Graph demonstrating willingness to sacrifice across different ratios Morality in Reality Stuart, Pugh Glen Carrigan, Dr Andrew Churchill, Dr Andy Morley & Dr Lea Pilgrim. Correspondence: Stuart M. Pugh Address: School of Psychology University of Central Lancashire Preston England United Kingdom PR1 2HE Email: SMPugh@uclan.ac.uk Introduction Experiment One “I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important.” Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man Experiment one used the traditional theoretical Trolley problem paradigm with participants (n=284) responding to an online questionnaire. The level of jeopardy (potential victims) and impact (ratio) was systematically adjusted in order to understand when participants were more likely to endorse utilitarian decisions. Psychologists use the “Trolley problem” (Foot, 1967), as a moral dilemma in order to test and understand human morality when facing inevitable death/s. The research has suggested that factors such as emotional engagement (Greene, 2001), the Doctrine of Double Effect (Aquinas, 1952; Lotto, Manfrinati & Sarlo, 2013), language used (Borg, 2006) or number of lives saved (Nakamura, 2012) are all considered, but each agrees that a utilitarian decision is the most frequent outcome (75%-85%, Hauser, 2006). But is morality a simple calculation of saving the greatest amount of lives? Additionally, with the exception of Navarrete (2012) who used virtual reality to immerse participants in a pseudo-realistic dilemma, nearly all research has used theoretical questioning raising a possible methodological issue. Does theoretical questioning predict how a person will actually respond to a moral dilemma in reality? Graph demonstrating willingness to sacrifice across different ratios 96% 83% 60% Experiment Two Experiment two conducted a physical version of the trolley problem in an attempt to immerse participants in a more representative pseudo-realistic environment. Using a train set with human models as ‘victims’, participants (n=48) were required to physically intervene, pulling a lever, in order to demonstrate a utilitarian decision, bearing witness to the consequences of their actions (train hitting the ‘victims’). Discussion Both experiments showed that moral choices in the ‘Trolley problem’ reflect utilitarianism whilst also considering factors such as ratio and impact. The significant increase in endorsement in the pseudo-realistic setting suggests that the currently accepted view that theoretical questioning is wholly representative of peoples actions warrants further investigation. Future research should attempt to apply pseudo-reality to other established moral problems to understand the extent of this effect. Results Experiment one supports previous figures of utilitarianism endorsement for the traditional ‘Trolley problem’ (shown below). However, the graph shows that utilitarianism is not the only factor considered when examining jeopardy and impact, instead demonstrating a complex interplay of maximum lives saved, lost and relative ratio. Experiment two showed a significant effect of ratio, thus supporting experiment one. A comparison between experiments showed a significant increase in utilitarianism in the pseudo-realistic setting across all ratios. Hypotheses 1) To confirm whether moral decision making is driven by utilitarianism by applying differing levels of jeopardy and impact. 2) To understand whether historical (theoretical) findings accurately predict the choices people would make if they found themselves in a moral dilemma situation. Example Trolley Problem An out of control trolley is running down the track towards five workmen who will be killed. However you may divert the train onto a siding, away from these five workmen, but this action will kill one other workmen instead. Do you throw the switch? Acknowledgements A big thank you to all participants and to Dr Andy Morley and Glen Carrigan for their support on the project REFERENCES Aquinas, T. (1952). The summa theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican province, trans.) In W. Benton (Series Ed.). Great Books Series: Vol 19. Chicago: Encyclopédia Britannica, Inc. (Original work published 1274). Borg, J.S., Hynes, C., Van Horn, J., Grafton, S. & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2006) Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral Judgements: An fMRI Investigation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, Vol 18(5), 803-781. Foot, P. (1967). 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