Windows Tech Series Module 13: Device Guard Speaker name Title

Objectives Define what Device Guard is SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Objectives Start Time xx:xx / Length: 2 minutes Review the learning objectives. Define what Device Guard is Understand the requirements for deploying Device Guard Determine the planning strategy Identify options for signing applications Title: Objectives Length: 2 minutes <Instructional Designer: List the module learning objectives here. You can use longer descriptions than slide bullets if you want to.> © 2010 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, Windows Vista and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

The security landscape isn’t changing; it’s changed…

US Office of Personnel Management Hacked SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Sony Hacked US Office of Personnel Management Hacked Anthem Hacked Lockheed Hacked Show exams of company security breach, why security is the top consideration of every industries Aramco Hacked Bushehr nuclear reactor Hacked NSA Hacked Microsoft, Google, Apple, Facebook Hacked © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Device Guard Windows 10 Secure Identities Threat Resistance SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Windows 10 Secure Identities Threat Resistance Secure Identities -Windows Hello -Microsoft Passport Information Protection -Enterprise Data protection Threat Resistance -Device Guard Device Guard Information Protection © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

What is Device Guard? Combination of hardware + software security features Enables businesses to strongly control what is allowed to run Brings mobile-like security protections to desktop OS with support for existing line of business apps

Device Guard Solution Virtualization based Security (VBS) SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Device Guard Solution Virtualization based Security (VBS) Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity  Credential Guide Configurable Code Integrity (CI) Virtualization Based Security -  Virtualization Based Security allows the OS to move sensitive operations and data into a protected area in memory, where even malware running in the normal OS kernel can't read it. Credential Guard - Using virtualization based security as a foundation, Credential Guard protects your domain credentials from being collected by malware in the event of a compromise. When Credential Guard is running, you don't notice anything different about your user experience. Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity -  Windows ensures that drivers and other code that runs in kernel mode is properly signed. Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity protects the management of the code integrity checks using virtualization based security. Configurable Code Integrity - This gives an enterprise the ability to lock down what apps are allowed to run on a machine. An IT admin can create their own policy, which can include a mix of modern apps and legacy apps. Kno © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Hardware Requirements SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Hardware Requirements UEFI 2.3 or higher firmware along with Secure Boot Virtualization Extensions, such as Intel VT-X, AMD-V and SLAT must be enabled BIOS Lockdown X64 IOMMU such as Intel VT-D and AMD-Vi Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0 Hardware requirements of Device Guard © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Virtualization Based Security SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Virtualization Based Security In the next slides, we will go through the configuration of VBS © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Virtualization Based Security (VBS) SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Virtualization Based Security (VBS) Provides a new trust boundary for system software Leverage platform virtualization to enhance platform security Limit access to high-value security assets from supervisor mode (CPL0) code Provides a secure execution environment to enable: Protected storage and management of platform security assets Enhanced OS protection against attacks (including attacks from kernel-mode) A basis for strengthening protections of guest VM secrets from the host OS Windows 10 services protected with Virtualization Based Security LSA Credential Isolation vTPM (server only) Kernel Mode Code Integrity © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

VBS Requirements Hyper-V + Isolated User Mode features These features can be configured manually by using Windows PowerShell, Deployment Image Servicing and Management, or the Unattend.xml file when deploying images Restart is needed after

VBS Requirements UEFI 2.3 or higher firmware along with Secure Boot Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection can be enabled to provide additional memory protection but requires processors to include DMA protection technologies Registry HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard Set the EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity DWORD value to 1 Set the RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures DWORD value as appropriate: Setting this value to 1 enables the Secure Boot option Setting this value to 2 enables the Secure Boot with DMA Protection option Group Policy Object Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Device Guard\Turn On Virtualization Based Security Select the Enabled option, and then select Secure Boot or Secure Boot and DMA Protection from the Select Platform Security Level list

VBS Requirements Restart is needed after configuring Registry or GPO SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 VBS Requirements Restart is needed after configuring Registry or GPO © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Enabling VBS of Kernel Mode Code Integrity Registry HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard Set the HypervisorEnforcedCodeIntegrity DWORD value to 1 Group Policy Object Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Device Guard\Turn On Virtualization Based Security Select the Enabled option, and then select the Enable Virtualization Based Protection of Code Integrity check box Restart is needed after configuring Registry or GPO

Enabling VBS of Kernel Mode Integrity

Credential Guard

Credential Guard Part of a significant Protect the Platform (PtP) initiative Protecting against Pass the Hash (PtH) attacks LSA/NTLM/Kerberos refactored to run critical parts in VBS User credentials remain in VBS and cannot be stolen by kernel malware Let’s talk about Credential Guard. Credential Guard is designed to protect the client secrets, both Kerberos and NTLM. It utilizes virtualization based security. Prevents PtH attacks by storing credentials in an isolated area not accessible to outside processes. Problem: Not accessible with debugging tools. Wait, if it’s not accessible to debugging tools..

