A Pro-competition, Anti-corruption Program for Public Procurement William E. Kovacic George Washington University/King’s College London ACF 13th Annual Conference Hong Kong, 11 December 2017

This Morning’s Agenda Why Care? Difficulties Solutions Caveat: Personal Views Only Contact: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu

Some Findings Based on Joint Work Alison Jones Marianela Lopez-Galdos Special Thanks Damos Anderson Emma Cronenweth

Procurement: Why Care? Big Money Large Economic Harm Enduring Cynicism

Car Wash: Brazil The Unanticipated Corruption Case What’s at Stake? At home In the region Globally Rank: Current Competition Cases Rank: Competition Cases since 1889

Leonard Francis: “Fat Leonard”

The Fat Leonard Case: United States Marine Services for US Navy in Asian Region Hundreds of Millions of Dollars Dozens of US Navy Officers and Procurement Officials Corrosive Public Cynicism

Possible Policy Improvements Trip-wires and Remedies Personnel Cooperation Networks at Home and Abroad Common Research Agenda

Difficulties for Anti-Collusion and Anti-Corruption Politically Explosive Example: Indonesia Anti-Corruption: Frankenstein’s Monster Examples: Brazil and Ukraine Cooperation Transaction Costs

Better Trip-wires and Remedies Trip Wires: False Statements, False Claims Certificate of Independent Pricie Determination Bounties: Qui Tam Mechanism of the US Civil False Claims Act

Personnel Procurement Teams Competition Agencies

Cooperation at Three-Levels: Antitrust, Procurement, Anti-Corruption Top Leadership Senior Managers Program-level Case Handlers Specific matters

Methods Commonality Devices Interagency Case Teams Secondments Guidelines Studies Consultations

Common Global Research Agenda Case Assessments Compare: Electrical equipment, lysine Compliance: accident reconstructions Patterns in governance, management (“rogues”?) Market Studies Data Reporting and Collection: e.g., Chemicals Comparative Study: The Course Former officials, case studies