University of Cambridge https://cambridge.academia.edu/KasiaJaszczolt University of Manchester, 27 January 2015 Default Semantics and Pragmatic Compositionality Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge https://cambridge.academia.edu/KasiaJaszczolt

‘How much pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?

What is expressed in the lexicon in one language What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another. What is expressed overtly in one language may be left to pragmatic inference or default interpretation in another.

Swahili: consecutive tense marker ka (1) a. …wa-Ingereza wa-li-wa-chukua wa-le maiti, 3Pl-British 3Pl-Past-3Pl-take 3Pl-Dem corpses ‘…then the British took the corpses,   b. wa-ka-wa-tia katika bao moja, 3Pl-Cons-3Pl-put.on on board one put them on a flat board, c. wa-ka-ya-telemesha maji-ni kwa utaratibu w-ote… 3Pl-Cons-3Pl-lower water-Loc with order 3Pl-all and lowered them steadily into the water…’ adapted from Givón (2005: 154)

cf. rhetorical structure rules, Asher and Lascarides 2003 Narration: (2) Lidia played a sonata. The audience applauded. e1  e2

Thai rain fall (3) f3on t1ok (3a) It is raining. (default meaning) (3b) It was raining. (possible intended meaning)

Minimalism/contextualism debate ‘Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have claimed? Contextualism: Yes. Literalism: No. (…) Like Stanley and the formal semanticists, I maintain that the semantic interpretation is grammar- driven.’ Recanati (2012: 148)

K.M. Jaszczolt, 2005, Default Semantics: Foundations of a Compositional Theory of Acts of Communication, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

K. M. Jaszczolt, 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H K. M. Jaszczolt, 2010. ‘Default Semantics’. In: B. Heine and H. Narrog (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 215-246. K. M. Jaszczolt, forthcoming (in 2015), Meaning in Linguistic Interaction: Semantics, Metasemantics, Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Assumptions The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning underdetermined. The object of study of a theory of meaning is a pragmatically modified representation. There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study.

a rationale for a radical contextualist theory (Default Semantics)

(4) A: Shall we meet tomorrow. B: I’m in London (4) A: Shall we meet tomorrow? B: I’m in London. (4a) B is in London at the time of speaking. (4b) B will be in London the following day. (4c) B can’t meet A the following day.

Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted. Experimental evidence: Pitts 2005 Schneider 2009

Merger Representation  Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations. The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. Merger representations have the status of mental representations. They have a compositional structure.

Sources of information for  (i) world knowledge (WK) (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS) (iii) situation of discourse (SD) (iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS) (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)

properties of the human inferential system IS (5) The author of The Catcher in the Rye still shocks the readership. (5a) J. D. Salinger still shocks the readership.

sources of information types of processes

Mapping between sources and processes WK  SCWD or CPI SC  SCWD or CPI WS  WS (logical form) SD  CPI IS  CD DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of  with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

Compositionality of primary meanings

Compositionality is a methodological principle: ‘…it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.’ Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)

Compositionality should be an empirical assumption about the nature of possible human languages. Szabó (2000)

Two examples of applications

Example 1 Representing Time: Pragmatic Compositionality

Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013. ‘Temporality and epistemic commitment: An unresolved question’, in: K. Jaszczolt & L. de Saussure (eds). Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 193- 209. (vol. 1 of Oxford Studies of Time in Language and Thought)

Main questions Is the human concept of time a universal concept? Probably yes Is it primitive or composed of simpler concepts? Supervenient on properties of modality How do linguistic expressions of time reflect it? Representations in Default Semantics

Supervenience A set of properties T supervenes on a set of properties M iff no two things can differ with respect to T properties without also differing with respect to M properties. ‘There cannot be a T-difference without an M-difference.’ adapted from McLaughlin & Bennett 2005

Time as Modality: Supervenience (i) supervenience of the concept of time on the concept of epistemic detachment (temporal properties on modal properties in semantics) (ii) supervenience of the concept of time on space-time (properties of the concept of time on properties of space-time). (i) + (ii): It is not just the construal of reality that requires modality; it is reality itself.

