Pattern reflect the impact of the 2008-09 economic downturn, and Post-2011 conflicts

Marginalization II Arab youth face exclusion on multiple fronts compared to youth globally Education Arab states have made significant advances in access to schooling and university over recent decades but Education quality is poor and not matched to skills required by labor markets Arab states consistently score below the global average in international tests of mathematics and science

Marginalization III Unemployment Region has the highest average youth unemployment in the world since the early 1990s In 2014, it stood at 29.3%, more than twice the world average of 13.99% Traditional employment provider, the public sector can no longer absorb this growing number of new labor market entrants Means more young people face insecure, low paid work in the informal sector As a result they experience and extended transition to economic independence and struggle to establish families and homes

Rates of Youth Unemployment

Marginalization IV Gender Inequality Arab women face some of the highest levels of social and economic exclusion globally While they have gained greater access to education in recent decades they still struggle to find jobs More then two-thirds aged 15-29 are estimated to be outside the labor force compared to 20% of men of the same age. Young women also face heavy social restrictions, discrimination and domestic violence due to cultural and social norms – these are weakening however.

Marginalization V Politics Young Arabs are far less engaged in formal politics than older generations and youth The regional average for youth participation in voting is 20% below the average for middle-income countries Particularly low rates in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria Conversely protest rates are high at 18% of youth compared to 11% in middle income countries Reflects the perception among Arab youth that formal politics is not a route for meaningful change

Marginalization VI Conflict The Arab region (defined by UNDP as including Somalia and Sudan) is home to 5% of the world’s population yet in 2014 suffered 45% of global terrorist attacks 69% of battle related deaths and Hosted 58% of refugees The report forecasts that conflict will increase over the coming decades, with 75% of the Arab population living in countries at risk of conflict by 2050 Report’s estimate that 13 million children (40% of the region’s) are out of school has particularly negative implications for longer-term economic and reconstruction prospects

Marginalization VII New Development Model Report argues that youth empowerment is the route to stabilizing the region and making significant gains toward economic and social development Presents a new youth-centered development model Involves wide-spread structural and institutional reforms and Integrating youth development issues into the heart of policy across government.

Recommendations I The main recommendations include Enhancing young people’s capabilities through improved education, technology, healthcare, housing and unemployment allowance Creating more jobs by encouraging productive economic growth, work experience programs, and careers’ advice These recommendations imply Root-and-branch reform of the “rentier state” economic model, Reform of the social contract as well as The resolution of the region’s bitter conflicts.

Recommendations II The problem Many Arab Governments lack Political will, Institutional capacity and Financial resources To achieve these ambitious goals quickly if at all, especially during this period of subdues oil revenues, and heightened geopolitical rivalry

Diverging Prospects I Because of these factors youth prospects likely to diverge within the region ever more sharply in coming decades Conflict-affected areas (especially Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen) will experience long-term damage reducing living standards for this generation and those that follow Egypt’s large youth population also face grim prospects – youth unemployment is estimated to be 40%

Diverging Prospects II By contrast countries with Higher educational attainment Relative stability Smaller populations and Diversified private sectors Are likely to make some progress. These include UAE Bahrain Lebanon and Jordan

Diverging Prospects III Saudi Arabia has placed youth at the heart of its Vision 2030 program and could also make advances on youth inclusion, particularly if it brings women into the workforce However, youth unemployment is likely to remain high for the next two decades, potentially entrenching high inequality levels, eroding the social contract and increasing instability

Assessment The region’s youth population is set to grow for the next 20 years at least UN estimates 60 million jobs will need to be created during next decade to absorb rising numbers of young people entering the labor market Tackling unemployment and other youth grievances will require Deep structural reforms Investment in human capital and Conflict resolution However this is unlikely to occur at the speed and scale required in most Arab countries