IOT SECURITY CARE FOR SOME.

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Presentation transcript:

IOT SECURITY CARE FOR SOME

WHOAMI Srdjan Radojcic BSc Geomatics, MSc Mechatronics Radio Amateur Member of Maker community IoT background (LoRa, Zigbee, BLE, RFID…) Linux developer

First (IoT) Project

WHAT IS SDR? Software cheap(??), hardware expensive Therefore, more software, cheaper hardware Not everything, ofc. (Really?) RF front-end

WHAT IS RF FRONT END?

WHAT IS SOFTWARE PART? In brief, a software radio is a radio system which performs the required signal processing in software instead of using dedicated integrated circuits in hardware. The benefit is that since software can be easily replaced in the radio system, the same hardware can be used to create many kinds of radios for many different transmission standards; thus, one software radio can be used for a variety of applications. “What is GNU radio?” Wikipedia So basically, everything else Algorithms Middleware Flexible One platform to rule them all

BLUETOOTH LOW ENERGY GFSK 40 channels in 2.4 Hopping 3 channels, advertising 37 channels, data

UBERTOOTH RF front end Wireless Transceiver ARM processor PHY layer Link layer Packets

A LITTLE BIT ABOUT LINK LAYER What do we need to sniff Bluetooth? Access address CRC Channel(Hop interval, hop increment) Two cases Advertainment channel Data channel

PARTY STARTED WITHOUT ME ☹ Identify Access address (xx100010111101000000000000000101010xx) Determining hopping interval (t/37 = hop interval) Determining hopping increment ()

WIRESHARK Run the command: mkfifo /tmp/pipe Open Wireshark Click Capture -> Options Click "Manage Interfaces" button on the right side of the window Click the "New" button In the "Pipe" text box, type "/tmp/pipe" Click Save, then click Close Click "Start"

SO PDU IS ENCRYPTED, RIGHT? 4.0/4.1 BLE pairing Just (doesnt)WorksTM Out of Band pairing (TK could be strong, NFC etc) Passkey 4.2 BLE pairing New pairing method, Numeric comparison, both devices needs to have display ECDH Key Echcange

ZIGBEE SECURITY OVERVIEW Low Cost ☺ Low Power ☺ Low to moderate range DSSS CSMA-CA 16 channels Actually, it is not bad Few notes for developers: 802.15.4 security MAC turned off by default

ZIGBEE SECURITY, THEORY Symmetric encryption(AES 128) Message Authentication Integrity protection (MIC) Replay protection Network key(ALL devices) Link key(Two devices)

ZEGBEE SECURITY, REALITY They imagine it right So, how whey implemented it? Keys Preinstalled Out of Band Key establishment Trust centre default LINK key NDA-protected shared master key Signal strength No pair key

TOOLS FOR SNIFFING USAP Kisbee (Kismet) CC2531(Very nice software TI SmartRF Protocol Packet Sniffer) Atmel RZRAVEN(killerbee)

Keynotes about LoRa LoRa(Long Range) 868/915 MHz 8 Channels Unique CSS modulation LoRa vs LoRaWAN

LoRa join OTAA Node has unique 128bit APPkey Message is not encrypted but signed Server calculates AppSKey and NwkSkey ABP No need for joining Unique DevAdr + AppSKey and NwkSkey “Each device should have a unique set of NwkSKey and AppSKey. Compromising the keys of one device shouldn't compromise the security of the communications of other devices.” “The process to build those keys should be such that the keys cannot be derived in any way from publicly available information (like the Node address for example)”

Key notes about... RFID Garage doors Cars