DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

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Presentation transcript:

DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Dr. Richard Lamb Santa Venera, Malta ION Malta 18 September 2017

DNSSEC: A Global Platform for Innovation or.. I* $mell opportunity ! *and a few others. See all the patent filings relying on DNSEC !!

Game changing Internet Core Infrastructure Upgrade “More has happened here today than meets the eye. An infrastructure has been created for a hierarchical security system, which can be purposed and re‐purposed in a number of different ways. ..” – Vint Cerf (June 2010)

Another source of trust on the Internet CA Certificate roots ~1482 Symantec, Thawte, Godaddy DNSSEC root - 1 Internet of Things IoT Content security “Free SSL” certificates for Web and e-mail and “trust agility” DANE Cross-organipltional and trans-national authentication and security Content security Commercial SSL Certificates for Web and e-mail SSL cert for tata.in can be provided by 1482 CAs including govts!! How do you know who to trust? The Internet community started by with just trying to secure the DNS but we ended up with something much more. (see Vint Cerf’s quote) With so many, trust is diluted. Used to be good when there were fewer. Any one can encrypt. Few can Identify : Encryption != Identity Examples of this problem: Comodo, MD5 crack, DigiNotar etc.. Failures. Fact is that DNS has been unfortunately used as an independent authentication tool for some time: e.g. email authentication Looking forward: Build and improve on established trust models, e.g., CAs Greatly expanded SSL usage (currently ~4M/200M) Make SMIME (secured email - SMIMEA) a reality. All email packages already have support for this. They just don’t have a way to distribute keys. /w DNSSEC – now they do. May work in concert with in enhancing or extending other cyber security efforts like digital Identities, WebID, BrowserID, CAs, .. Securing VoIP Simplify WiFi roaming security Secure distribution of configurations (e.g., blacklists, anti-virus sigs) Cryptocurrency?? Crypto currencies and e-commerce? DANE and other yet to be discovered security innovations, enhancements, and synergies E-mail security SMIME, DKIM RFC4871 Securing VoIP Login security SSHFP RFC4255 Domain Names https://www.eff.org/observatory http://royal.pingdom.com/2011/01/12/internet-2010-in-numbers/

DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Q: How do you know if the TLS/SSL certificate is the correct one? A: Store the certificate (or fingerprint/hash of it) in the DNS and sign it with DNSSEC Certificate stored in the DNS is controlled by the domain name holder. But not just for web pages. Could also be: Email, voip, chat, pgp ….

Opportunity: New Security Solutions Improved Web SSL and certificates for all* Secured e-mail (e.g., s/mime, pgp) for all* Securing VoIP Cross organizational authentication+security Secured content delivery (e.g. configurations, updates, keys) – Internet of Things Securing the Smart Grid Increasing trust in e-commerce Securing cryptocurrencies and other new models A Global Built-in PKI Configuration data examples: anti-virus signatures, blacklists, etc… Imagine if you could trust “the ‘Net” – again? Inter email server exchange (SMTP) security using DNSSEC+DANE+TLS is becoming very popular in Germany and elsewhere post-Snowden. At the 2015 Prague IETF meeting Snowden (via video conference) publicly singled out DNSSEC as a key technology for enhancing privacy. A good ref http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/ *IETF standards complete and interest by govt procurement.

A thought: Scalable Security for IoT root DNS is already there DNSSEC adds security com and crosses organipltional boundaries. google.com pl iot.pl iotdevices.iot.pl security.iot.pl electric.iot.pl car.rickshome.iotdevices.iot.pl water.rickshome.security.iot.pl aircond.rickshome.electric.iot.pl window.rickshome.security.iot.pl thermostat.rickshome.iotdevices.iot.pl meter.rickshome.electric.iot.pl door.rickshome.security.iot.pl refrigerator.rickshome.iotdevices.iot.pl Animated slide

Lots of excitement (and standards) in the Internet The underlying mechanism that secures all these processes is DANE RFC6698 (protocol), RFC6394 (use cases), RFC7671 (operational guidance) RFC7672 SMTP Security RFC7673 Chat RFC7929 PGP email RFC8162 S/MIME email OpenSSL supports DANE

Govt interest? NIST published Special Publication 1800-6, “DNS-Based E-Mail Security” https://beta.csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/1800-6/draft

DNSSEC: Internet infrastructure upgrade to help address today’s needs and create tomorrow’s opportunity. DANE is a key example.

Thank You Thanks to many including: Dan York / ISOC Email: richard.lamb@icann.org ICANN provided KSK Rollover Information and Tools: Thanks to many including: Dan York / ISOC https://www.icann.org/kskroll https://github.com/iana-org/get-trust-anchor https://go.icann.org/KSKtest youtube.com/icannnews Root Zone DNSSEC Trust Anchor: linkedin/company/icann https://data.iana.org/root-anchors www.icann.org Call for TCRs: https://www.iana.org/help/tcr-application