Merger Representations for the Past (6) Lidia went to a concert yesterday. (regular past) (7) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a concert, meets her school friend and tells her… (past of narration) (8) Lidia would have gone to a concert (then). (epistemic necessity past) (9) Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic necessity past) (10) Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past) (11) Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past)

Fig. 3: Degree of epistemic commitment for selected expressions with past-time reference

Acc ├ p ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that p’ Grice (2001)

ACCΔ ├ Σ ‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

amended and extended language of DRSs (Kamp and Reyle 1993)

Fig. 4: Σ for ‘Lidia went to a concert yesterday.’ (regular past)

Past-time reference in Thai (pragmatic) (12) m3ae:r3i:I kh2ian n3iy3ai: Mary write novel

Fig. 5:  for example (12) ‘Mary wrote a novel’ (regular past)

Capturing cross-linguistic differences Consecutive tense (Swahili): WS + CPIpm

Mapping Question qualitative differences between P, N, F quantitative modal differences( in ACC)

quantitative concept (ACC  ) qualitative concepts (P, N, F) (i) correlation (Modal-Contextualist view) or (ii) P, N, F as quantitative concepts (Direct-Quantitative view)

Example 2 First-person indexical

(14) I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge. The scenario: (13) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame. (14) I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge. after Perry (1979: 3)

De se Grammar/pragmatics trade-offs in conveying the intended de se meaning Representing de se reports in Default Semantics

referential semantics conflates (13) with (14): (13) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame. (14) I am to blame. x [to-blame(x)] (kasia jaszczolt)

? Grammar produces the self-referring function Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

? Grammar produces the self-referring function Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

x Pace Chierchia, cognitive access to oneself is not so ‘systematically’ excluded from the interpretation of non-pronominal expressions:   (15) Sammy wants a biscuit. (16) Mummy will be with you in a moment.

Honorifics: The first-person marker has the characteristics of both a pronoun and a noun. Pronouns and nouns are not morphologically different: like nouns, pronouns do not form a closed class; like nouns, they form the plural by adding a plural morpheme; e.g. Japanese, Thai, Burmese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, or Vietnamese Typically: ‘slave’, ‘servant’, royal slave’, ‘lord’s servant’, ‘Buddha’s servant’ are used for self-reference with self-denigration; Thai: 27 forms for first person (cf. ‘mouse’) (Siewierska 2004: 228; Heine and Song (2011); Japanese: 51 (Tanaka 2012).

Indexicals: A hasty generalization? (17) ‘I am happy.’ (indexical) (18) ‘Kasia Jaszczolt is happy.’ (non-indexical)

Neither nouns nor pronouns form a closed class; Both nouns and pronouns form the plural form by adding a plural morpheme; Pronouns are not, strictly speaking, indexicals (e.g. honorification – a compulsory social aspect of their meaning).

Spatial deixis can also be employed for self-reference (e. g Spatial deixis can also be employed for self-reference (e.g. Thai phŏm1 nii2, ‘one male this’; Japanese kotira, Korean yeogi, and Vietnamese hây, ‘here’. The use of reflexives (Japanese zibun/jibun, Vietnamese mình). Acoma (New Mexico), Wari’ (Brazil): no personal pronouns (Heine and Song 2011);

Outcome: The indexical/non-indexical distinction does not universally apply in the domain of first-person reference. This could in principle signal that there is no pure universal concept of the self that can be detached from other meanings. see Jaszczolt (2013) and Expressing the Self: Cultural Differences and Cognitive Defaults, The Leverhulme Trust Project, University of Cambridge

A stronger hypothesis: The indexical/non-indexical dichotomy does not stand up to scrutiny in the case of any natural language in that admixtures of other aspects of meaning that take the deictic term beyond the bounds of pure, direct reference can always be attested.

First-person reference is often achieved through the use of non- pronominal expressions, while pronominals convey other functions in addition to those specific for indexicals.

An argument from 1st person pronoun Kratzer (2009): pronouns can be ambiguous between a referential and a bound-variable interpretation (19) I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children. (20) Only I admitted what I did wrong. (21) Only you can eat what you cook.

