Co-operate or cheat: beyond individual choice Prisoners’ dilemma Co-operate or cheat: beyond individual choice
In a game of imperfect information, players do not know game dimension, players are simply unaware of the actions chosen by other players. However if they know the other players type information is complete. In incomplete information games, players may or may not know some information about the other players - their type, their strategies, payoffs or their preferences but they have beliefs.
Binary Preference Co-operate Reward Compete Not Punished No Reward
Binary Preference Co-operate 1st preference Compete ? 4th
Payoffs reflect preference order Payoffs reflect preference order. Guaranteed a 2 but there is an elusive 3 What if? Strategy I: cooperate What if? Strategy II: compete. Then if Strategy I is the consensus……..? Strategy I Strategy II 2,2 0,3 3,0 1,1 Nash Equilibrium
Winning in terms of number of moves CHEAT 8 Moves Σ = ⓫ THIEF OF NATURE TRUST 8 Moves Σ = ⓰ Move 1 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 2 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②… After 2 moves ❹ Move 3 = ② Rival Move 1 = ②…… After 3 moves ❻ Move 4 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 5 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 6 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 7 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 8 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 1 = ② Rival Move 1 = ② Move 2 = ❸ Rival Move 2 = ⓿… After 2 moves ❺ Move 3 = ① Rival Move 3 = ①… After 3 moves…❻ Move 4 = ① Rival Move 4 = ① Move 5 = ① Rival Move 4 = ① Move 6 = ① Rival Move 4 = ① Move 7 = ① Rival Move 4 = ① Move 8 = ① Rival Move 4 = ① Cheating on 2nd move after signalling trust on 1st move delivers ❺ 2 moves ❺ Short-term gain 2 moves ❺ > 2 moves ❹ Indifference with thief of nature…. Opponent likewise with ‘I-think-You think-I-think’ and punishes the cheater for breaking trust. If knowledge of 8 moves then Short- term gain < Long Term Benefit
All bets are off the table (A,B) B Reciprocal Altruism Prisoners’ Dilemma A 1st Preference Pro-active No Regrets Tough commitment & Trust ? Descartes’ Game Change A lags behind, Costly Altruism for B unsustainable unilateral B lags behind, Costly Altruism for A 4th Preference Reactive Conflict All bets are off the table
Trust & Commitment Co-operate cheat 2,2 Kantian equilibrium 0,3 3,0 1,1 Nash equilibrium alliance No alliance 2,2 Payoff-dominant 0,1 1,0 1,1
Play Games of Strategic Interaction Play Games of Strategic Interaction The Prisoner’s Dilemma Conflict Trust & Commitment nflict & Truhttp://ncase.me/trust/ http://www.patrickmcnutt.com/kaelo/kaelo.html