Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control DESIRED OUTCOME: This session is an opportunity to benchmark programs for.

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Presentation transcript:

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control DESIRED OUTCOME: This session is an opportunity to benchmark programs for the identification and control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control programs/processes. Introduce Yourself: Kelly Howard Configuration Management Section 1

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control DEFINITIONS: Configuration Control SSCs: SSCs that are part of the current plant configuration but which are not described or referred to in the text of the UFSAR Expanded definition: Failure of these systems, structures or components are evaluated to not have any direct or indirect effect on the design, function of method of performing the function of systems, structures or components as described in the safety analysis report. Process for modification: Non-Design Configuration Change – Design Change Package “lite” Changes to these SSCs do not: Affect the reactor coolant system pressure boundary Affect the function of the SSCs required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown Affect the function of the SSCs required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, including fire Affect the function of the SSCs described in the safety analysis report for regulatory compliance (e.g., AMSAC) 2

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control DEFINITIONS: Exempt SSCs: SSCs or portions thereof, which have been excluded from Configuration Management entirely. Expanded definition: These SSCs and support connections, up to and including the first isolation device, such as isolation valves, breakers, etc. are exempted from all CM controls. Process for modification: No engineering involvement is required. Facilities department changes parts and design as required to match plant needs. 3

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control How do you do it? How many classifications does your station have for components out of design control? Discuss 4

How are new SSCs identified to be removed from design control? Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control How do you do it? How are new SSCs identified to be removed from design control? What is your approval process to remove SSCs from design control? Discuss: Typically we get a call on Thursday afternoon from Facilities, saying they need to work on it over the weekend. Approval Process: Who makes the approval? 5

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control How do you do it? What level of engineering support is required for changes to the component? Discuss: Formal process? 10CFR50.59 screen required? Who are the approvers? 6

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control How do you do it? How is the separation line between SSCs in design control and those outside design control communicated? Discuss: Shown on a drawing? Is there a list? 7

Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control How do you do it? Are any of these SSCs outside design control classified as Critical Digital Assets (CDA) or could they (or their documentation) be used to create Safeguards Information (SGI)? Discuss: Many of our components were exempted from design control prior to CDA becoming an issue. 8

How is work controlled on these components and who works on them? Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control How do you do it? How is work controlled on these components and who works on them? Discuss: 9

What can we take back home? Identification/control of permanent SSCs which are outside of Design Control Good ideas What can we take back home? Will you suggest any changes to your process based on what you have heard today? Discuss: 10