Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Copyright © 2004 South-Western 22 Frontiers of Microeconomics.
Advertisements

© 2007 Thomson South-Western. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION A difference in access to relevant knowledge is called information asymmetry.
Finance, Financial Markets, and NPV First Principles.
Introduction to Game Theory and Behavior Networked Life CIS 112 Spring 2009 Prof. Michael Kearns.
Strategic Game Theory for Managers. Explain What is the Game Theory Explain the Basic Elements of a Game Explain the Importance of Game Theory Explain.
Thinking Like a Modern Economist 6 Economics is what economists do. — Jacob Viner CHAPTER 6 Copyright © 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights.
Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics 11 Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics All men can see the.
Proposal Selection Form Proposer Identification Code __________________ Circle a proposal: 19/1 18/2 17/3 16/4 15/5 14/6 13/7 12/8 11/9 10/10 9/11 8/12.
Lecture 2 Economic Actors and Organizations: Motivation and Behavior.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright  2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. GAME THEORY, STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING, AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS.
On Economics Desmond McNeill. Economists have a special way of seeing the world. And they exert great influence over decision-makers that shape our.
Experimental Economics NSF short course David Laibson August 11, 2005.
The Logic of Individual Choice: The Foundation of Supply and Demand 10 The Logic of Individual Choice: The Foundation of Supply and Demand The theory of.
The Scientific Method. Scientifically Solving a Problem Observe Define a Problem Review the Literature Observe some More Develop a Theoretical Framework.
Perfect Competition Ch. 20, Economics 9 th Ed, R.A. Arnold.
Chapter 6 Motivation: From Concepts to Application
Management support systems II
Markets with Only a Few Sellers
Chapter 6 Motivation II: Applied Concepts
Logic of Hypothesis Testing
Proposal Selection Form
Chapter 1: An Economic Way of Thinking
Economics of Strategy Introduction.
The Foreign Language Effect on The Sunk-Cost Fallacy
Discussion of What Drives Corporate Inversions? International Evidence
Consumer Choice: Maximizing Utility and Behavioural Economics
An introduction to game theory
ECON 100 Lecture 2 Wednesday, February 6.
Principles of Economics Econ 100 (formerly known as Econ 200)
Frontiers of Microeconomics
Economics 430/530 EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS Fall 2009
AM Professional Lawn Services
ECON 100 Lecture 3 Monday, February 10.
Technical Change, Competition and Vertical Integration
Information failure It exists when some, or all, of the participants in an economic exchange do not have perfect knowledge. Asymmetric information.
Bounded Rationality Herbert A. Simon.
Lecture 8 Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection
Earnings and Discrimination
Literature reviews and reading lists
Sault College Career Essentials Mentors
Games & Politics Evgeniya Lukinova.
WHY SOCIETIES HAVE ECONOMIES
HRM 326 Competitive Success-- snaptutorial.com
HRM 326 Education for Service-- snaptutorial.com
HRM 326 Teaching Effectively-- snaptutorial.com
What Economics is About?
17. Game theory G 17 / 1 GENERAL ECONOMICS 6
Thinking Like an Economist
Unit 4 SOCIAL INTERACTIONS.
Research Methods in Psychology
Negotiating & Discounting
Chapter 2 Economic Activities: Producing and Trading
Frontiers of Microeconomics
Frontiers of Microeconomics
Copyright ©2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall 6-1 Essentials of Organizational Behavior, 10/e Stephen P. Robbins & Timothy A. Judge.
Choices, Values and Frames
Significance Tests: The Basics
© 2007 Thomson South-Western
In negative messages, the basic information is negative, and you expect that the reader may be disappointed or angry.
Copyright ©2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall 6-1 Essentials of Organizational Behavior, 10/e Stephen P. Robbins & Timothy A. Judge.
Value Based Reasoning and the Actions of Others
Behavioral Economics.
Earnings and Discrimination
Net Present Value and Other Investment Criteria
By Carina Gonzalez A. Per 7 Economics Mr.Traeger
STA 291 Spring 2008 Lecture 17 Dustin Lueker.
DEV 501: THE THEORY OF CONSUMER CHOICE
Frontiers of Microeconomics
Marginal Utility Theory
Presentation transcript:

Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist Presented by Amr S Algarhi Hendrik Buhrs M.Sc. Seminar 29th November 2006

Ariel Rubinstein Born in 1951 Educated at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in both mathematics and economics. Main field of interest: Game Theory. Currently a Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University. Published “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)”, an important contribution to the Theory of Bargaining. Served as President of the American Economic Association in 2004. Received several prizes (e.g. Nemmers Prize, 2004) Photo © Gabriel Baharlia

What are economic theorists trying to accomplish? The Dilemma of absurd conclusions. The Dilemma of responding to reality. The Dilemma of modelless regularities. The Dilemma of relevance.

1. The Dilemma of absurd conclusions Models and conclusions. Sound assumptions and absurd conclusions. Should we be concerned about/abandon these models? Example: Adam in the Garden of Eden.

Adam in the Garden of Eden Framework and Assumptions: Stream of apples. Rational. relation. 2 apples a day Impatient. (1,0) (0,2) (2,0) (1,1) 120 years. ( , )

Adam in the Garden of Eden Adam should be willing to exchange his endowment for a single apple right away! Why is that? (=First Traumatic Experience) Adam enters the Garden. After day 17: One apple per day (= 43,813)

Adam in the Garden of Eden 21 days after day 1: (0,1,1) (0,2,0) (1,0,0) 22 days after day 2: (0,0,1,1,1,1) (0,0,2,0,2,0) (0,1,0,1,0,0) (0,1,1,0,0,0) (0,2,0,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0,0,0) 217 days after day 17: (0,0,0,..,0,1,1,1,….,1,1) (1,0,0,0,……,0)

Adam in the Garden of Eden Recovering from the first traumatic experience The consequences are independent of time: Consumption on day 27 is the same. The consequences are not independent of time: Split his personality Consumption on day 27 differs. t+27 t+26 t+1 t

Adam in the Garden of Eden Framework and Assumptions: Stream of apples. Rational. relation. Less appetite. 1 apple a day (0,1) (1,0) 120 years.

