THE US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES AND THE POLITICS OF NONPROLIFERATION CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Key Points and Arguments US-India Nuclear Deal: Rationales and Negotiation The Politics, Diplomacy, and the Nuclear Agreement The Broader Context of US-India Relations post- 1998 tests Chinese Perspectives and Concerns Beijing’s Responses and Policy Adjustments The Emerging US-India-China Triangle? Geopolitics and the Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation Concluding Remarks

US Sanctions after Indian/Pak Tests Suspend foreign aid (except for humanitarian assistance or food and other agricultural commodities); Terminate sales of any military items; Terminate other military assistance; Stop credits or guarantees to the country by US government agencies; Vote against credits or assistance by international financial institutions; Prohibit US banks from making loans to the foreign government concerned; and Prohibit exports of specific goods and technology [as specified in the Export Administration Act of 1979] with civilian and military nuclear applications. Source: Morrow and Carriere (1999), Nonproliferation Review

US Sanctions:Ｏｂｊｅｃｔｉｖｅｓ The United States imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as a result of their nuclear tests in May　 1998. Imposing these sanctions, the United States sought: • To send a strong message to would-be nuclear testers; • To have maximum influence on Indian and Pakistani behavior; • To target the governments, rather than the people; and • To minimize the damage to other US interests. Source: Morrow and Carriere (1999), Nonproliferation Review

US Sanctions:Ｏｂｊｅｃｔｉｖｅｓ The goals of the United States are that India and Pakistan: • Halt further nuclear testing • Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without conditions; • Not deploy or test missiles or nuclear weapons; • Cut off fissile material production for nuclear weapons • Cooperate in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in Geneva; • Maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies with other countries; and • Reduce bilateral tensions, including Kashmir. Source: Morrow and Carriere (1999), Nonproliferation Review

Restoring Bilateral Ties The (Strobe) Talbott-(Jaswant) Singh strategic dialogue Easing of US sanctions on India and required benchmarks: stronger export controls Separating civilian and military reactors nuclear and missile test restraints fissile material production restraints President Clinton’s historical visit to India, March 2000; however, most post-1998 sanctions stayed Lifting of post-Pokhran sanctions after 9.11 The Bush administration and efforts to strengthen US-India relations: lifting sanctions; high-tech sales/dialogue (HTCG); Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)

US-India Interactions after Test

NSSP: Getting to the Nuclear Deal HTCG and expanding technology cooperation New Delhi’s push for civilian nuclear cooperation and promise of minimum strategic nuclear program Bush second term and NSSP (high-technology, civilian space, and civilian nuclear issues) Obstacles to nuclear cooperation: US bureaucratic resistance and regional tensions (2001-02, between India and Pakistan) Bush second term: renewed efforts and strategic vision for stronger US-India ties to advance American interests in multiple ways

Negotiating the Nuclear Deal The July 2005 US-India Joint Statement on civilian nuclear cooperation US-India negotiation separation of facilities/power plants fuel supply assurances and safeguards Congressional mandates/initiatives congressional hearings legislative measures US domestic politics bureaucracies: strategic vs. nonproliferation India lobby; media; nonproliferation group

The Nuclear Deal: Milestones March 1-3, 2006, President Bush visited India; joint statement emphasizes strategic partnership and nuclear cooperation July 26, 2006: House passes “Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006” Nov 16, 2006: Senate passes the “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act” Dec 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy Aug 1, 2008: IAEA adopts India-specific safeguards agreement Sept 4-6, 2008: NSG meets to consider/grant exception for India Sept 11, 2008: Pres Bush sends text of 123 Agreement to Congress Sept 27, 2008: House approves the Indo-US nuclear deal 298-117 Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal 86-13 Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement

123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation “Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act requires the conclusion of a specific agreement for significant transfers of nuclear material, equipment, or components from the United States to another nation. Section 123 Agreements are important tools in advancing U.S. nonproliferation principles. These Agreements act in conjunction with other nonproliferation tools, particularly the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to establish the legal framework for significant nuclear cooperation with other countries. Moreover, the Agreements allow for cooperation in other areas, such as technical exchanges, scientific research, and safeguards discussions. In order for a country to enter into such an Agreement with the United States, that country must commit itself to adhering to U.S.- mandated nuclear nonproliferation norms.” Source: National Nuclear Security Administration

