3. War of Ideas Root Causes? Radicals vs. Moderates De-radicalization? Narratives vs. Counter-narratives Failed States

A. Root Causes Radical Ideologies Ethno-nationalism Non-democratic nations

Explaining the Growth of Extremist Ideas Political Factors *Technological factors Authoritarian government advances in communication Corrupt government computers for info storage Lack of civil rights; no democracy internet and e-mail Lack of human rights; no individual freedoms ease of travel Liberal and moderate ideas crushed ease of global financial transactions Radical ideas crushed (Egypt) advantages of networks Radical ideas encouraged (Saudi Arabia) globalization Prison torture SOP Controlled press spreads ruling ideology Anti-West and anti-US Social Factors Colonialism in past *Rapid economic change Israeli-Palestinian conflict * Population growth Pan-Islamic ideas Lack of social and economic mobility Pan-Arab ideas *More university education; lack of jobs *Failures of secular nationalism (Syria, Iraq) *Generation with a lack of identity No outlet for moderate dissent or debate *Expectations of success; lack of success Strong religious traditions (exploited by radicals) *Expectations of change; lack of change Economic Factors Poverty Small wealthy elite *Geopolitical Factors *Expectations of wealth through oil Rapid wealth creation in Middle East *Rising population Iranian revolution *Massive underemployment Globalization Socialist economies Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Closed economies Collapse of Cold War *Knowledge of wealth in other societies Instability of shift to post-cold war world *Temporal Factors: These variables explain why events happened when they did. Many people ask why radical Islam developed, but we need to ask why it developed and why it developed when it developed. Growth of extremist ideas

B. Radicals vs. Moderates HAMAS Fatah (Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, Pres. Obama, and Palestinian Pres. Mahmud Abbas) Within every movement there are radicals and moderates. Take the Palestinian independence movement. The PLO was a terrorist organization, but when it lost its Soviet backing in the late 1980s, it moved toward peace. It evolved into a political party after the Oslo Accords (the agreement that gave Palestinians authority over areas in the West bank and Gaza). The political Party that won elections and led the Palestinian Authority (the name for the government there) was Fatah. Fatah was willing to deal with Israel and was willing to work to negotiate a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. So the picture on the right is Mahmoud Abbas, leader of Fatah and President of the Palestinian Authority, shaking hands with PM Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Neither of them is very happy because the negotiations are going nowhere. On the left is Hamas. Hama, born in 1988, says it will fight Israel to the death (though some members talk of negotiation). The point of all this is that groups that use terrorism may stop using that strategy at some point. They do seem to be able to de-radicalize. The question is how you do this. One of the dilemmas is that when you begin to deal with a group, you ask them to end their acts of violence. Will they actually do it? And will the more radical segments of the group refuse to put down their guns (like Hamas or the CIRA and RIRA). What does this have to do with the notion of a war of ideas.? In the Palestinian case or the IRA, the notion of independence or autonomy is not necessarily radical. The use of violence to further the cause is. So can you de-radicalize a group by explaining that ends of the movement are negotiable (autonomy or independence), but the means are not (violence). In other words, ideas matter. Can you change someone’s ideas then/ Can you convince an organization that violence is the only way they will not succeed? Can you convince them that radical ideas (refusal to bend on issues, rejection of pluralism within a movement) will always fail? For the average Palestinian, can you convince them that Hamas will fail and that Fatah might succeed? Of course, in that case Israel has to bend too. That requires efforts at de-radicalization and creation of a counter-narrative. Take Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government has attempted to de-radicalize people arrested for terrorism by exposing them to the ideas of more moderate clergy who explain to them that the Quran explicitly rejects violence. These people may have been listening to radical clergy and no non-clergy can ever convince them that the radical clergy has a skewed view of Islam. But another member of the clergy may be able to do that. Saudi Arabia has had success at de-radicalization. The counter-narrative is an attempt to take the idea the radical clergy and radical political leaders are espousing and come up with a different version of the story. Every terrorist organization has a version of the world it tells recruits. If someone believes that version of the world, they might join the group. Take the ideas of people who would be attracted to the Army of God (the evils of the federal government, the persecution of the white race, the persecution of Christians, the evils of Jews, and African-Americans). Can you develop a counter-narrative to that, one that dismantles the bizarreness of those ideas. Maybe.

C. De-Radicalization Saudi Arabian programs

D. Narrative vs. Counter-narrative ISIS Tahrir Square, Cairo, 2011

E. Failed States Al-Shabab in Somalia Bad ideologies thrive in areas where states have collapsed, where governmental authority is gone, where law and order and basic justice no loner function. These nations are called failed states – the state itself has collapsed and there is no functioning government. Al-Shabab grew out of the Somali civil war. Al-Qaeda in Iraq grew out of the Iraq civil war. ISIS grew out of the Syrian civil war. Civil Wars radicalize people and geographic areas where there is no functioning government are the perfect places to mobilize and train your radical army. Failed states become a security threat for everyone.