Towards a ‘clash of civilizations’? Paul Bacon SILS, Waseda University

The ‘clash of civilizations’ In this lecture I will summarize the main points of Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis. Huntington’s main argument is that culture and cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post-Cold war world. Cultural identity, at the broadest level, is civilizational identity. Your cultural identity is ultimately formed by the civilization of which you are a member. Huntington makes five further arguments, and devotes a section of the book to explaining each argument in more detail.

Argument 1 1. For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational. Modernization and Westernization are not the same thing. It is possible to modernize without becoming a Western society. Modernization is not producing a universal civilization. Non-Western societies are not becoming Western.

Argument 2 2. The balance of power amongst civilizations is shifting. There are four elements to this claim: A. The West is declining in relative influence. B. Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military and political strength. C. Islam is exploding demographically, which will cause problems for Muslim countries and their neighbors. D. Non-Western civilizations are re-affirming the values of their own cultures.

Argument 3 3. A civilization-based world order is emerging. A. Societies which share cultural affinities are cooperating with each other. B. Some countries have attempted to move from one civilization to another, but these attempts have been unsuccessful (Mexico, Turkey, Australia). C. Countries are grouping themselves around the leading or core states of their civilization.

Argument 4 4. The West’s attempts to impose universalism are increasingly bringing it into conflict with other civilizations. A. At the level of global politics, the most serious problems are those between the West, on one hand, and Islamic countries and China on the other. B. At the local level, fault-line wars between states from different civilizations provoke kin-country rallying. This increases the likelihood that core civilizational states will become involved. This increases the possibility that conflicts will escalate. Huntington argues that fault-line wars are largely fought between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Argument 5 5. The West is unique not universal. The survival of the West depends on: A. Americans re-affirming their Western identity, and B. Westerners uniting to renew and preserve their civilization from the influence of non-Western societies. World leaders should acknowledge the reality that the world is multi-civilizational, and cooperate accordingly.

Western Civilization and empire For most of human history, contacts between civilizations were either limited or non-existent. With the beginning of the modern era, from roughly 1500 onwards, the politics of civilizations had two aspects. 1. Firstly, for roughly four hundred years, there was a multipolar international system within Western civilization. The nation-states of the West - most importantly Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany and the United States – interacted, competed and fought with each other. 2. Secondly, during this period, the major Western nations created substantial empires. In the process, they expanded their influence across the world, and conquered and colonized countries from all other civilizations.

The Cold War During the Cold War global politics became bipolar, and the world was divided into three camps. The first camp contained a group of mostly wealthy and liberal-democratic capitalist societies led by the United States. The second camp contained a group of somewhat poorer communist countries led by the Soviet Union. The third camp contained mostly Third World countries, which were often poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed that they were non-aligned in the Cold war conflict. The communist and liberal-democratic camps were engaged in ideological, political, economic and occasionally military competition with each other. Much of this competition and conflict actually took place in the Third World outside these two camps.

The end of the Cold War In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed. The Cold War ended, and the division of the international system into competing communist and capitalist camps also ended. People define their identities by referring to the things that are the most important to them. During the Cold War, people and states defined their identity in terms of ideology, politics and economics. In the post-Cold War world, Huntington argues that people and nations will define their identities in terms of culture.

Cultural identity People will define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. In the post-Cold war world, people will identify with cultural groups. These cultural include: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. During the Cold War, the question was ‘whose side are you on?’ In the post-Cold War world, the question is ‘who are you?’

The continuing significance of states Importantly, Huntington argues clearly that nation-states will remain the principal actors in global politics. The behavior of states is always shaped to some extent by the pursuit of power and wealth. However, in the post-Cold War world, state behavior will also increasingly be shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states during the Cold War were the blocs of communist, capitalist and non-aligned states. In the post-Cold War world the most important factor guiding the alignment of states will be their civilizational identity.

Huntington’s nine civilizations Sinic Japanese Hindu Islamic Western African Buddhist Latin American Orthodox

A civilization-based future world order Henry Kissinger has argued that in the 21st century the international system will contain six major powers. These six are: the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India. Kissinger’s six major powers belong to five different civilizations. There are also many important medium-sized Islamic states which have large populations, significant oil resources, and strategic locations. These Islamic countries will also feature importantly in the international politics of the 21st century, in particular Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Huntington argues that Cold War superpower rivalry has been replaced by a clash of civilizations. In this new world, local politics is the politics of cultural identity, and global politics is the politics of civilizations.

