Exploitation and the Perversion of Social Capital in Exchange Networks: Two Social-Psychological Models and a Proposed Experiment Phillip Bonacich, U.C.L.A.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Rawlsian Contract Approach Attempts to reconcile utilitarianism and intuitionism. Attempts to reconcile utilitarianism and intuitionism. Theory of distributive.
Advertisements

Fairness and Social Welfare Functions. Deriving the Utility Possibility Frontier (UPF) We begin with the Edgeworth Box that starts with individual 1,and.
Network Matrix and Graph. Network Size Network size – a number of actors (nodes) in a network, usually denoted as k or n Size is critical for the structure.
Section 3 Types of Social Interaction. Journal #25 What did you discover about in-groups at MKS?
Chapter 4 Social Structure
Fehr and Falk Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market Economics 328 Spring 2005.
Chapter 6 © 2006 Thomson Learning/South-Western Game Theory.
1 chapter: >> First Principles Krugman/Wells Economics
Portfolio Analysis and Theory
The Commons Dilemma. Hardin's (1968) work represents the first major contemporary analysis of the commons dilemma. Harding noted that there are no effective.
Do Networks Facilitate Collective Action? John T. Scholz Florida State University.
Developing a Partner Reward Strategy – to build competitive advantage Peter Scott Consulting
Economics for Business II Day 12 – Some Macro Numbers and Answers Dr. Andrew L. H. Parkes “A Macroeconomic Understanding for use in Business” 卜安吉.
Organizing ideas and writing the outline
Microsociology: Testing Interaction Theories “Social Psychology”
Chapter 9 : SOCIAL NETWORKS Learning Objectives  Understand the social network vocabulary  Know why social networks and networking are valuable  Learn.
Reputational advantages and disadvantages of punishment toward norm-violators Yutaka Horita Toshio Yamagishi Hokkaido University 13th international conference.
Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3: Seung Hoon Lee.
Lecture 2 Economic Actors and Organizations: Motivation and Behavior.
Exchange, Cooperation, and Reciprocity Liang Jie Nov 4,2002.
ANOVA and Linear Regression ScWk 242 – Week 13 Slides.
Methodology Matters: Doing Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences ICS 205 Ha Nguyen Chad Ata.
Economics of Standards Economics of Standards The Standardization Problem - An Economic Analysis.
CHAPTER 2 Research Methods in Industrial/Organizational Psychology
Social Exchange Theory Professor Tamara S. Arrington University of Kentucky Bluegrass Community and Technical College.
Lecture by: Jacinto Fabiosa Fall 2005 Consumer Choice.
THE GUIDE TO ECONOMIC THINKING
OVERCOMING COORDINATION FAILURE THROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD CHOICE ~AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY~ Maastricht University Arno Riedl Ingrid M.T. Rohde Martin Strobel.
Game theory Chapter 28 and 29
Chapter 13 Basis Adjustments to Partnership Property
Production and Cost in the Firm
Assignment pts - Ethical Framework
Exchange Chapter 31 Niklas Jakobsson Click to add notes.
Theoretical issues Traits capture relatively stable individual differences. They are assumed to be relatively stable over time. They are also assumed to.
Choice Behavior One.
Voting Power Centrality
THE LOGIC OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE: THE FOUNDATION OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY
6 The Manager as a Decision Maker.
Zoolinomics The Economics of Zoo Keeping
Social Exchange Theory
CHAPTER 2 Research Methods in Industrial/Organizational Psychology
Pairings FIDE Arbiter Seminar.
Psychology as a science
Game theory Chapter 28 and 29
Development and Theorists
Social Exchange Theory
IS Psychology A Science?
SOCI 102/122 Diversity of Peoples and Cultures
Stage 6: Deciding on basic moral principles by which you will live your life and relate to everyone fairly rare people have considered many values and.
The Sick role and illness behavior
European Network of e-Lexicography
Index Section 1: Rolling a die Section 2: Master table 14:29.
Utility Maximization Ch7
Understanding Social Exchange Theory
IS Psychology A Science?
Theoretical issues Traits capture relatively stable individual differences. Traits are assumed to be relatively stable over time. Traits are also assumed.
The Sick role and illness behavior
Theories of Altruism Contrast two theories of altruism.
Computer-Mediated Communication
Pairings FIDE Arbiter Seminar.
Analysis and Interpretation of Experimental Findings
Games with Imperfect Information Bayesian Games
Thinking Like An Economist
Value Based Reasoning and the Actions of Others
Psychological Research Methods and Statistics
Descriptive Statistics
Chapter 6 Existential Therapy.
Chapter 34 Welfare Key Concept: Arrow’s impossibility theorem, social welfare functions Limited support of how market preserves fairness.
DEV 501: THE THEORY OF CONSUMER CHOICE
Presentation transcript:

Exploitation and the Perversion of Social Capital in Exchange Networks: Two Social-Psychological Models and a Proposed Experiment Phillip Bonacich, U.C.L.A. July 8, 2010 As a student of social networks I am best known for developing measures of centrality in networks, but I am also a social psychologist. Today I will present a model of power that I’m working on and intend, eventually, to test with laboratory experiments

Exploitation The inequality in power that tens to emerge when two individuals differ in their dependency on one another. Exploitation is a network phenomena because dependency refers to the availability of alternative relations

Exploitation can be benevolent

Exploitation can be malevolent

Or exploitation can be inadvertent

Some Principles of Exchange The Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Reciprocity: Return favors Exploitation: Exploit others who are dependent on you.

