CIRAS final conference Barcelona transport use case Katowice, June 8th, 2016 Jose-Ramon Martinez-Salio, ATOS CIRAS Technical Manager 20 min

Rationale of the use case

Use case general approach We decided to use the metro as it is a Critical Infrastructure that have specific threats Metro systems: Have been created to be open and accessible Gather crowds of people at predictable times Have predictable routes and specific timetables Are very visible Any disruption has high impact in day by day life © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved

Threats considered (1/2) Terrorist threats Real cases Terrorist threats   Bomb / Improvised Explosive Device (IED) During last decade in Madrid, Moscow, London and Brussels Armed attack: Shooting / Mass shooting New York 1993 metro shooting (Long Island) and others (usually not connected to terrorist attacks) Armed attack: Stabbing London 2015 (terrorist), Taipei 2014 (non terrorist) Cyber attack Seoul, South Korea 2014 (non terrorist) Assault with hostages None recorded in metro. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological attack (CBR) Tokio metro attacks 1995 (Sarin and Zyklon B) (non terrorist) Employees sabotage Many. Usually unreported (non terrorist) Common chemicals attack (e.g. tear gas, pepper spray) External sabotage (e.g. cut signal cables, arson, etc) Japan 1984 attack to 34 metro nodes causing major disruption (terrorist)

Why Terrorist Threat? From http://www.tcrponline.org/PDFDocuments/TSYN27.pdf Transit systems offer potential terrorists, particularly those willing to embrace high-order violence, with: Easy-to-exploit target signature Highly visible and represent government authority Carry large numbers of people in concentrated spaces along predictable routes Virtually impossible to secure

Threats considered (2/2) Criminal threats Real cases Criminal threats   Non Terrorist external sabotage (e.g. cut signal cables, arson, etc) Madrid Metro strike 1998. 49 trains disabled due to train cab windows broken by using slingshots Theft Bilbao Metro in 2015. Theft of cupper of the overhead line Robbery Many Pickpocketing Protests and actions Usually related with strikes Settling of scores between bands Many. e.g. Barcelona metro in March 2015 Criminals fleeing using Metro system Random attacks January 2016, NY metro - At least six slashing attacks targeting random strangers occur at various subway platforms throughout the city

Why Criminal threat? Metro offers a big target for criminal threats, especially related with low intensity crime Many potential targets concentrated in a small area that leave the platforms and trains very fast, not to return in many hours A person to people contact is almost impossible to avoid at certain times and places Metro systems are created to be open and easy to enter and leave fast, making controls difficult

Use cases

Terrorist threat scenario (1/2) Bomb in a train during rush hour This use case covers the threat: “T 1.1 Bomb / IED” From unattended baggage; baggage; human attached or even placed in bins Use case 1: Bomb in a train during rush hour This sub-scenario implies the access to any station with a explosive device concealed © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved

This use case covers the threat: “T 1.1 Bomb / IED” Terrorist threat scenario (2/2) Bomb in train workshop during the night shift © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved This use case covers the threat: “T 1.1 Bomb / IED” Human attached or left behind Use case 2. Bomb in train depot/workshop during the night shift (maintenance) This sub-scenario implies the access to premises during the night shift © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved

Criminal Threat Scenario This use case covers the threat: “T 2.8 Random attacks” We have considered the use case of a random stabbing in metro platform during rush hour. This scenario implies the use to concealed weapons that can be knifes, machetes or even glass

Security measures to consider

Security measures to evaluate We have included 27 security measures from different sources (like http://www.uitp.org/news/public-transport-security) For the use case, these measures have been grouped in five alternatives to be assessed © Grup TMB 2016. All rights reserved

Security measures we have considered Security Operation and Control Centre (SOCC) CCTV cameras for surveillance CCTV cameras with video analytics Intrusion detection sensors Network separation/firewall Fences with fiber optics or sensors CBRN sensors Private/Public security Internal training procedures and guidelines Broadcast of messages Public Address (PA) systems Solo guards Patrols Mobile patrols Security dogs Sniffer dogs Metro TV on Station SOS interphones See-through bins Armed soldiers Identification of people Random searches of passengers Awareness campaigns to passengers and staff Random baggage search for passengers Armed police officers Airport-style metal detectors Limitation of entry points Explosive devices analyzer

Results

CIRAS tool has proven a real success in the selected use cases: Use case results CIRAS tool has proven a real success in the selected use cases: Tool´s flexibility in combining different Security Measures in alternatives Possibility of recovering previous recorded scenarios Final report allowing one page summary

Acknowledgments

Our stakeholders Use case analysis and execution would have been impossible without the collaboration of our transport use case stakeholders: Transports Metropolitans de Barcelona (TMB): Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalonian Police) in its Metropolitan Transport Security Area

Thank you for your attention! Jose-Ramon Martinez Technical Manager ATOS Spain jose.martinezs@atos.net www.cirasproject.eu Co-funded by the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Programme of the European Union