Summary of Access Control Rules Processing

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Presentation transcript:

Summary of Access Control Rules Processing Group Name: SEC Source: Phil Hawkes, Wolfgang Granzow, Josef Blanz Meeting Date: 2014-05-28 Agenda Item: #10.6

Objective This slide deck describes how the Access Control Rules given in privileges or selfPrivileges attributes can be processed to derive the access decision This presentation is complementary to the proposed text for TS-0003 in contribution SEC-2014-0285R04 We hope this slide deck eases understanding of the proposed terminology, introduced definitions and the access control decision logic, in order to simplify the discussion

Representation of access control rules (1) Each privileges attribute is a set of „access control rules“ (curly brackets are used to denote a set = { ... }) acrs = { acr(1), acr(2), ..., acr(k), ..., acr(K) } Each access control rule acr(k) is represented as an „access-control-rule-tuple“ of three elements: acr(k) = { acr(k)_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)_accessControlOperations, acr(k)_accessControlContexts } accessControlOriginators : set of parameters of any type defined in Table 9.6.2.1-1 Examples: {CSE-ID1, AE-ID1, AE-ID2, entityGroup1, entityGroup2}, {all} AccessControlOperations: set of operations that can be authorized Examples: {Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, Discover, Notify}, {Retrieve, Discover, Notify}

Representation of access control rules (2) accessControlContexts: a set of M accessControlContext parameters accessControlContexts = { accessControlContext(1), …, accessControlContext(m), …, accessControlContext(M) } accessControlContext: set of context constraints where each context constraint consists of 3 parts: accessControlContext= { accessControlTimeWindows, accessControlLocationRegions, accessControlIpAddresses }

Representation of access control rules (3) accessControlTimeWindows represents a set of time windows in which access is permitted Example: {04:30 – 06:00, 11:30 – 12:30, 22:15 – 00:30} e.g. hours UTC time accessControlLocationRegions represents a set of locations from where access is permitted Example: {geoRegion1, geoRegion2, geoRegion3} accessControlIpAddresses represents a set of permitted IPv4/IPv6 addresses or address blocks Example (IPv4): {212.75.201.105, 88.77.0.0/16, 116.27.123.0/24} NOTE: the exact formats of the above parameter representations are TBD

Processing of Access Control Rules (1) The parameters associated with a request, which are evaluated against the parameters contained in the access control rules (acrs) , are denoted as follows: rq_orig: originator of the request (i.e. URI of the originating entity) rq_op: operation requested (i.e. Create, Retrieve, Update, etc.) rq_time: time when the request was received (e.g. time in hh:mm:ss UTC, exact format TBD) rq_ip: IP address of the originator (i.e. set of IPv4/IPv6 addresses, address blocks or address prefixes) rq_loc: location information about the originating entity (format TBD)

Processing of Access Control Rules (2) Notation: „res_origs(k)“ means: the binary result (TRUE/FALSE or 1/0) of evaluating the originator of a request („rq_orig“) against the accessControlOriginators included in the kth access control rule („acr(k)_accessControlOriginators“). Definition: 1 (TRUE) if rq_orig matches acr(k)_originators res_origs(k) = 0 (FALSE) else

Processing of Access Control Rules (3) 1 (TRUE) if request matches any of the access control rules res_acrs(k) = 0 (FALSE) else Can be derived recursively as follows: res_acrs = res_acr(1) OR res_acr(2) ... OR res_acr(k) … OR res_acr(K) res_acr(k) = res_origs(k) AND res_ops(k) AND res_ctxts(k), k = 1…K Definition set operator „ismember“: 1 (TRUE) if x ∈ SetX ismember(x, SetX) =

Processing of Access Control Rules (4) Then res_origs(k), res_ops(k) and res_ctxts(k) can be derived as: res_origs(k) = ismember(rq_orig, acr(k)_accessControlOriginators) res_ops(k) = ismember(rq_op, acr(k)_ accessControlOperations) res_ctxts(k) = res_context(k, 1) ... OR res_context(k, m) ... OR res_context (k, M_k) where, res_context(k, m) = res_time(k, m) AND res_ip(k, m) AND res_loc (k, m) and (for k = 1…K and m = 1…M_k) res_time(k, m) = ismember(rq_time, acr(k)_accessControlTimeWindows(m)) res_ip(k, m) = ismember(rq_ip, acr(k)_accessControlIpAddresses(m)) res_loc (k, m) = ismember(rq_loc, acr(k)_accessControlLocationRegions(m))