draft-huston-kskroll-sentinel

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Presentation transcript:

draft-huston-kskroll-sentinel Geoff Huston Joao Damas Warren Kumari

Measuring KSK Roll Readiness Getting resolvers to report on their local trusted key state Resolvers that support the RFC8145 signal mechanism periodically include the key tag of their locally trusted keys into a query directed towards the root servers But: An aggregated signal is only visible to root servers DNS forwarders and local caching confuse attribution efforts The number of users that exclusively rely on reporting resolvers is not apparent It is unknown whether the user has alternate resolvers that they can use

User-Side Measurement Can we devise a DNS query that could reveal the state of the trusted keys of the resolvers that the user actually invokes back to the user? Not within the current parameters of DNSSEC and/or resolver behaviour But what if we could change resolver behaviour? Just as RFC8145 required a change in resolver behaviour We propose a change to the resolver’s reporting of validation outcome depending on the resolver’s local trusted key state: If a query contains the label “_is-ta-<key-tag>” then a validating resolver will report validation failure if the key is NOT in the local trusted key store If a query contains the label “_not-ta-<key-tag>” then a validating resolver will report validation failure if the key IS in the local trusted key store

User-Side Measurement Three DNS queries: _is-ta-4066.<some.signed.domain> _not-ta-4066.<some.signed.domain> <badly-signed>.<some.signed.domain> Single Resolver Analysis: Resolver Behaviour Type Loaded New KSK NOT loaded New KSK Mechanism not supported Not validating Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 A SERVFAIL SERVFAIL SERVFAIL A SERVFAIL A A SERVFAIL A A A

User-Side Measurement Multiple Resolver Analysis A SERVFAIL response will cause the user to repeat their query to other locally configured resolvers. In a multi-resolver scenario, and where forwarders are used, we can still determine if the user will be impacted by the KSK roll User Impact OK NOT OK Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 A SERVFAIL SERVFAIL SERVFAIL A SERVFAIL A A SERVFAIL SERVFAIL SERVFAIL SERVFAIL A A A UNKNOWN NOT Impacted

Measuring User Impact Use these tests in a script to allow users to test the state of their DNS environment: If the user can resolve Query 1, and SERVFAILs on Query 2 and Query 3 then the user is able to validate using the nominated key as a trusted key If the user SERVFAILS on Query 1, resolves Query 2 and SERVFAILs on Query 3 then the user is unable to validate using the nominated key as a trusted keys If the user SERVFAILS on Query 3 then the result is indeterminate Otherwise, the user will not be impacted by the KSK roll

Privacy and Security Considerations This test itself does not reveal which resolvers are used by end users in resolving names The query itself need not contain any end user identifying material The methodology never changes “insecure” to ”authenticated” – it will only change “authenticated” to “insecure” depending on the resolver’s local trusted key state when resolving certain labels Anyone can set up a test condition within their delegated part of the DNS The results of the test are passed back only to the user in the form of a resolution outcome

Questions Should this label be at any location in the name or should it be specified to be the left-most label? I can’t think of any other questions – maybe you can!