Sovereign Debt: Risk management and contingent debt

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The euro crisis Lars Calmfors Fores 14 January 2014.
Advertisements

Credit Derivatives.
Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds Andrew G Haldane, Adrian Penalver, Victoria Saporta and Hyun Song Shin.
Structural balance macro imbalances and fiscal surveillance Lucio R. Pench Director for Fiscal Policy European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs.
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Credit Risk in Derivative Pricing Frédéric Abergel Chair of Quantitative Finance École Centrale de Paris.
SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY. Goals of Bankruptcy Regimes Ex-post efficiency: once bankruptcy is triggered –Maximize total value –Ensure growth: clean slate Ex-ante.
Economic Experience and Crisis in the Euro Zone Carlos Hurtado* The Restructuring and Resolution of External Sovereign Debt World Bank. Annual Law, Justice.
Restoring Debt Sustainability through Debt Restructuring Presented by: Zita Magaña Perez Ministry of Finance and Economic Development June
1 A Strategy for Fiscal Adjustment When the Recovery Takes Hold Paolo Mauro November 17, 2009 Bangkok.
“Today, there are three kinds of people: the have's, the have-not's, and the have-not- paid-for-what-they-have's.“ Earl Wilson.
INBU 4200: International Financial Management Professor Michael Palmer Leeds School of Business Fall Semester, 2010.
Macroeconomic Policy in the Eurozone: Are There Alternatives to Slow Growth and High Unemployment? Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director Center for Economic and Policy.
Carlo Cottarelli Director, Fiscal Affairs Department October 2011.
BSE-IMC-NIPFP Budget Roundtable: Public Debt Management Agency Tarun Ramadorai April 2015.
Macroeconomic Policy in the Eurozone: Are There Alternatives to Slow Growth and High Unemployment? Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director Center for Economic and Policy.
Debt Sustainability: A Practitioner’s view. Emerging Markets Analysis & Multilateral Organisations a situation in which a borrower is expected to be able.
Austerity in the Eurozone: It’s Not Working Mark Weisbrot Center for Economic and Policy Research
The Quest for Lasting Financial Stability Centre International d'Etudes Monétaires et Bancaires José Viñals Financial Counsellor International Monetary.
June 2001 Universita’ degli Studi di Bergamo Corso di dottorato di ricerca 1 Asset/Liability Management Models in Insurance.
Daniel Bauer Ulm University DFG Research Training Group 1100 Frederik Weber Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
Dynamic Portfolio Management Process-Observations from the Crisis Ivan Marcotte Bank of America Global Portfolio Strategies Executive February 28, 2013.
© RAINER MAURER, Pforzheim Prof. Dr. Rainer Maure Prof. Dr. Rainer Maurer Digression: The Eurozone Debt Crisis 2010.
Finance for Actuaries Interest Rate Sensitive Insurance Products 2000 Investment Conference Jeroen van Bezooyen Shyam Mehta.
Carlo Cottarelli Director, Fiscal Affairs Department September 2011.
New Narrative for Europe (and for the monetary union after the crisis) Lamfalussy Lecture series Budapest, 2 February 2015 Reform and Prosperity in the.
Charts and Tables from “An Attempt to Think Through the Greek Crisis,” GaveKal A Look at Euro Zone Sovereign Debt Markets.
Bond Markets in Latin America: Comments on Recent Proposals Alejandro Werner April, 2003.
Issues in the Choice of a Monetary Regime for India Warwick J. McKibbin & Kanhaiya Singh.
2UN Multi-stakeholder Meeting Debt sustainability: a Paris Club perspective Emmanuel MOULIN Secretary general of the Paris Club New-York – March 7, 2005.
ECON 5570: Money and Banking
The eurozone crisis: how banks and sovereigns came to be joined at the hip Ashoka Mody and Damiano Sandri Presented by Caterina Rho May 15, 2013.
Lecture 5 Valuing Bonds Professor Paul Howe. Professor Paul Howe.5-2 Lecture Outline 5.1 Bond Cash Flows, Prices, and Yields 5.2 Dynamic Behavior of Bond.
Comments on “Policy Trade-offs for Unprecedented Times” Mauricio Cardenas, Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative Brookings Institution April.
1 Understanding Financial Crises Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale Clarendon Lectures in Finance June 9-11, 2003.
Growth-indexed Bonds Advantages Help avoid defaults and collateral damage Help avoid defaults and collateral damage Avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policy Avoid.
Brazil’s Currency Crisis. 2 Brazil: Recent Problems (2002) 40% devaluation of the Real against the dollar Large public debt (~60% of GDP), default risk.
Argentina’s ongoing policy challenges Central Bank of Argentina Alfonso Prat-Gay Governor Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics, May 2004.
Policy Trade-offs for Unprecedented Times: Confronting the Global Crisis in Latin America, IADB, 2009 (A. Izquierdo & E. Talvi, coordinators) Ernesto Talvi,
 Why do we have international financial crises? How do these crises influence economy and politics in each country?  AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IPE STRUCTURES.
API Prof.J.Frankel Lecture 3: Country Risk 1.The portfolio-balance model with default risk. 2.Default. 3.What determines sovereign spreads? 4.Debt.
International Finance Program Dr. Antony Mueller.
“Debt and Credit, Growth and Crises” Bank of Spain and the World Bank Madrid, Spain 19 June,
1 From ‘Fear of Floating’ to Targeting Inflation: Comments on Arora (IMF) and Grandes, Peter and Pinaud (OECD) Prof Eric Schaling* *Department of Economics,
S E P T E M B E R B U I L D I N G A D E B T S T R A T E G Y : T H E B R A Z I L I A N E X P E R I E N C E Anderson Caputo D. Silva Head of Public.
Lecture 25: Sovereign Risk An additional factor for portfolio investors: risk of default, – called sovereign risk, in the case of risk of default by governments.
EU Debt Crisis Group 1 Day3 Pavlina Rucki, Tony Chen.
Post recession Euro Area: what are the challenges? Lucrezia Reichlin London Business School and Now-casting economics Vienna 26 November 2013.
Case Study: LDC Debt and Brady Bonds
Chapter 6 Valuing Bonds.
Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of market discipline
The European Economic Crisis: Origins and Prospect for the Future
Monetary Policy and Fiscal Soundness
Banks, Government Bonds and Default: what do the data say?
Market-Risk Measurement
GROWTH AND CRISIS IN THE European Policy Response: The Euro
Lecture 3: Country Risk The portfolio-balance model with default risk.
Overview of risks in advanced and emerging countries
Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets
Mexico’s Improved Macroeconomic Policy Framework
Issues Regarding Implications for EMU-Integration of Europe‘s Policy Response to the Fiscal Crisis Prof. Dr. Wagner.
Measures taken By the ECB, EC, FMI to tackle the crisis
Seminar on Safe Assets, Sovereign Debt, and Financial Stability
Economics of Monetary Union 11e
Sovereign debt and multiple equilibria
An Overview of Asset Prices and Liquidity Indicators
Valuation and Capital: Segregated Fund Guarantees
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
Presentation transcript:

Sovereign Debt: Risk management and contingent debt Andrea Consiglio University of Palermo Stavros A. Zenios University of Cyprus Norwegian School of Economics Wharton Financial Institutions Center

Q1 Is debt sustainable with high probability, say 95% Q1 Is debt sustainable with high probability, say 95%? Q2 If debt is unsustainable, what debt restructuring schedule will restore sustainability? Q3 What is the optimal debt financing strategy for the sovereign, with or without restructuring? The devil is in the tails www.voxeu.org, Aug. 2015

Kingdom of Atlantis debt financing It is about tradeoffs and assumptions

Outline The debate on sovereign debt restructuring Risk management for debt restructuring Sovereign contingent debt Optimizing stochastic debt sustainability analysis Case study of Greece

Ex post: Risk management for debt restructuring Q1 and Q2. Need stochastic debt sustainability analysis Incorporating risk measures Systematic synthesis of assumptions Q3. Portfolio optimization.

Ex ante: Sovereign contingent debt A sovereign debt instrument with a built-in trigger to allow standstill of payments when a crisis indicator breaches a threshold

Debate on sovereign debt restructuring

Debate on sovereign debt restructuring IMF 2013 mea culpa on Greece “Debt restructurings have often be too little and too late, failing to re-establish debt sustainability and market access in a durable way” UN General Assembly 2015 Resolution 69/319 on “Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes" (136 in favor, 6 against and 41 abstained) IMF 2015 declares Greek debt unsustainable

Debate on sovereign debt restructuring Data: Bank of Canada 2014.

Debate on sovereign debt restructuring Data: Trebesch 2011.

