Proposed solutions to comments on section 7

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Presentation transcript:

Proposed solutions to comments on section 7

Minor comments Doc 294 Minor comments and resolutions Bad use of “shall” Incorrect cut and paste Not always saying only use ESN functionality if ESN capable Define ID numbers Better diagrams Not clear encrypting only data frames Description of usage of elements should be in section 5 not 7 NULL security to 0.0.0.0 and move rest down We do not mandate all ESN – make recommended not mandatory

Major comments Unspecified authentication Kerberos Optimization Which elements are in which messages How Multicast Ciphers are negotiated ESN without ULA

Unspecified authentication Use of unspecified authentication to allow 802.1X to decide WG discussed this before and there were deployments that it was useful for – reject

Kerberos optimization Information elements are optional, all authentication methods must run without the information elements. The elements defined are optimized for Kerberos

Beacon Client may optimize if supplied but if not can find out either via probe or associate/re-associate ASE optional UCSE optional MCSE optional Realm Name optional Principal Name optional

Probe Request Client asks for what it wants to optimize, a STA that is not ESN capable does not supply the elements in the response 802.11d Request Element containing ASE, UCSE, MCSE, Realm Name or Principal Name element IDs

Probe Response If ESN capable must supply whatever elements were asked for in Probe Req Request Element ASE optional UCSE optional MCSE optional Realm Name optional Principle Name optional

Associate Request ASE optional UCSE optional MCSE optional Left to other STA if not supplied UCSE optional MCSE optional Nonce optional Authentication methods must be able to handle not having them, but optimize the auth protocol

Associate Response ASE optional UCSE optional MCSE optional Must be supplied if defaults not correct and must be within request scope UCSE optional MCSE optional Realm Name optional Authentication methods must be able to handle not having them, but can be used to optimize the auth protocol Principle Name optional Nonce optional

Re-associate Request ASE optional UCSE optional MCSE optional Left to other STA if not supplied UCSE optional MCSE optional

Re-associate Response ASE optional Must be supplied if not defaults not correct and must be within request scope UCSE optional MCSE optional Realm Name optional Authentication methods must be able to handle not having them, but optimize the auth protocol Principle Name optional

UCSE/MCSE Each STA/STA pair can negotiate a different UCS The AP decides the MCS and forces all STAs to it (may be based on the first STA) If MCSE is not specified in response defaults to AES not to UCSE

ESN without ULA Should AES without ULA is allowed in ESN? E.g. For IBSS No allowed, need to support ULA within IBSS