SQL Authorization Book: A First Course in Database Systems

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Presentation transcript:

SQL Authorization Book: A First Course in Database Systems Authors: Ullman and Widom SQL Authorization Dr. Deepti Joshi Dept. of Math & computer Science The Citadel djoshi@citadel.edu

Privileges Grant and Revoke Grant Diagrams SQL Authorization Privileges Grant and Revoke Grant Diagrams

Authorization A file system identifies certain privileges on the objects (files) it manages. Typically read, write, execute. A file system identifies certain participants to whom privileges may be granted. Typically the owner, a group, all users.

SQL Authorization ID’s A user is referred to by authorization ID, typically their login name. There is an authorization ID PUBLIC. Granting a privilege to PUBLIC makes it available to any authorization ID.

Privileges – (1) SQL identifies a more detailed set of privileges on objects (relations) than the typical file system. Nine privileges in all, some of which can be restricted to one column of one relation.

Privileges – (2) Some important privileges on a relation: SELECT = right to query the relation. INSERT = right to insert tuples. May apply to only one attribute. DELETE = right to delete tuples. UPDATE = right to update tuples.

Example: Privileges For the statement below: INSERT INTO Beers(name) SELECT beer FROM Sells WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT * FROM Beers WHERE name = beer); We require privileges SELECT on Sells and Beers, and INSERT on Beers or Beers.name. beers that do not appear in Beers. We add them to Beers with a NULL manufacturer.

Database Objects The objects on which privileges exist include stored tables and views. Other privileges are the right to create objects of a type, e.g., triggers. Views form an important tool for access control.

Example: Views as Access Control We might not want to give the SELECT privilege on Emps(name, addr, salary). But it is safer to give SELECT on: CREATE VIEW SafeEmps AS SELECT name, addr FROM Emps; Queries on SafeEmps do not require SELECT on Emps, just on SafeEmps.

Granting Privileges You have all possible privileges on the objects, such as relations, that you create. You may grant privileges to other users (authorization ID’s), including PUBLIC. You may also grant privileges WITH GRANT OPTION, which lets the grantee also grant this privilege.

The GRANT Statement To grant privileges, say: GRANT <list of privileges> ON <relation or other object> TO <list of authorization ID’s>; If you want the recipient(s) to be able to pass the privilege(s) to others add: WITH GRANT OPTION

Example: GRANT Suppose you are the owner of Sells. You may say: GRANT SELECT, UPDATE(price) ON Sells TO sally; Now Sally has the right to issue any query on Sells and can update the price component only.

Example: Grant Option Suppose we also grant: GRANT UPDATE ON Sells TO sally WITH GRANT OPTION; Now, Sally not only can update any attribute of Sells, but can grant to others the privilege UPDATE ON Sells. Also, she can grant more specific privileges like UPDATE(price)ON Sells.

Revoking Privileges REVOKE <list of privileges> ON <relation or other object> FROM <list of authorization ID’s>; Your grant of these privileges can no longer be used by these users to justify their use of the privilege. But they may still have the privilege because they obtained it independently from elsewhere.

REVOKE Options We must append to the REVOKE statement either: CASCADE. Now, any grants made by a revokee are also not in force, no matter how far the privilege was passed. RESTRICT. If the privilege has been passed to others, the REVOKE fails as a warning that something else must be done to “chase the privilege down.”

Grant Diagrams Nodes = user/privilege/grant option?/is owner? UPDATE ON R, UPDATE(a) on R, and UPDATE(b) ON R live in different nodes. SELECT ON R and SELECT ON R WITH GRANT OPTION live in different nodes. Edge X ->Y means that node X was used to grant Y.

Notation for Nodes Use AP for the node representing authorization ID A having privilege P. P * = privilege P with grant option. P ** = the source of the privilege P. I.e., A is the owner of the object on which P is a privilege. Note ** implies grant option.

Manipulating Edges – (1) When A grants P to B, We draw an edge from AP * or AP ** to BP. Or to BP * if the grant is with grant option. If A grants a subprivilege Q of P [say UPDATE(a) on R when P is UPDATE ON R] then the edge goes to BQ or BQ *, instead.

Manipulating Edges – (2) Fundamental rule: User C has privilege Q as long as there is a path from XP ** to CQ, CQ *, or CQ **, and P is a superprivilege of Q. Remember that P could be Q, and X could be C.

Manipulating Edges – (3) If A revokes P from B with the CASCADE option, delete the edge from AP to BP. But if A uses RESTRICT instead, and there is an edge from BP to anywhere, then reject the revocation and make no change to the graph.

Manipulating Edges – (4) Having revised the edges, we must check that each node has a path from some ** node, representing ownership. Any node with no such path represents a revoked privilege and is deleted from the diagram.

Example: Grant Diagram CP* B: GRANT P TO C WITH GRANT OPTION AP** BP* A: GRANT P TO B WITH GRANT OPTION CP A: GRANT P TO C A owns the object on which P is a privilege

Example: Grant Diagram A executes REVOKE P FROM B CASCADE; Even had C passed P to B, both nodes are still cut off. AP** Not only does B lose P*, but C loses P*. Delete BP* and CP*. BP* CP* CP However, C still has P without grant option because of the direct grant.

Question Page 436 in textbook