Restriction: Bound-variable uses are rare, restricted, and differ from language to language Tylko ja jeden przyznałem się do błędu. only 1Sg soleSgMNom admit1SgPastM Refl to mistakeSgMGen Tylko ja jedna tutaj potrafię zajmować się Only 1Sg soleSgFNom here can1SgPres careInf Refl swoimi dziećmi. ReflPronPl Instr childPl Instr

Kratzer: bound variable pronouns are underlyingly referential pronouns whose meaning can be accounted for through context-shifting. or: they are unspecified and obtain the meaning through feature transmission from their binders in functional heads.

 Grammatical foundation of self-reference cannot be excluded.

(22) Alice wants what Lidia wants (22) Alice wants what Lidia wants. underlying ‘I’-reference (self-attribution of property) But: (23) Lidia’s mother wants what Lidia wants and that’s why she is buying her lots of scientific books. no underlying ‘I’-reference ( propositionalism)

  Languages also employ devices for signalling a degree of self-reference, Generic one and arbitrary PRO: (24) One can hear the wolves from the veranda. (25) It is scary PRO to hear the wolves from the veranda. Generic one and arbitrary (non-controlled) PRO express ‘generalizing detached self-reference.’ Moltmann (2010: 440)

Degrees of cognitive access to oneself: (26) I think I put this book back on the shelf. (27) I think I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf. (28) I put this book back on the shelf. (29) I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.  Conscious awareness is present to different degrees rather than as a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic.

The semantic category of the first-person indexical does not correspond bi-uniquely to a morphosyntactic category. ? The category of indexical expressions is not well supported on the conceptual level.

? What is the unit that undergoes such a pragmatic- compositional analysis?

Summary so far Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself defies any attempt to fit it squarely into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

This suggests that formal semantics that relies on the rigid distinction between an indexical and non-indexical expression (Kaplan 1989) needs ‘pragmaticising’ . (Jaszczolt 2012a; forthcoming)

 lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs

Reports de se/de re about oneself (30) Kasia believes that she is to blame. quasi-indexical

Default De Se (i) syntactic processing results in a de dicto reading; (ii) presuppositions added (‘equality first’), coreference is established as a default link; (iii) if  recognize (x,x), then no coreference and search continues (Maier 2009).  Default Semantics

A disclaimer: non-coreferential readings ‘Kasiax believes that shex is to blame.’ a strong tendency for coreference, van der Sandt’s (1992) (presupposition as anaphora)

Towards a (pragmatic) solution self-ascription (linguistic semantic) self-reference (linguistic pragmatic) self-attribution (epistemic) self-awareness (cognitive)

?Grammar conveys self-awareness Allocation of self-awareness to grammar is a matter of an agreement as to what we want the grammar to do: capture strong tendencies or capture patterns that underdetermine meaning.  minimalist or contextualist account

Proposal: We should not ‘split’ the power of grammar into that pertaining to the system and that pertaining to how grammar functions in utterance processing.  De se belief ascription provides strong support for a contextualist, but grammar-triggered construal

De Se in Default Semantics Bel (x,’) the individual x has the cognitive state represented as an embedded representation ’

CD  default status of de re coreference x=y (iii)  de se (= from CD, WS)

Merger representation: coreference: condition [y=x]WS the lack of self-awareness: differentiation of indexing on x and y (CD vs CPI) and the non-default use of the belief operator (CPI)

Fig. 6: Σ for ‘I believed, in a sense, I was to blame Fig. 6: Σ for ‘I believed, in a sense, I was to blame.’ (marked reading)

Fig. 7: Σ for ‘Kasia believes she is to blame.’ (default reading)

Conclusions Merger representations of Default Semantics allow us to represent lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs in expressing various concepts (e.g. temporal reference, reference to objects) in discourse. Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of Σs rather than WS. Radical contextualism seems to be the only framework that can account for the fact that words mix up indexical and non-indexical properties in one simple unit.

Self-awareness can be construed as conveyed by the grammar only when grammar is allowed to produce cancellable interpretations. This is best achieved on a contextualist account such as Default Semantics. When compositionality is shifted to the level of the merger of information (), as in DS, the differences between syntactic and pragmatic solutions to de se are rendered unimportant.

‘holistic guesswork’? ‘Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have claimed?’ Recanati (2012: 148)

radical contextualism holistic (interactive semantics) compositional (pragmatic compositionality) ?algorithmic (merger representation)

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