The mind as a ‘tabula rasa’ Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing
Tabula rasa Do all our concepts derive from experience or are some of the innate? Locke: at birth (or when consciousness begins), the mind is a ‘tabula rasa’ (blank slate) It contains no ideas, thoughts or concepts. All our concepts derive from Sensation: perceptual experience of objects outside the mind Reflection: experience of the internal operations of our minds. © Michael Lacewing
Impressions and ideas Locke uses the term ‘idea’ to cover both sensations and concepts and thoughts But these are distinct. Hume is clearer Perceptions: what we are immediately and directly aware of. Divide into Impressions (forceful, vivid, related to feeling and sensing) Divide into impressions of sensation and of reflection Ideas (less forceful, vivid, related to thinking). © Michael Lacewing
Impressions and ideas Ideas are ‘faint copies’ of impressions Fainter except in disease or madness. As there are impressions of sensation and reflection, so there are ideas – concepts – derived from sensation and reflection. Without a particular type of experience, a person can’t form the related concepts E.g. blind man and colours. © Michael Lacewing
Simple and complex concepts We start from simple impressions single colours, shapes, smells, etc. – not distinguishable into different impressions. We copy these to form simple concepts; we can then construct complex concepts Unite and combine impressions into a concept of a single object, e.g. ‘that dog’ Abstraction, ‘dog’ Do this creatively, e.g. ‘unicorn’. © Michael Lacewing
The missing shade of blue Are all ideas copied from impressions? A possible counterexample: A spectrum of blue with one shade missing We probably can form the idea of the missing shade So not all ideas are copied from impressions. Is this the only exception? Important, because Hume uses the ‘copy principle’ to unpack and criticise complicated concepts. © Michael Lacewing
Solutions Amend the copy principle: ‘Any ideas that are not copied from impressions are only meaningful if they could be copied from impressions.’ Keep the copy principle, but explain why the missing shade is an exception that can’t be generalized E.g. it only works for impressions that are highly similar. © Michael Lacewing
Objection Can we derive all complex ideas from simple ideas, and thus from experience? Hume: yes. E.g. ‘God’ – we extend beyond limits (infinite = not finite) the qualities of knowledge, goodness, etc., that we experience in ourselves. Counterexamples? Philosophical concepts, e.g. Knowledge Truth Beauty Substance © Michael Lacewing