Adam in the Garden of Eden Second Traumatic Experience “Why don’t you give me the apple and get one tomorrow?”, Eve said. (1,0) (0,1) → (0,0,0,0,0,………,∞)

Adam in the Garden of Eden Recovering from the Second Traumatic Experience “Be consistent with sophisticated behaviour”, The snake said. (1,0,1,0,……,1,0,1,0) (0,1,0,1,……,0,1,0,1)

Adam in the Garden of Eden The Third Traumatic Experience Adam can pick one apple every day (1,1,1,….,1,1). “You should pick an apple only after an odd number of days which you have not done”, the snake said. (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,1) → (0,1,0,1,……,0,1,0,1)

1. The Dilemma of absurd conclusions If we followed this methodology, we would reject a theory if it reaches an absurd conclusion. How should we respond to absurd conclusion?!

2. The Dilemma of Response to Evidence Models and the real world. Experiments. Should we modify a model if one of its assumptions is experimentally rejected? Example: The case for hyperbolic discounting.

2. The Dilemma of Response to Evidence The case for hyperbolic preferences: t+27 t+26 Traditional vs. Hyperbolic discounting formula. Experiments show that people follow the hyperbolic discounting What if we design an experiment to reject the alternative theory? t+1 t

2. The Dilemma of Responding to Reality Problem (1) Imagine you have finished a job and have to choose between two payment schemes: (A) Receiving £1,000 in 8 months. (B) Receiving £500 in 6 months and £500 in 10 months. Problem (2) Imagine you have bought a computer and have to choose between two payment schemes: (A) Paying £1,000 in 8 months. (B) Paying £500 in 6 months and £500 in 10 months. 54% chose A and 46% chose B. 354 participants (rejecting hyperbolic discounting) 39% chose A and 61% chose B. 382 participants 37% chose A and 63% chose B. 113 participants (supporting hyperbolic discounting) 53% chose A and 47% chose B. 118 participants t=6 t=8 t=10 £ 500 £ 500 £ 500 £ 500 ≈ 502 ≈ 499

2. The Dilemma of Response to Evidence Should we dismiss the hyperbolic discounting model? How do we respond to experimental evidence given that it is so easy to challenge (nearly) any given assumptions with it?

3. The Dilemma of Modelless Regularities Models and Regularities. Do we really need economic theory to find these regularities? Or should we rather examine the real world? Example: The Traveler’s Dilemma.

3. The Dilemma of Modelless Regularities Miro Hendrik 300 299 298 297 … 180 Hendrik and Miro visiting Panos. £ 180 - £ 300. £ 5. What is the choice? Nash Equilibrium Basu (1994)

3. The Dilemma of Modelless Regularities A regularity in distribution: 180 181-294 295 296-298 299 300 13% 15% 5% 3% 9% 56% 96 sec. 87 sec. 72 sec. 70 sec.

3. The Dilemma of Modelless Regularities Do we really need complicated theoretical models when we want to find interesting regularities?

4. The Dilemma of Relevance Is the advice economists give of any relevance to the world? How does the formal way economics is taught (models, theorems and assumptions) influence our “message”?

4. The Dilemma of Relevance Assume you are a vice president of a company. The company employs hundreds of workers among them, 196 temporary low-skilled workers. Until recently, the company was making large profits. However as a result of a recession, there has been a significant drop in profits. You will be attending a meeting of the management in which a decision will be made regarding the layoff of some of the temporary workers. Complete the following: I recommend continuing to employ ____________ of the 196 workers presently employed by the company.

4. The Dilemma of Relevance Econ1 Econ2 MBA Law Maths Phil n= 94 130 172 216 64 88 100 49% 45% 33% 27% 16% 13% 144 31% 29% 36% 19% 170 7% 9% 23% 18% 25% 196 6% 12% 11% Other 4% 2% 3% Average 127 133 142 151 165

4. The Dilemma of Relevance Sobe: U. Exeter Psychology: U. Exeter n= 98 74 100 67% 31% 144  19%  27% 170 7%  20%  196 4%  19%  Other 3%  Average 115   143

4. The Dilemma of Relevance The Jungle Model “Social Darwinism”: Only the stronger agent is interested in transactions. Power vector instead of initial endowment vector. The stronger are also the richer (in equilibrium). Purpose: make students reflect/reconsider traditional competitive market model.

4. The Dilemma of Relevance Economic theorists have very little to say about the real world (very few models can be used to provide serious advice) But they influence student’s minds. x* max Photo ©: Volme-Galerie, Ido Rosenthal

Concluding words A good model in economic theory, like a good fable: A situation between fantasy and reality. Has a moral message. Unrealistic and simplistic. Something significant remains.

Concluding remarks How should we respond to absurd conclusion?! The model may still be interesting! How do we respond to experimental evidence given that it is so easy to challenge (nearly) any given assumptions with it? Models are not meant to be testable! Do we really need complicated theoretical models when we want to find interesting regularities? Models have limited scope! Can economists give valid comments on the real world? Yes, although they don’t give advice/predict directly, but influence “culture”!

Thank you Any Questions?!