Nicola Dimitri MSc Business Administration November 2017

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Presentation transcript:

Nicola Dimitri MSc Business Administration November 2017 Designing the Competitive Tendering Process: Competition with Sealed Bids and Electronic Auctions Nicola Dimitri MSc Business Administration November 2017 Rome November 2017

The Nature of Uncertainty Factors affecting the cost of performing a contract are divided into Private component Common component Firm-specific Affects all suppliers Rome November 2017

What if the Private Component Prevails? In most cases, both private and common components are present However, the impact of the common component can be ignored when suppliers share the same information about the common component The prevalence of the private component implies that each single supplier’s estimate of the cost for performing the contract would not change if it were to learn another firm’s private component Rome November 2017

Lessons for the Design of a Tendering Process When the private component prevails, the sealed bid competitive process is appropriate (or the single-round auction) But which sealed bid format? (Vickery 1961) Each tender’s profit depends on its private piece of information Advantages of this approach Low management costs Speed Favours participation of smaller tenderers Reduces risk of collusion Rome November 2017

How to Cope with the Common Value Component – Case 1 Consider the following simple contract for cleaning services The contract comprises two main space categories: A. Offices and corridors and B. Laboratories. Table 1 summarises one of the tenderer’s estimated costs per square metre. Each tenderer knows perfectly the exact size of surfaces to be cleaned for both categories A and B Each tenderer’s bid will only depend on its (private) efficiency component and, arguably, upon its conjectures on other competitors’ efficiency levels Rome November 2017

How to Cope with the Common Value Component – Case 1 Consider a more sophisticated version of the same contract for cleaning services The contract comprises again two main space categories: A. Offices and corridors and B. Laboratories. Table 1 summarises one of the tenderer’s estimated costs per square metre. Each tenderer does not know the exact size of surfaces to be cleaned for the two classes A and B Each tenderer’s bid will now depend also upon its estimate of the common value component Rome November 2017

Learning Through Bidding When suppliers have different information about the common component and those pieces of information show some degree of (statistical) dependence (i.e. correlation) A dynamic bidding procedure (electronic auction with a number of rounds) makes learning possible Bids reveal part of a supplier’s information to its competitors, which in turn helps them form a more precise estimate of the actual cost – thus reducing the risk of suffering from the winner’s curse (actual production costs higher than estimated ones) Rome November 2017

Policy Guidelines on the tendering Format When opting for a dynamic format, avoid: Fixing exogenously the number of rounds, unless mechanisms for forcing bid downwards are put in place leaving tenderers in a position to determine price dynamics Rome November 2017

Conclusions Single round sealed-bid formats are generally quite appropriate Dynamic auctions can be used only if there is no suspect of collusion for cost-discovery Rome November 2017