Growing US-India Ties

Rationales for Nuclear Deal Removal of long-standing irritants in US-Indian relations Civilian nuclear agreement would integrate India into the international nuclear nonproliferation regime Lifting of tech embargoes could open US-India defense cooperation, including US arms sales Nuclear energy critical for Indian economic development India’s growing use of nuclear power would reduce pressure on global energy demands and global warming Strategically, India’s rise a major power, an emerging market, and a democracy with shared values make it an important partner in counter-terrorism, WMD nonproliferation, regional security, China

India’s Rise at a Glance Population: 1.24 billion GDP in 2014: US$2.048 trillion (est) GDP in PPP (2014): US$7.277 trillion GDP growth rate in 2014: 5.6% Trade 2013/14: US$763 billion ($100bn with US) Foreign exchange reserve in 2013: $295 billion Foreign direct investment: US$310 billion Defence budget: US$38 billion ($5bn US arms) Armed forces: 1.3 million

International Reactions Issues raised: precedent or exception and the implications for the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation regime A dilemma for many NSG member states: nonproliferation principles; trade opportunities (uranium sales; reactors); US pressure; relationship with India Russia, France, and UK supportive Pakistan disgruntled and displeased China cautiously critical but not seeking to publicly opposing the deal (NSG exception for Pakistan?)

India’s 1998 Nuclear Tests: Setback In Relations Chinese responses to Indian nuclear tests  Restrained response to first round of tests  Strong reaction to second round of tests  The Vajpayee letter and Chinese concerns over “China threats” as justification (George Fernandes’s early remarks)  China, P-5 communiqué, UNSCR 1172 and Sino-US Joint Statement on South Asia Setbacks in bilateral relations and Chinese pressure on India to “untie the knot”  Cancellation of JWG meeting in Beijing  hints of renewed supported of Pakistani positions on Kashmir  Greater Sino-Pakistani military exchanges  Encouragement of Indian domestic opposition

Rebuilding Bilateral Relationship US policy shift, Kargil crisis, and Chinese policy adjustment  Singh-Talbott talks and US policy shift from UNSCR 1172  New Delhi retraction on “China threat”  Growing crisis in Kargil and potential risk for China  The Singh visit and the untying of the knot Initiatives to rebuild the tattered bilateral relationship  Sino-Indian Track-II dialogue  Singh-Tang agreement on security dialogue  Resumption of JWG meetings and movement on LAC  High-level visits  Greater cooperation: trade, terrorism, economic ties  Limited military exchanges: visits and port calls

Chinese Perspectives While official statements muted and low-key, analysts and commentators expressing critical views of the deal, charging Washington of “double standards” in nuclear nonproliferation (cf. North Korea, Iran) US-India nuclear cooperation would enable New Delhi in its weapons program Assessment of Bush administration intention: enlisting India in efforts to constrain China (shared democratic values; counter China’s rise; Sino-Indian disputes/rivalry) Broader US-India cooperation in space, high-tech, defense (Indian procurement of US weapons systems; mil-mil exchanges; regional implications)

Sino-indian Relations: The International Factors Sino-US relations since 1989: instability, competing interests, cooperation, and hedging  Divergent strategic visions and interests  Cooperation: North Korea; GWOT;  US policy toward Taiwan  Trade dispute and human rights issues  Managing China’s rise  US-Indian relations: looking for common interests  US reassessment of India’s role  De-linking nuclear proliferation  Consolidating US-India security ties  US-India nuclear deal and defense cooperation  India in the Indo-Pacific Region

Developing Strategic & Cooperative Partnership High-level visits by leaders of two countries  Vajpayee (2003); Wen Jiabao (2005); Hu Jintao (2006); Singh (2008); Wen (2010); Li Keqiang (2013); Singh (2013); Xi (2014) Growing bilateral trade  $117 m (1987); $25 bn (2006); $38 bn (2007); $65.47 bn (2013) Special political representatives to resolve border issues and 2005 joint declaration  17 rounds of meetings held, 2003-2014 Regular consultation and dialogues on bilateral, regional, and global issues (e.g., BRICS) Military exchanges and defense MOU  High-ranking visits; Port calls; joint search & rescue exercises

Developing Strategic & Cooperative Partnership

The Politics of Nonproliferation NPT and its key pillars: balance of implementation NPT RevCon and PrepCom: progress and setback CTBT: negotiation, adoption, and ratification: issues and challenges FMCT: production, accounting, stockpile, and obstacles Nuclear-Weapons Free Zones Supplier Regime: NSG and the US-India exception The politics of nonproliferation: national interests and domestic politics; international norms and geopolitical realities; best practices and trade-offs