Kin-country rallying In the post-Cold war world the most important and dangerous conflicts will be between people who belong to different cultural groups. Tribal conflicts and ethnic wars will, of course, still occur within civilizations. But the key point that Huntington is making is that violence between states and groups from different civilizations carries a more dangerous potential for escalation. Huntington believes that states and cultural groups which come from the same civilizations will support their kin countries – kin country rallying.

Kin-country rallying Huntington cites Yugoslavia, the Caucusus, Kashmir and Central Asia as areas where local clashes between rival groups could escalate into wars involving core or leading states from rival civilizations. Kin states do not become involved in such conflicts because of ideology, power politics or economic interests. They become involved because of shared cultural kinship. As a result of this, the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those which occur along the fault lines between civilizations (see the map for an explanation of fault-lines).

Culture can be a unifying force 1. During the Cold War the two Germanys, the two Koreas and the many Chinas were divided by ideology but united by culture. In the post-Cold War world, Huntington argues that countries and groups with such cultural ties will increasingly come together. 2. Countries with cultural affinities cooperate politically and economically. 3. International organizations which are based on states which share a common culture are more successful than those which are not. Huntington cites the European Union as an example of this.

Culture can be a divisive force 1. Some societies are formed due to shared ideology or historical circumstance and contain groups from different civilizations. Huntington argues that such states will either come apart or be subject to great strain in the post-Cold war world. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia came apart, and both were federations which contained ethnic groups from different civilizations. Ukraine, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan and India are all currently under great strain. 2. Philosophies, values, social relations, customs and overall outlooks on life differ greatly amongst civilizations. Religion has been revitalized in many countries, and this has reinforced cultural differences.

Culture can be a divisive force 3. It is true that cultures can change, and that the impact of culture on economics and politics can vary over time within the same civilization. But Huntington believes that the major differences in political and economic development between different civilizations are clearly rooted in their cultural differences. He provides the following examples: East Asian economic success has its roots in East Asian culture. The difficulties that East Asian societies have had in achieving stable democratic political systems have their source in East Asian culture. Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in the Muslim world.

Multicivilizational and multipolar Huntington has made the case that international politics are multicivilizational and multipolar. It is necessary to explain what he means by this in a little more detail. He argues that the West is and will remain for years to come the most powerful civilization. However, the long-term power of the West, relative to other civilizations, is in decline. As the most powerful civilization, the West continues to assert its values and protect its interests. This presents non-Western civilizations with a choice.

Multicivilizational and multipolar Some civilizations attempt to emulate the West, to join the West, or to bandwagon with the West. Other non-Western societies, particularly Confucian and Islamic ones have attempted to develop their own economic, military and religious power in attempts to resist, or to balance against the West. Huntington believes that one of the most important features of contemporary international politics is the relationship between Western culture and power, and the culture and power of non-Western civilizations.

Summary The contemporary world is a world of nine major civilizations. Shared culture and cultural difference shape the interests, alliances and antagonisms of states. The most important countries in the world mostly come from different civilizations. The local conflicts which are most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilizations. The predominant patterns of economic and political development differ from civilization to civilization, and can be explained by cultural difference. Relative power is shifting from Western civilization to non-Western civilizations. Global politics has become multipolar and muticivilizational.

Realism – basically correct Realist theory is a highly useful starting point for analyzing international politics. Realism explains much state behavior. States are and will remain the dominant actors in international politics. However, realist theory does have some clear and important limitations. Realism assumes that all states understand their own interests in the same way, and act in the way. Realists claim that the behavior of states can be explained by reference to their power.

Realism + culture? But power is only part of the explanation. States do define their interests in terms of power, but they also define their interests in terms of many other factors. Values, culture and institutions have a substantial influence on how states define their own interests. It is true that states prioritize their own security. But different types of states define their interests in different ways. In particular, states with similar cultures and institutions believe themselves to have common interests.

The culturally-informed behavior of states Since the end of the Cold war, Huntington believes that states have increasingly defined their interests in cultural or civilizational terms. States are more likely to cooperate with states with a similar or common culture. States are more likely to form alliances with other states which share a similar or common culture. States are more often in conflict with countries with which they do not share a common culture.

