James P. Howard, II University of Maryland Baltimore County

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Presentation transcript:

Estimating the Net Social Benefits of the National Flood Insurance Program James P. Howard, II University of Maryland Baltimore County Fifth Annual Conference and Meeting of the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis February 21, 2013 Missouri floods in the 1920s caused significant damage. Private insurers pulled out of the market for decades. Gilbert White proposed national flood insurance in 1942. After initial trials in 1956, NFIP comes in 1968 Changes include introduction of flood mitigation standards --and requirements for actuarial soundness

Flood Disaster Management Flood recovery Insurance program/payout Federally administered Privately financed Flood mitigation Dams, flood control Building codes Planning laws Flood Insurance implemented to piggy back on homeowners policies FEMA manages the National Flood Insurance Fund Traditional insurers provide administrative duties Severe losses from major storms. --Katrina hit ~16B losses --Rita ~2B losses Flood mitigation comes from three programs FMA SRL RLF United States Geological Survey

Data Benefit-Cost Analysis Willingness-to-Pay for Flood Insurance Provided by FEMA: NFIP financial statements FMA grant summaries County-level data Study period is 1996-2010 Willingness-to-Pay for Flood Insurance Heinz Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment Survey data and financial data, collected 1998 This is fundamentally an economic analysis Will cover from 1996-2010 Will address both flood mitigation and flood recovery Have recoded info for local governments Statewide-allocation issues - by population makes distribution more equitable - by income biases toward inequitable

NFIP Theoretical Model Benefits Costs Insurance claims paid to victims Administrative fees paid to insurance companies Marginal Excess Tax Burden Willingness-to-pay for Flood insurance Insurance premiums paid to the program Environmental impacts of the program BCA may be considered as a balance sheet, looking like an accounting question BCA can also be considered as the sum of economic surpluses contributing to the NSB Delta-S is the change in S due to the program This takes advantage of that thought to simplify the development of the flood insurance NSB model

Valuing Flood Insurance ∆S = ∆C + ∆P + ∆G + ∆E ⇓ ∆S = λγ + φωπ − κ + mκ λ = covered amount γ = WTP for flood insurance φ = administrative fees ω = premiums paid to NFIP π = profitability ratio κ = claims against NFIP m = METB This is the key equation in valuing the flood insurance component represents 1 year's net social benefits

Estimating the WTP Calculated using Tobit censored-data model Data from Heinz survey on flood insurance Dependent variable is amount of flood insurance purchased Control variable for price is unknown, but estimated at lower and upper bounds The exact premium paid is unknown so the lower figure represents the WTP at the lower-bound estimate and the upper figure represents the WTP at the upper-bound estimate. Model 1 is a model including all respondents, including participants and non-participants Model 2 is a model only including those who do not believe they are required to carry NFIP insurance Model 3 is a model only including those who are not required to carry NFIP insurance

WTP for Flood Insurance Controls for several factors, e.g., location and presumed risk Price coefficient may be biased due to endogeneity in deciding to purchase flood insurance Cost / $100 of coverage Model Lower Upper Model 1 0.4971 0.9378 Model 2 0.6276 1.1999 Model 3 0.0831 0.1276 The exact premium paid is unknown so the lower figure represents the WTP at the lower-bound estimate and the upper figure represents the WTP at the upper-bound estimate. Model 1 is a model including all respondents, including participants and non-participants Model 2 is a model only including those who do not believe they are required to carry NFIP insurance Model 3 is a model only including those who are not required to carry NFIP insurance

FMA Theoretical Model Uses 2050 FMA grants during the study period Benefits transfer Uses estimates of other mitigation projects Scales-up estimates to national level Assumes estimate is broadly applicable across time Uses 2050 FMA grants during the study period Estimates returns to the year 2010 Artificially discounts more recent grants due unrealized returns BCA may be considered as a balance sheet, looking like an accounting question BCA can also be considered as the sum of economic surpluses contributing to the NSB Delta-S is the change in S due to the program This takes advantage of that thought to simplify the development of the flood insurance NSB model

Valuing Flood Mitigation 2005 MMC report Based on sample of 28 FEMA grants Used Hazus-US report to estimate benefit-cost ratio BCR = 5.0 at 2% SDR ⇓ ≅17.4% annualized Multihazard Mitigation Council. (2005). Natural hazard mitigation saves: an independent study to asses the future savings from mitigation activities. National Institute of Building Sciences. Washington. This is what the Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council found forms a major baseline in establishing the NSB of flood mitigation today BCR is lifetime returns (at 50 years). MMC report premised on funds spent in year 0 and a useful lifetime of 50 years The 2% SDR is removed and we are free to apply our own SDR

Atkinson Distributional Weight Net Social Benefits—2010 Atkinson Distributional Weight WTP Est. Premium ε = 0.0 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.5 ε = 0.75 ε = 1.0 Model 1 Lower 60,832 48,492 36,899 26,435 14,597 Upper 144,186 119,943 100,776 86,487 71,216 Model 2 85,510 69,646 55,811 44,214 31,359 193,764 162,441 138,770 122,206 104,893 Model 3 -17,485 -18,642 -23,118 -29,890 -38,601 -9,068 -11,426 -16,667 -23,925 -32,884 Millions of 2010 dollars

Conclusions Estimate of WTP for flood insurance causes wide swings in NSB estimate Aversion to income inequality causes smaller, but pronounced swings in NSB estimate If NSB is positive, the benefit is coming indirectly from government funds Large NFIP debt to Treasury Congress will have to address the large debt at some point

Acknowledgements Scott Farrow, UMBC Craig Landry, ECU Advising and Review Grant Support Scott Farrow, UMBC Craig Landry, ECU UMBC Graduate Student Association