Optical Networks & Smart Grid Lab.

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Presentation transcript:

Optical Networks & Smart Grid Lab. Moving Target Defense Intrusion Detection System for IPv6 Based Advanced Metering Infrastructure Brycent Chatfield & Rami Haddad Department of Electrical Engineering Georgia Southern University

Outline Brief overview of smart grids Focus of study Moving Target Defense Intrusion Detection System algorithm Experimental overview & results Conclusion

What is a Smart Grid? A system which includes a variety of operational and energy measures including smart meters, smart appliances, renewable energy resources, and energy efficiency resources. Integrates high speed two-way communication technologies Current traditional grid features one-way communication

HAN, NAN, & WAN

Need for Smart Grid Current power grid is reaching its limitation Development of traditional power grid not keeping pace with industrial and social advancements Energy demands increased approximately three times within 60 year period Brings about challenge of using energy efficiently

Vulnerabilities Increased connectivity brings about vulnerabilities within smart grid Consequences: Blackouts Access to personal information and energy usage Manipulation of pricing Ease of delaying, blocking, or corruption communications (DoS) Much larger attack surface

Focus of Study Implementation of Moving Target Defense Intrusion Detection System (MTDIDS) Moving Target Attacks New era attack vectors Changeable attack characteristics Renders conventional signature based approaches useless Anomaly detection algorithm Entropy based approach Random routing protocol Planar Keys

MTDIDS Overview Three Training Phases Detection Phase Phase 1: Random Routing Table Generation Phase 2: Parity Packet Rate Selection Phase 3: Planar Key Development Detection Phase Planar Signature Analysis Coordinator node/server Utilizes IPv6 Address Space Session validation timeframe

Phase 1: Random Routing Table Packet Analysis Length Parameter Determines size of routing table Randomly generated number (i.e. PAL = 1024) Each packet provided random IP and Port Packet Trajectory Number of IPs and Ports determined by utility company Rolling Window i.e. Transmission begins where last packet left off

Phase 1: Random Routing Table Packet Number IPv6 Address Port Assignment 1 Rand(IP) Rand(Port) 2 3 . Packet Analysis Length

Phase 2: Parity Packet Rate Selection Packets appended with security bits Parity Rate Randomly generated number Constitutes increment in which parity packets are selected i.e. PR = 3 Purpose Second dimension of security Allows detection if intruder has accessed routing table

Phase 3: Planar Key Development Secure delivery of routing table & parity information to nodes Planar Key Creation Packet, IP, & Port used as coordinates (Packet Number,IP,Port) Generates signature plane for each IP Likewise, planar key developed for parity packets Valid for allotted session time

Phase 3: Planar Key Development Packet Planar Key Coordinate 1 Packet 1, Rand(IP), Rand(Port) 2 Packet 2, Rand(IP), Rand(Port) 3 Packet 3, Rand(IP), Rand(Port) 4 Packet 4, Rand(IP), Rand(Port) N Packet N, Rand(IP), Rand(Port)

Detection: Planar Signature Analysis |E(Packet,IP,Port) – O(Packet,Port,IP)| = 0 Incoming packets analyzed according to packet analysis length Packets mapped: O(Packet,IP,Port) Compared to planar key: E(Packet,IP,Port) Network Conditions Normal: Singularity exists at origin Compromised: Difference planes will populate

Normal Traffic Conditions

MTDIDS Experimental Overview MATLAB used to establish TCP/IP connection Node A and B wish to communicate Session 1 valid for 10 minute interval Packet Analysis Length: 25,000 Parity Rate: 3 Number of IPs: 5 Number of Ports: 65536

MTDIDS Address Selection # IPv6 Address Selection 1 2001:0db8:3c4d:0015:5e39:bfc9:99b2:3ef7 2 2001:0db8:3c4d:0015:dab7:4ea2:d754:9943 3 2001:0db8:3c4d:0015:52f7:2912:96c9:e095 4 2001:0db8:3c4d:0015:d1a3:aaa8:99db:6ee8 5 2001:0db8:3c4d:0015:6185:8bac:2931:ab5e

Planar Key Development

Malicious Objective Objective: Malicious node attempts to mimic network traffic to crack planar key. Information known to attacker by means of reconnaissance: IPs used Number of ports Packet analysis length

MTDIDS Results

Conclusion MTDIDS proposed for new era attack detection Creates dynamic attack surface Significantly decreases profitability of exploits Variable Parameters Packet Analysis Length Parity Rate Number of IPs Number of Ports Session Time Attack detection 4.29 times faster when implemented with solid state technology

Questions