OPERATION BLUE SINGA Intelligence The next few slides highlight the warning order issued by the supported strategic commander, in this case the Singapore Joint Staff. The actual warning order is included in the read ahead materials.

INTELLIGENCE Purpose Outline the threat and intelligence objectives for OPERATION BLUE SINGA This is the mission statement from the Singapore Joint Staff to the Commander, CTF.

INTELLIGENCE Overview Mission Intelligence Guidance The Threat Intelligence Objectives Summary While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Mission Statement Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will commence deployment of a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02, to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, in order to create conditions necessary for a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. This is the mission statement from the Singapore Joint Staff to the Commander, CTF.

Singapore Joint Staff Warning Order Intelligence Guidance Ensure thorough handoff of collection efforts from UNMOG Work closely with local civil administration, in particular police forces, and civil affairs/civil military operations personnel to obtain information on increased level of hostile actions between opposing factions Develop processes to pass actionable intelligence on possible terrorist activities to proper civil authorities While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

INTELLIGENCE The Threat Terrorism Local terrorists/independent cells State-sponsored terrorist activities Crime Bandits -- direct impact on relief operations Organized criminal activities/ corruption Citizens need to feel safe and free to move Aggression from opposing military forces Forces in the immediate AOR Intentions of third party nations seeking to destabilize BLUE SINGA While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

INTELLIGENCE The Threat (cont) Poor humanitarian conditions Opposition may exploit adverse conditions to destabilize BLUE SINGA operations While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

INTELLIGENCE Objectives Rapidly warn civil authorities on terrorist ops Incorporate US and other national intel resources Employ “hot-line” comms with CTF staff and major civil nodes Add civil representatives to the CTF ops center? Transition UNMOG collection activities Continue to develop new contacts within local police and civil authorities Conduct collection/reporting training for CTF Set up emergency reporting for CTF forces While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

INTELLIGENCE Objectives (Cont) Increase CTF’s visibility into local crime Place criminal investigators and agents in the BLUE SINGA intelligence operations center, including military police Include crime analysis in reporting for CCTF Report worldwide political and military developments of interest to CCTF Intentions/capabilities to disrupt BLUE SINGA objectives or humanitarian operations Terrorist movements, capabilities, and intentions Political developments affecting BLUE SINGA While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

INTELLIGENCE Objectives (Cont) Report status of North/South Tindoro forces Intentions/capabilities to break the cease-fire Readiness of forces to conduct operations Current locations of major force elements Evidence of involvement in crime or terrorism While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.

SUMMARY Deliver rapid warning on terrorism Use local collection resources (police, CTF personnel) to maximum advantage Incorporate national intelligence resources Inform CCTF on local crime and its potential for destabilizing BLUE SINGA Keep CCTF aware of terrorist and military movements While Singapore Joint Staff expects Samagaland and South Tindoro senior commanders to be somewhat transparent on their overall forces disposition and intentions, there is significant danger from lower level units, terrorists, and disgruntled civilian factions. These elements have precipitated actions resulting in death, destruction, and the disruption of humanitarian relief efforts. Hence, the importance of ensuring a thorough handoff of collection efforts and points of contact developed by the UNMOG. CTF must work closely with local civil administration, police, and Samagaland and South Tindoro forces to obtain information on activities that could jeopardize the CTF mission. The CTF will not plan nor execute counter-terrorist actions. However, given its mission and anticipated interaction with various elements of North and South Tindoro society, CTF personnel will be in a position to obtain information that can be reviewed and passed on to host nation civil authorities so they can take appropriate action.