Reciprocity is a strong principle There is much research on the strength of the principle of reciprocity in human affairs. Natural selection may have operated to make us cooperate with those who cooperate with us.

Reciprocity can be perverted, according to Peter Blau “The principle of reciprocity operates on the basis of equality between all those linked by the cycle of reciprocity. Its malfunction leads to inequality, but that is an abnormal situation.” “To surpass a rival in generosity, to crush him if possible under future obligation, which is hoped he cannot meet, thus taking from him privileges, titles, rank, authority and prestige.”

The power-dependence approach PAB = DBA The power of A over B equals the dependence of B upon A. B is dependent A to the degree to which he receives valuable rewards unavailable elsewhere. Blau is discussing sociopathic misuses of resources to put others in situations of submission. The power-dependence approach, developed by the sociologists Peter Blau, George Homans, and Richard Emerson, sees some amount of exploitation of dependence as a normal and unavoidable feature of social life. It has been used, for example, to explain differences in power in marriage between working and non-working spouses, where the former have greater economic and social opportunities outside the relationship. Revolutionary Road. Kate Winslet (April Wheeler) and Leonardo DiCaprio (Frank Wheeler)

Linda Molm’s Experiment Linda Molm, a sociologist as the University of Arizona, has done extensive research on exchange and has created an experiment that can be used to study power and dependence. I am not modeling exploitation in general but her experiment in particular – to suggest a set of predictions if I were to run a variant of her experiment, which I plan to do, NSF be willing. Social psychology advances if everyone uses the same tools

Conditions At each trial subjects chose one of their contacts to reward. The reward was costless to the giver. There were a large number of trials. Subjects were not aware of the shape of the network or, naturally, their position within it. Subjects knew how much of their limited resources they gave others but not how much their gifts were worth to others. Some pairs could reward each other with many more (four times as many) points than could other pairs. Dotted lines

Molm’s results The guiding principle was reciprocity: subjects in advantaged positions did not exploit their more dependent partners. A and B exchanged equally and fully, as did C and D. How can exploitation occur if actors were not aware of the dependence of others?

Model For Reciprocity

Implications Of Reciprocity

This was the result.

Exploitation vs. Reciprocity

What if B behaves rationally while others reciprocate What if B behaves rationally while others reciprocate? Earnings of all positions as a function of how frequently B rewards A. However, I’s clear that A and D are at a disadvantage. B’s rewards to A are so much greater than D’s. B can get A to reciprocate easily and use his other opportunities to encourage C to reciprocate. This chart is from simulations. All actors except B are assumed to behave according to the principle of reciprocity. The X axis shows the relative frequency with which B rewards A.

Frequency with which A and C reward B as a function of how frequently B rewards A Again, the X axis is the frequency with which B rewards A. B doers not have to reward A very much to get his undivided loyalty while still encouraging frequent rewards from C.

The A and X matrices for the Box Network C changed into A and P changed into X, as I thought of the allocation as a proportion of ones resources rather thab as a probability.

Reciprocity and Dependence Fitting the Molm experimental design, the dependence of j on i (and the power of i over j) is the proportion of j’s rewards he receives from i. This should also equal how much of his resources j gives I, under reciprocity.

I Model T(ransitional): Actors want to reciprocate The pattern of results is insensitive to the choice of alpha.

II Actors initiate reciprocity in others

Maximizing rewards Assume this maximization occurs with respect to every i and j.

Maximizing Behavior in Four-person Box Network C D x .94 ,06 .21 .79 X .06 reward .90 6.92 power 2.23 5.55 Power is total dependence, weighted by value of tie: power i = a ji D ji So far, in every network I’ve looked at, the results are in a “Nash equilibrium”: no one has a unilateral incebtive to change.

Reciprocity versus exploitation Rewards represented by size of disk.

Tee Network These networks will seem odd. They are chosen because they have been experimented on. Everyone has alternative relations.

Maximizing Behavior in Tee network C D E x .82 .18 .19 X .62 .54 .46 .07 .86 reward .83 6.72 5.92 2.20 power 1.59 9.03 4.29 2.49

Reciprocity versus exploitation Add tee with another A position

Un-analyzable

Un-analyzable

Model A(ltered)

New A and X matrices

4-line giving using Model A B C D .003 .997 .064 1.104 .832

Giving in Star Network Using Model A B C D 1.873 .376 .818 .184

New experiment: full information