The problem: Someone goes fishing on your network Pass the Hash enables an attacker to get user access tokens using common tools such as MimiKatz. In order to run these types of tools administrative privileges on the local machine are required which includes the user right Debug Programs. By default, only administrators and LocalSystem accounts have the privileges to debug programs. To understand PtH consider: LSA is the Local Security Authority Sub System which authenticates user accounts and supports protocols such as Kerberos and NTLM. It is the prime target for attackers trying to steal user credentials. Pass-the-Hash attacks target credentials like the NTOWF (NT One Way Function) and Kerberos Keys. Attackers harvest one user's credentials from another user, with privileges. Attackers can leverage these to laterally traverse from one user to another and from one device to another Once obtained the attacker can use this account to obtain additional access tokens and walk up the ladder of permissions until a domain administrator account is captured. Even if the compromise is detected it is hard to completely remove.

Pass-the-Hash Technique Patient Zero Carol_Tablet APT-ONE Recon User: Carol User: Bob NT: 238D… Will go each steps of Pass-the-Hash technique Escalate User: Carol User: Alice Foothold Bob_Laptop Alice_PC HR_Vids User: Bob User: Alice NT: A3D7… NT: 4F3D… Bob@PTHCorp.com

The solution: Credential Isolation When lsass.exe detects that credential isolation is enabled, it spawns an LsaTrustlet as an isolated process, ensuring that it runs within isolated user mode. The startup of LsaTrustlet is performed before the Security Support Provider initialization, ensuring that the secure mode support routines are ready before any authentication begins. Requirements: Windows 10 Enterprise TPM 2.0 UEFI 2.31 input/output memory management unit such as Intel VT-d Credential isolation is enabled via a UEFI variable. This is done in order to guard against remote modifications of the configuration. Now this means once configured it will require physical access to remove or modify.

Architectural Overview SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Architectural Overview LsaTrustlet protects credentials by encrypting them with either a per-boot or persistent key. The per-boot key is used for any in-memory credentials which do not require persistence. An example of such a credential would be a TGT Session Key. This key is negotiated with a KDC every time authentication occurs, and is protected with a per-boot key. The persistent key, or some derivative thereof, is used to protect items which are stored and reloaded after a reboot. An example of a persisted, protected secret is a domain credential stored in the credential management system (CredMan). Such credentials are intended for long-term storage, and must be protected with a consistent key. When credential isolation is enabled certain calls are routed via RPC to the LsaTrustlet trustlet. However, when isolation is off, the calls are handled directly in-process. An abstraction around all credential isolation calls is used encapsulate the differences between the two modes. The following diagram illustrates the code layout. Limitations Credential Guard is designed to protect user credentials on a Windows 10 device and is not intended to run on a domain controller. There is no benefit to enabling Credential Guard without Device Guard. It can be enabled without Device Guard for testing purposes. © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Credential Guard login flow 9/16/2018 Credential Guard login flow Domain Controller LSASS VSM NTLM NTLM NTOWF: C9DF4E56… NTOWF: C9DF4E56… Kerberos Demo the credential guard login flow Kerberos Kerb key TGT Kerb key TGT key File server Alice’s User Session Hypervisor User: Alice Password: a1b2c3 © 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Enabling Credential Guard SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Enabling Credential Guard Registry HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Set the LLsaCfgFlags DWORD value to 1 Group Policy Object Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\System\Device Guard\Turn On Virtualization Based Security Select the Enabled option, and then select the Enable Credential Guard check box Restart is needed after configuring Registry or GPO How to enable credential guard © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Enabling Credential Guard SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Enabling Credential Guard How to enable credential guard © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Validating Device Guard Hardware Based Features SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Validating Device Guard Hardware Based Features Get-CimInstance –ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard –Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard Validate via powershell cmdlets SecurityServicesConfigured: whether or not VBS is configured SecurityServicesRunning: whether or not VBS is running VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus: VBS status Detailed parameter guide can be found in next hide slides. © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Validating Device Guard Hardware Based Features SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Validating Device Guard Hardware Based Features Msinfo32.exe © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Configurable Code Integrity SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Configurable Code Integrity https://technet.microsoft.com/en- us/library/dn986865(v=vs.85).aspx Windows 10 Enterprise Hypervisor introduces new capabilities around virtual trust levels, which helps Windows 10 Enterprise services to run in a protected environment, in isolation from the running operating system. Windows 10 Enterprise virtualization-based security helps protect kernel code integrity and helps to provide credential isolation for the local security authority (LSA). Letting the Kernel Code Integrity service run as a hypervisor-hosted service increases the level of protection around the root operating system, adding additional protections against any malware that compromises the kernel layer. Important  Device Guard devices that run Kernel Code Integrity with virtualization-based security must have compatible drivers - legacy drivers can be updated - and have all virtualization capabilities turned on. This includes virtualization extensions and input/output memory management unit (IOMMU) support. © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Configurable Code Integrity SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Configurable Code Integrity Secure Boot Kernel Mode Code Integrity (KMCI) User Mode Code Integrity (UMCI) AppLocker Introduce what is Configurable code integrity, how many types of it. ROM/Fuses Bootloaders Native UEFI Windows OS Loader Windows Kernel and Drivers 3rd Party Drivers User mode code (apps, etc.) KMCI UEFI Secure Boot UMCI Platform Secure Boot AppLocker © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Securing Scripts Scripts can do dangerous things Windows Script Host will require signed scripts WSH is the scripting host for VBScript (.vbs), JScript (.js), Windows Script File (.wsf) and Windows Script Component (.wsc) scripts MSIs must be signed PowerShell will be in “ConstrainedLanguage” mode Signed PowerShell scripts can be in full language mode .bat & .cmd scripts are not restricted

