Multi-domain Command & Control

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Presentation transcript:

Multi-domain Command & Control CMSgt Brian Stafford Superintendent, MDC2 ECCT 23 Aug 17

As a reminder… CSAF’s 3rd “Big Rock” Multi-domain C2 is key to success in future war Connective tissue of joint fight Complex and will require a broad effort Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team to address cross-functional high priority mission areas Purpose Provide an assessment of the Air Force’s Multi-Domain C2 Core Mission Offer investment options (materiel & non-materiel) to enhance our capabilities Enhancing old processes/capabilities insufficient Set conditions for leap in capabilities

Challenge Competitors have invested heavily in A2AD (IADS, ASATs, CNA) and threaten our current military advantages in the air, space and cyber domains To preserve our advantage in the future, we must advance our concept of multi-domain operations Additive Domains Coordinated Integrated Enhanced Effects Synchronized Effects Synergistic Effects Very Complex Advanced Dilemma For Adversary C2 Capability Why is Multi-domain C2 one of the CSAF’s focus areas? Because as we look forward toward future conflict, we face a significant challenge. Our potential adversaries have invested heavily in technology designed to deny us the advantages we have enjoyed in air and space. The Anti-access, Area Denial weapons in air defense, ballistic missiles, anti-satellite weapons and computer network attach threaten our ability to generate effects in the manner we have in the past and currently. To preserve our military advantages, we must advance our concept of multi-domain operations. In the past, we have leveraged assets in multiple domains to solve tough problems. In 1942, the Navy could not get close enough to Japan to target them and AAF aircraft could not transit the Pacific ocean-distances to hold Japanese targets at risk. But through innovation and daring, a multi-domain solution in the form of the Doolittle Raid enabled combat effects on the Japanese homeland. Today we continue to use assets operating in multiple domains to increase our combat effectiveness. However, for the most part our space and cyber capabilities are used to enhance our air capabilities. This is natural as we have not generally had to contest the space and cyber domains and it was the best use of our resources. In the future, we will have to fight for space and cyber superiority and we will not be able to operate in the air with the degree of freedom we currently enjoy. To remain effective, we must leverage effects from all domains in a synergistic way Expanded Tough Ability to integrate domains to create multiple, complex dilemmas for an adversary, is dependent on our ability to design and implement an advanced MDC2 construct

Attributes of critical C2 functions Situational Awareness Access all relevant data Discern decision-quality information in operationally-relevant context Rapidly observe and orient to dynamic intel Determine blue force availability in real-time Leverage relevant open source info Operational Decision-Making Rapidly account for constraints and restraints Delegate to the lowest operationally-competent level Make decisions in support of the desired ops tempo Understand impacts across operational seams Plan effectively for force packages Ensure Unity of Effort for force packages Operational Decision-Making Shared Data Structure Situational Awareness Force Direction Battle Management Identify, assess and address changes to threat environment in real-time Dynamically adjust missions to changes in force packages Effectively make Go/No-Go decisions Execute CC Intent in absence of direction/communication Communicate securely with tactical force packages Force Direction Provide clear guidance to force packages Communicate securely to all elements of force packages Effectively direct attached forces Dynamically clarify ROE Effectively assess operational risk to forces Dynamically allocate and reallocate missions Battle Management

Future Warfare Cyber Space Air Land Maritime Sub-surface “Projected AF force structure is not capable of fighting and winning against this array of potential adversary capabilities” AF must develop “multi-domain capabilities and capacity” Future War: Multi-regional, Multi-domain, Joint, Coalition and High Velocity Ops Tempo 4 of these features create seams that must be managed…and the high velocity feature will require us to have the operational agility to navigate these seams expertly and thereby mitigate any operational impact they may otherwise cause

Vision for Multi-Domain Operations MDO leverages seamless, dynamic and continuous integration of capabilities generating effects in all domains. Advanced multi-domain operations are high velocity, operationally agile operations that present multiple dilemmas for an adversary at an operational tempo they cannot match. As envisioned, the Multi-domain Operations end state is achieved when: Coalition forces have the operational agility to seamlessly shift between levels of war, geographic areas, missions, functions and warfighting domains. Coalition forces can dynamically create multiple dilemmas for an adversary at an operations tempo they cannot match. Coalition forces have the support processes and resiliency to conduct sustainable, persistent operations in spite of a contested battlespace.

What does this mean for operations? Future wars will be decided by the side with an information advantage I&W, resolving “gray zone” with attribution, intent determination, COG transparency Therefore, we must wield information like firepower with C2 software as weapons We must be postured to respond to relevant information with high velocity decision-making Machine-to-machine decision-making where appropriate Systems which “tee up” and prime decision-makers to act on response options We must be able to create complex, simultaneous dilemmas for adversary Attack vectors must come from all domains to complicate defense Response resiliency derived from effects disaggregation across domains Synchronized, integrated and massed effects We must have self-healing systems with perpetually optimized operations Shortfalls and vulnerabilities immediately addressed to create continuous pressure on adversary

Overarching Plan of Attack In order to keep multi-domain command and control perpetually optimized to provide high velocity, operationally agile operations, the Air Force will: Build and formally develop an operational-level C2 Cadre Provide them the tools, data and IT infrastructure on the leading edge of technology Exploit purpose-built opportunities to explore enhanced C2 processes and concepts C2 Concepts Leading Edge Technology Professionally developed MDC2 Cadre Key is to build processes, procedures, forums and mechanisms to allow continual development of experts, tools and concepts. Success is about processes not products

Enlisted Force Institutional Competencies EPME, Professional Development Leverage talent management Be creative! Embrace cultural change! Think “Yes, if…”

QUESTIONS?