VP, Threats, Technology and Future Requirements

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Presentation transcript:

VP, Threats, Technology and Future Requirements Postulated Russian Strategic Nuclear Force Production and Deployment: 2024 James R. Howe VP, Threats, Technology and Future Requirements Vision Centric, Inc. Presented to SMDWG 25 Jan 2018 256-489-0869 James.r.howe@visioncentricinc.com 100 MT WH PAK-DA? UNCLASSIFIED

Study Objective Objective– Using open sources estimate Russian 2024 Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) force structure based on: 1) Existing deployed force levels (including modernized/life extension systems) and planned retirements 2) Planned IOC’s for RS-26, RS-28, RS-X-29, Tu-160M3, PAK-DA and Borei SSBN build rates 3) Planned production: Pres Putin 2012—”Russia will build 400 new ICBM’s by 2022” NOTE- The public decision on producing RS-28 & RS-29’s was made ~ 1 year later, so not included in the 400. Also 400 IC/SLBM’s is within Votinsk’s production capability. 4) Demonstrated missile production capabilities – Russia could have three missile production plants: -- Votinsk built 38 IC/SLBM’s in 2014, 50 in 2015, >40 in 2016 – can produce 400+ by 2022 -- Krasnoyarsk built >4,000 liquid SLBM’s and is building RS-28 Sarmat – could build 10-30/yr -- Khrunichev built ~400 liquid fueled ICBM’s (SS-19), and currently is producing the Proton and Angara SLV’s, and may build the RS-X-29. Could build 10-30/yr 5) Given the planned SNF force levels and capabilities of conventional missiles w/advanced technology WH, it is believed a significant portion of the force will have a conventional mission. Given the number of variables that exist, the baseline estimates used are what is believed to be a conservative estimate of what Russia could deploy by 2024 (baseline study) While both Krasnoyarsk (RS-28) and Khrunichev (RS-X-29) could produce 10-30+ missiles/year, the rate of 10 missiles/year for each was used. --- During the Cold War, USSR built over 200 IC/SLBM’s/year UNCLASSIFIED

Integrated Cyber-Radio Electronic Combat Russian Integrated Strategic Offense/Defense System – Will be completely Modernized by 2022—Why the URGENCY? Focus of this brief is on Russian Strategic Offense (Nuclear and Non-nuclear), -- Relationship w/Aerospace Defense Forces -- Space, cyber warfare and strategic indirect warfare issues will also have to be addressed. -- President Putin 22 Dec 2016—Strategic non-nuclear forces are a high force development priority; 2nd priority in 2018-2027 State Armament Program Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO) (2015) Space Command Air & Space Defense Command (PRO/PKO) -- Moscow ABM -- S-400/500 units -- Civil/passive Defense Russian Air Force Counter force operations? Strategic Offense Nuclear -- ICBM -- SLBM -- Bomber -- SSN/SSGN LACM? Non-Nuclear -- Kinetic -- Cyber The combination of a declining state creating need -- strategic/theater nuclear superiority providing means , -- together with effective air/missile defenses and extensive civil defenses reducing vulnerabilities -- means Russia will be willing to accept far more risk --US/NATO risk adverse BM/C4ISR Integrated Cyber-Radio Electronic Combat UNCLASSIFIED

Nuclear Weapons and Warfare are not Immune to the March of Technology V. Mikhaylov, Minister of Atomic Energy, and First Deputy Minister, proposed creating a force of 10,000, Low yield, “clean”, highly accurate nuclear weapons – confirmed by CIA 22 June 2000 (1) Yeltsin reportedly signed presidential decree authorizing development 29 Apr 99 Goal is to “…make the threat realistic”…“make nuclear weapons an instrument of policy” …” provide usable military force” “Evidence of Russian operational testing of new sub-kiloton nuclear warheads”– CIA 30 Aug 2000 (1) -- Large number of low-yield nuclear tests against equipment and biological targets Russia reportedly has deployed precision nuclear WH w/50-200 ton yields on SLBM’s. Col-Gen Muravyev, Dep CINC of the RVSN -- [Strategic missile systems should be capable of conducting ‘surgical’ strikes… using both highly accurate, super-low yield nuclear weapons, as well as conventional ones…” “…groupings of non-nuclear MBR (ICBM’s) and BRPL (SLBM’s) may appear…” ] Moscow Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 Dec 1999. President Putin –”Russia is creating a new generation nuclear weapons …these will be things which do not exist and are unlikely to exist in other nuclear powers.” -- e.g. Drone torpedo w/100 MT WH; Sea bottom based SLBM’s; Precision, low-yield, “clean” nuclear weapons? “discrete” EMP weapons? Neutron? Other tailored nuclear weapon effects? – Russia is developing a spectrum of nuclear weapons which can maintain escalation dominance all along the conflict spectrum – from “de-escalate” conflicts to conducting major nuclear warfare. 1) Declassified CIA documents Russia Has a Very Different View of Nuclear War Than The US and is developing the policy/doctrine/forces to implement The most cost-effective way to deter the US is with nuclear weapons UNCLASSIFIED

What Are Russia’s SNF Implementing Activities? Putin – 2012 “ Russia will build 400 new ICBM’s by 2022”—(Note: all w/4-10+ WH capability) -- A simple calculation illustrates how many IC/SLBM nuclear warheads Russia could have deployed by 2022 due to SNF modernization, new production and MIRVing: 400 IC/SL X 4 RV’s = 1600 WH 400 IC/SL X 7RV’s = 2800 WH 400 IC/SL X 10 RV’s = 4000 WH Plus ~ 50 SS-18/Sarmat X 10/15 = 500/750 WH Plus refurbished Delta IV’s = 384-960 WH Plus 30 “like new” SS-19 = 180 WH Plus 78 SS-27 Mod 1 MIRV = 312-780 Plus RS-X-29 new liquid (6-12 RV’s?) = TBD Life extension and MIRV’ing could allow a much slower rate of new SNF production—but it isn’t By 2024 Russia’s Votinsk could produce an additional 100-200 IC/SLBM’s: Krasnoyarsk 20 more RS-28’s @ 10/yr. and Khrunichev an additional 20-40 RS-X-29’s @ 10 or 20/yr. Potentially 2976-6670 IC/SL WH ( Plus > 800 bomber WH) Great Uncertainty -- Numbers -- Types -- WH loadings -- Missions Consequently, life extension & MIRV’ing to maximize near-term firepower and new production missile WH numbers/throw-weight will far exceed New START limits and raises questions about Russian intentions UNCLASSIFIED