Create Device Guard Policy SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Create Device Guard Policy New-CIPolicy -FilePath Destination file -Audit Create from audit log -Level Level of detail - RootCertificate, PCACertificate, LeafCertificate, FileName, Hash, FilePublisher -Fallback Fallback level of detail if primary not available -ScanPath Scan path -UserPEs Include user mode code integrity Merge-CIPolicy -PolicyPaths Comma separated list of policy file paths -OutputFilePath Destination file Use cmd line to configure CI policy © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Create Device Guard Policy Set-RuleOption -Help List available options -Option Identifier for option to configure -Delete Remove the specified option -FilePath Policy file path

Create Policy from “Golden” System SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Create Policy from “Golden” System PS C:\> #Create a ShadowCopy to avoid locks PS C:\> $s1 = (gwmi -List Win32_ShadowCopy).Create("C:\", "ClientAccessible") PS C:\> $s2 = gwmi Win32_ShadowCopy | ? { $_.ID -eq $s1.ShadowID } PS C:\> $d  = $s2.DeviceObject + "\" PS C:\> cmd /c mklink /d C:\scpy "$d" PS C:\> #Create policy from current system PS C:\> New-CIPolicy -level PcaCertificate –fallback hash -filepath C:\TRPolicy.xml –scanpath C:\scpy –u PS C:\> #Remove ShadowCopy PS C:\> "vssadmin delete shadows /Shadow=""$($s2.ID.ToLower())"" /Quiet" | iex Explain the command used to create policy from gloded system. Create Shadow Copy of System Drive Generate a new policy from scan Clean up Shadow Copy © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Create and Merge Policy from Audit SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Create and Merge Policy from Audit PS C:\> #Create policy from audit log events PS C:\> New-CIPolicy -l PcaCertificate -f C:\AuditPolicy.xml –a –u PS C:\> #Merge audit policy with other policy/policies PS C:\> Merge-CIPolicy –OutputFilePath C:\MergedPolicy.xml –PolicyPaths C:\AuditPolicy.xml,C:\IgnitePolicy.xml PS C:\> #Set policy options e.g. Audit Mode (option 3) PS C:\> Set-RuleOption –option 3 –FilePath C:\MergedPolicy.xml PS C:\> #Compile policy as binary PS C:\> ConvertFrom-CIPolicy C:\MergedPolicy.xml C:\MergedPolicy.bin PS C:\> #Install compiled policy PS C:\> cp C:\MergedPolicy.bin c:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\SIPolicy.p7b PS C:\> #Policy takes effect after reboot Convert from XML to binary file Install compiled policy © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 KMCI protected by VBS CI rules are still enforced even if a vulnerability allows unauthorized kernel mode memory access Memory pages are only marked executable if CI validation succeeds Kernel memory cannot be marked both writeable and executable BUT… not all drivers will be compatible initially Talking point: why we have Kernel mode CI © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Hardware (TPM 2.0, Vt-x2, IOMMU) KMCI in Windows 8.1 Host OS User Kernel Normal World Howdy Peer! KMCI Malware Firmware (UEFI) Hardware (TPM 2.0, Vt-x2, IOMMU)