The issues in sovereign debt crises To default or not to default? Eaton-Gersovitz (1981), Krugman (1988), Reinhart-Rogoff (2009), Sturzenegger-Zettelmeyer (2006), Benjamin-Wright (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2011), De Grauwe (2012) Is to forgive to forget? Bulow-Rogoff (1989), Arsanalp-Blaire (2005) Cruces-Trebesch (2013), B-W (above), Wright (2012) Massive legal problems Krueger (2002), Gianviti et al. (2013), Buchheit et al. (2013), Delays in resolving crisis destroy value

The issues in sovereign debt crises Endogenously determine debt limit and fiscal space Mendoza and Oviedo (2009), Blanchard et al. (1990) Optimal debt financing Barro (many), Bohn (many), Angelettos (2002), Bolder (2011) Tradeoffs Missale (1997) Assumptions Panizza (in half hour)

The issues in sovereign debt crises What happens if problem is infeasible? Synthesis with sufficient granularity for operations Term structure of legacy debt “Need for development of criteria for “optimal” debt restructuring process” (Wright 2012, Harvard Business Law Review) Risk management has not been part of analysis Operational models are missing

Risk management for debt restructuring

Risk management for debt restructuring Debt dynamics Re-finance debt of different maturities Look at debt flows Look at alternative debt structures

Risk management for debt restructuring States and paths determine conditional and unconditional information flow

Risk management for debt restructuring Scenario dependent debt dynamics D is the term structure of debt (multiple issues) r is the term structure of sovereign rates NB can be state-dependent SF can be state-contingent Scenario tree integrates economic and financial risk factors Objective and risk neutral probabilities (Consiglio, Carollo, Zenios, Quantitative Finance, 16:201-212, 2016)

Risk management for debt restructuring Sovereign issues xn(j) nominal value of instrument j at node n

Joint Stock and Flow model

Risk management for debt restructuring: Flow model

Risk measures Worst case Risk neutral Coherent

Risk management for debt restructuring: Stock model Conditional Debt-at-Risk (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000)

Risk management for debt restructuring: Joint stock and flow model

Risk management for debt restructuring: Joint stock and flow constraints Specifying xn(j) Fixed mix (simple rules) Adaptive fixed mix Stochastic program

Risk management for debt restructuring: Endogeneity 𝐶𝐹 𝑗 𝑛,𝑚 =𝚽 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 Risk premium 𝑟= 𝑟 𝑓 +𝛒 𝛒:=𝛒 𝑑 𝑟 𝑛 = 𝑟 𝑓 𝑛 +𝛒( 𝑑 𝑛 ) Term premium

Risk management for debt restructuring: Endogeneity 𝛒:=𝛒 𝑑

The Kingdom of Atlantis

The Kingdom of Atlantis

The Kingdom of Atlantis Constant fixed-mix (benchmark) 13.11% of GDP Adaptive fixed-mix 8.82% of GDP Stochastic program 8.32% of GDP

The Kingdom of Atlantis. Vicious and Virtuous cycles.

Case study of Greece

Case study of Greece: current debt situation

Sovereign contingent debt: From ex post to ex ante solutions

Ex ante: Sovereign contingent debt

Ex ante treatment of sovereign risk Address creditor moral hazard Deal with “neglected risks” Contingent contracts

S-CoCo designs: Trigger 30-day average CDS spread > 300 to 400bp Country Trigger Signed Program Early response Greece 24 April 2010 5 Sept. 2010 4 months Portugal 16 Nov. 2010 20 May 2011 6 months Ireland 1 Oct. 2010 16 Dec. 2010 2,5 months Spain 27 March 2012 Dec. 2012 9 months Cyprus 11 July 2011 15 May 2013 21 months

S-CoCo Pricing

Risk management for debt restructuring with CoCo

Conclusions Ex post risk management for sovereign debt Ex ante deal with uncertainty

References Consiglio, A. and Zenios, S.A. 2016 Risk management optimization for sovereign debt restructuring Journal of Globalization and Development, (Joseph Stiglitz et al., eds.) Consiglio, A. and Zenios, S.A. 2016 Contingent convertible bonds for sovereign debt risk management http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2694973 Consiglio, A., Carollo, A. and Zenios, S.A. A parsimonious model for generating arbitrage free scenario trees Quantitative Finance, 16:201-212, 2016.