The culturally-informed behavior of states States in the traditional security dilemma define threats in terms of the intentions of other states. But those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by cultural considerations. People and governments are not as likely to feel threatened by countries that they believe they can trust, because of shared language, religion, values, institutions and culture. People and governments are more likely to feel threatened by countries which have different cultures, which they find difficult to understand. As a result of this it is difficult to trust countries which are culturally different as easily.

Culturally-informed realism? Huntington’s civilization-based approach is a kind of culturally-informed realism. Huntington believes that many important developments after the end of the Cold War can be understood by using his civilizational approach or paradigm, and could have been predicted by using it. These include: the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; the wars which occurred in the former territories of these federations; the rise of religious fundamentalism throughout the world; the identity struggles which are taking places within Russia, Turkey and Mexico; economic friction between the US and Japan;

Culturally-informed realism? … the opposition of Islamic states to Western foreign policy in the Middle East; the emergence of China as a potential long-term threat to US hegemony; the efforts of Islamic and Confucian states to acquire WMD; the consolidation of democratic regimes in some countries but not in others; and the developing arms competition in East Asia.

Reading the clash of civilizations fairly Huntington acknowledges that several civilizations have INTRA-civilizational wars. The point is that such wars do not usually lead to escalation. They do not lead to kin-country rallying. The COC is NOT a triumphalist argument. Huntington argues that “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do”. Huntington argues that there are three basic responses to modernization and the West. It is possible to embrace both, reject both, or embrace the former but not the latter.

Modernization Westernization Rejectionism (Tokugawa Japan) No Kemalism (Turkey) Yes Reformism (post-Meiji Japan)

Reading the clash of civilizations fairly Huntington argues that it would be childish to think that modernization would lead to the end of the rich and varied historical cultures which make up the world’s great civilizations. In the book, Huntington argues that “To preserve Western civilization in the face of declining Western power, it is in the interest of the United States and European countries [most importantly] to recognize that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world” (pp. 311-2). Huntington is on record as saying that he did not support the US invasion of Iraq.

Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards One of the most controversial sections of the book is that in which Huntington suggests that Islam has bloody borders and bloody innards. Huntington argues that there are two levels of international politics with which we should be concerned. At the level of global politics, the most serious problems are those between the West, on one hand, and Islamic countries and China on the other. At the local level, fault-line wars between states from different civilizations provoke kin-country rallying. This increases the likelihood that core civilizational states will become involved. This increases the possibility that conflicts will escalate.

Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards When Huntington argues that Islam has bloody borders, he is arguing that fault-line wars (wars between two actors from different civilizations) are largely fought between Muslims and non-Muslims. Huntington provides quite detailed evidence to back up his claim, from three different sources (see photocopy of p. 257 of Huntington’s book). But Huntington also argues that a significant proportion of intra-civilizational wars are fought between Muslim states. Again, detailed evidence is provided on the handout.

Islam - bloody borders, bloody innards So, Islam has bloody borders because Islamic states are involved in a far higher proportion of intercivilizational conflicts. And Islam has bloody innards because Muslim states are involved in a higher proportion of intracivilizational wars than states from all other civilizations apart from African civilization.

Reasons for Muslim violence Huntington offer six reasons for what he refers to as the late-20th century upsurge in fault-line wars, and the central role of Muslims in fault-line conflicts. 1. Militarism. It is suggested that “Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and that it glorifies military values”. 2. Proximity. Muslim and non-Muslim expansion by land has resulted in Muslims and non-Muslims living in close physical proximity throughout the whole of Eurasia. There are more fault-line wars. It might therefore be reasonable to expect that there will be more fault-line wars. 3. Muslim culture is “indigestible”. Islam is an absolutist faith that merges religion and politics, and draws a sharp line between insiders and outsiders. People from other civilizations find it easier to adapt to and live with each other than they do in adopting to and living with Muslims.

Reasons for Muslim violence 4. Victim status. Muslims are, according to this argument, victims of a widespread anti-Muslim prejudice. (Anti-Semitism, imperialism, subjection). 5. The absence of one or more core states in Islam. Islam lacks a dominant central power. Potential core states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey compete with each other for influence. No one state has the authority to mediate conflict within Islamic civilization. No one state has the authority to represent islam in its dealings with the non-Muslim world. 6. There has been a demographic explosion in Muslim societies. When this happens there are large numbers of unemployed males between 15-30. this is a natural source of instability and violence within society. This discussion of Islam has attracted widespread criticism.