Hardware (TPM 2.0, Vt-x2, IOMMU) KMCI with Windows 10 VBS I thought we could be friends  Measured Host OS User Normal World Secure World Hardened Boundary KMCI Kernel Malware Hypervisor Firmware (UEFI) Hardware (TPM 2.0, Vt-x2, IOMMU)

Planning for Device Guard

Planning for Device Guard Know your target(s) Use PowerShell cmdlets to create policy from “golden” system(s) Defaults to Audit Mode Merge multiple policies OR deploy differentiated policies Deploy policy in audit mode and test Use PowerShell cmdlets to create policy from audit log and merge Enable enforcement

Know Your Targets Fixed workloads Tightly managed SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Know Your Targets Tightly managed Very well-defined software and hardware configurations Low churn No user or standard user only Secure Boot restricted to only boot Windows Virtualization-based security (VBS) enabled Kernel mode code integrity protected by VBS User mode code integrity enforced Define how Device Guard can help increase security for different workloads. Fixed Workload example: ATM, Point of Sales machines. Fixed workloads © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Know Your Targets Fully managed Fixed workloads SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Know Your Targets Secure Boot restricted to only boot Windows Virtualization-based security (VBS) enabled Kernel mode code integrity protected by VBS User mode code integrity enforced Tightly managed Well-defined hardware configurations Managed software only Ideally standard user only Define how Device Guard can help increase security for different workloads. Fully managed workloads example: enterprise file server, dev\test machine Fully managed Fixed workloads © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Know Your Targets Lightly managed Fully managed Fixed workloads SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Know Your Targets Multiple and varied hardware configurations User can install “unmanaged” software Standard or Admin users Secure Boot may be restricted to only boot Windows VBS enabled KMCI may be protected by VBS Code Integrity in audit mode Lightly managed Define how Device Guard can help increase security for different workloads. Lightly managed: user machine, laptop Fully managed Fixed workloads © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Know Your Targets BYOD Lightly managed Fully managed Fixed workloads Personally owned devices Highly-variable hardware and software Secure Boot not required No VBS No enterprise code integrity policy BYOD Lightly managed Fully managed Fixed workloads

Device Guard Catalog Files

SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 IT Code Signing Just as most malware is unsigned, so too are the vast majority of LOB apps “Code Signing is hard” Decentralized LOB app development Lack of code signing expertise Enterprises don’t want to (and shouldn’t) blindly trust all software from an ISV even if signed Windows 10 includes tools enabling IT to address code signing for existing apps Why we have CI catalog, what’s the concern of using CI in Enterprise environment. © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Types of Digital Signatures Embedded Signature The binary and signing information is self contained Required for boot-start drivers (run-time check) Catalog Signing A signed file that identifies one or more binaries Published to Windows in a well defined path Required for driver packages (install-time check) Can be managed and deployed independently of the packaged binaries Preserves any existing signatures

Adopting Code Signing Microsoft Store signed and distributed apps SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Adopting Code Signing Microsoft Store signed and distributed apps Universal and Classic Windows apps Enterprise signing via internally managed PKI Incorporated into LOB app development processes Windows 10 package inspector tool to generate catalog for existing apps Microsoft Device Guard Signing Portal (coming later this year) Catalog signing with enterprise specific, unique key How apps can be signed? © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Additional Windows 10 CI Improvements Raising the bar for what runs in the kernel Windows 10 drivers must be signed by Microsoft Strong driver publisher identity verification via Extended Validation (EV) certificates Enterprises can enforce Windows 10 driver requirements via Device Guard policy Signed Device Guard CI policy protects from local admin Signed policy stored in pre-OS secure variable Requires a newer signed policy to update – cannot be deleted by admin Becomes a “machine” level policy which means boot from media must be compliant Measured into the TPM and part of device health attestation

AppLocker and Code Integrity Together, AppLocker and code integrity are the basis for enforcing code and application rules on Windows Think of code integrity as the bouncer at the door, and AppLocker as the bartender Code integrity best expresses high level expression of trust AppLocker allows for granular rules Managed through common management tools in Windows 10

Module review What is Device Guard solution. SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 Module review In this module, you learned to: Start Time xx:xx / Length: 2 minutes Introduce the review activity. “Before we conclude, let’s do a quick review of what we’ve learned today. Use the Text tool to type your responses to the question on the screen.” Acknowledge responses. If time allows, follow up verbally with one or two responses. What is Device Guard solution. How to deploy Device Guard solution. How to plan Device Guard solution. Title: Module Review Length: 5 minutes <Instructional Designer: use this slide to drive home the objectives and summary for this module. > 52 © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, Windows Vista and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.

Questions?

SMSG Readiness 9/16/2018 © 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows, and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries. The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.