Deterrence: Two approaches

Traditional Approaches Nine nuclear states? The task: Deter Use Dissuade Acquisition Proliferation Deny My arsenal is bigger than your arsenal Second strike capability MAD Limited missile defense

Nuclear Concerns Acquisition Horizontal v. Vertical Proliferation Use Deterring/Dissuading both Allies and Adversaries at the same time. Possible aspirants? Strategic Communications / Public Diplomacy

Challenges

Cultural Topograpy Identity: The characteristics a group assigns to itself – the roles and reputation it pursues. Norms: Accepted, expected, and preferred modes of behavior. Values: The material goods or personal characteristics that amplify status within the group. Perceptual Lens: The lens through which this group sees the world—their default belief systems about history, the future, and other actors.

Elaine Bunn’s Calculus of Tailored Deterrence What are the nation’s or group’s values and priorities? How are these affected by its history and strategic culture? What are their objectives in the particular situation? What factors are likely to influence their decisionmaking? Who makes decisions, how does the leadership think, what is their view of the world (perceptual lens) and their experience with and view of the United States? How do they calculate risks and gains? What do they believe their stakes to be in particular situations?

Continued… What is the likely credibility of U.S. deterrence options to this adversary – for both imposing costs and denying gains? (Additional question – why might the fact that we possess nukes not necessarily enhance our credibility in deterrence situations?) How risk taking—or risk adverse – is the leadership? How much latitude does the leadership have to either provoke or conciliate? What are their alternative courses of action? What do they believe the costs and benefits of restraint to be? Do they think they are worse off if they do not take the aggressive action? Do they see positive benefits in not taking the action in question?

Continued… What do they perceive as America’s answers to the questions above? How does a nation’s “identity” play a role? What about norms of morality? Beatrice Heuser on Germany: In the culture of the Bonn Republic, the use of force was from its creation regarded an absolute evil, and anything symbolizing this use of force, above all nuclear weapons, has been thought of, literally, as diabolical. Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons were thus rejected as totally immoral by an important section of the West German population, to the point where it would have been out of the question for any government to procure nuclear weapons – their own population would not have allowed them to.

Continued Deterrence specialists would be well served to understand “action templates” (built in problem-solving devices) in the following sampling of security concepts: Compromise – is it viewed as a sign of weakness or as a democratic solution? Violence -- when is it an accepted, or expected, solution? Political Change -- to what extent does this society rely on fate? Predestination? Personal initiative? Leadership -- Are leaders expected to make decisions as an omniscient head of state, or to reflect community will? Martial preferences – are manpower and clever strategy favored over technical solutions to security problems?

Other questions Why is it easier to deter a major power than a rogue state? To what extent are terrorists “deterrable”? What are the challenges inherent in tailoring deterrence messages?