I Want My Voice to Be Heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for Unobservable Censorship Circumvention Amir Houmansadr (The University of Texas at Austin) Thomas.

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Presentation transcript:

I Want My Voice to Be Heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for Unobservable Censorship Circumvention Amir Houmansadr (The University of Texas at Austin) Thomas Riedl (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Nikita Borisov (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Andrew Singer (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Internet Censorship The Internet is a big threat to repressive regimes! Repressive regimes censor the Internet: IP filtering, DNS hijacking, Deep packet-inspection, etc. Circumvention systems NDSS

New stage in the arms race The threat model has changed Past: detect circumvention end-points Now: detect circumvention traffic also We need traffic unobservability against passive, active, or proactive analysis NDSS

A recent approach A promising approach: hide circumvention traffic within popular Internet protocols Censors are unlikely to completely block that protocol A new trend: mimic the target protocol SkypeMorph, StegoTorus, and CensorSpoofer (CCS12) Its hard to imitate network protocols The Parrot is Dead: Observing Unobservable Network Communications [Oakland13] NDSS FLAWED

Our approach We seek the same objective, but take a different approach: Run the target protocol By running the target protocol no need to worry about implementation quirks, bugs, protocol details Challenge: how to efficiently encapsulate traffic into the target protocol NDSS

FreeWave: IP over Voice-over-IP Target protocol: Voice-over IP (VoIP) Why VoIP Widely used protocol (only 663 Million Skype users) Collateral damage to block Encrypted How to hide? The dial-up modems are back! NDSS

FreeWave architecture NDSS Client FreeWave Server

System components NDSS

MoDem component A typical acoustic modem QAM modulation Reliable transmission Turbo codes Use Preambles NDSS

Evaluations NDSS

FreeWaves unobservability Comprehensive unobservability at the protocol level Traffic analysis (packet rates and sizes) Fixed rate codecs (e.g., G.7 series) Not an issue Variable bit-rates (e.g., Skypes SILK) Simple analysis Superimpose with recoded conversation NDSS

Server obfuscation NDSS Client FreeWave Server

Future directions Embed into Video of VoIP Find other protocol to tunnel Look for better efficiency NDSS IP over Voice-over-IP Voice over IP over …

Questions! NDSS