Diffusion and Viral Marketing in Networks

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
LEARNING INFLUENCE PROBABILITIES IN SOCIAL NETWORKS Amit Goyal Francesco Bonchi Laks V. S. Lakshmanan University of British Columbia Yahoo! Research University.
Advertisements

Minimizing Seed Set for Viral Marketing Cheng Long & Raymond Chi-Wing Wong Presented by: Cheng Long 20-August-2011.
Spread of Influence through a Social Network Adapted from :
Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network
Social Networks 101 P ROF. J ASON H ARTLINE AND P ROF. N ICOLE I MMORLICA.
Diffusion in Networks Diffusion through social networks: why things spread Fun: i.e., why do things get popular? –Fashion, fads, internet memes,
A Game Theory Approach to Cascading Behavior in Networks By Jim Manning Jordan Mitchell Ajay Mattappallil.
Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network By David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos Report by Joe Abrams.
Based on “Cascading Behavior in Networks: Algorithmic and Economic Issues” in Algorithmic Game Theory (Jon Kleinberg, 2007) and Ch.16 and 19 of Networks,
CIKM’2008 Presentation Oct. 27, 2008 Napa, California
Social Networks: Advertising, Pricing and All That Zvi Topol & Itai Yarom.
Simpath: An Efficient Algorithm for Influence Maximization under Linear Threshold Model Amit Goyal Wei Lu Laks V. S. Lakshmanan University of British Columbia.
Maximizing Product Adoption in Social Networks
Models of Influence in Online Social Networks
Internet Economics כלכלת האינטרנט
Λ14 Διαδικτυακά Κοινωνικά Δίκτυα και Μέσα Cascading Behavior in Networks Chapter 19, from D. Easley and J. Kleinberg.
Group 18 Business Model- Revenue Side Bristol, Cuozzo, Holz, Lyman, Patibandla, Sexton.
Information Spread and Information Maximization in Social Networks Xie Yiran 5.28.
Influence Maximization in Dynamic Social Networks Honglei Zhuang, Yihan Sun, Jie Tang, Jialin Zhang, Xiaoming Sun.
School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University 1 The dynamics of viral marketing Jure Leskovec, Carnegie Mellon University Lada Adamic, University.
Many random walks are faster than one Noga AlonTel Aviv University Chen AvinBen Gurion University Michal KouckyCzech Academy of Sciences Gady KozmaWeizmann.
Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network Authors: David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, É va Tardos KDD 2003.
Online Social Networks and Media
1.2 Economic Theory Lesson Objectives:
Algorithms For Solving History Sensitive Cascade in Diffusion Networks Research Proposal Georgi Smilyanov, Maksim Tsikhanovich Advisor Dr Yu Zhang Trinity.
Steffen Staab 1WeST Web Science & Technologies University of Koblenz ▪ Landau, Germany Network Theory and Dynamic Systems Cascading.
Coye Cheshire July 20, 2016 // Computer-Mediated Communication Reputation (Part II)
Production & Costs Goal: To make sense of all the different costs & curves Strategy: Play the Airplane Game!
MARKETING MIX.
Q 2.1 Nash Equilibrium Ben
Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis
Inferring Networks of Diffusion and Influence
Chapter 1 marketing is all around us Section 1.1
Investment Appraisal - Is it worth it?
Nanyang Technological University
Johns Hopkins Business and Consulting Club
Internet Marketing Web Business Models.
Data Transformation: Normalization
Evaluation – next steps
Total quality management
Sports and Entertainment Marketing 1
What Is Economics? CHAPTER The Economic Problem
New models for power law:
Topics In Social Computing (67810)
AQA GCSE BUSINESS STUDIES
Eric Schmidt - Assignment
What Stops Social Epidemics?
How to build a good reputation online
Lecture 6-8 Information Technology.
Introduction to Consumer Behaviour
Information failure It exists when some, or all, of the participants in an economic exchange do not have perfect knowledge. Asymmetric information.
E-Commerce Theories & Practices
A Secret Weapon for Startup Ventures
Chapter 4 Online Consumer Behavior, Market Research, and Advertisement
What Is Economics? CHAPTER The Economic Problem
Effective Social Network Quarantine with Minimal Isolation Costs
The Value of Reviews Hello everyone! Thanks for joining us today in our weekly sales webinar, today's focus will be the value of reviews for local businesses.
Calculating Investment Returns
Linear Programming Duality, Reductions, and Bipartite Matching
Diffusion in Networks Dr. Henry Hexmoor Department of Computer Science Southern Illinois University Carbondale 1/17/2019.
Automating Profitable Growth™
Warm-Up Estimate the per night price of staying in both of these hotels. What made you guess these prices?
QUANTITATIVE METHODS 1 SAMIR K. SRIVASTAVA.
SEM Acquire Foundational Knowledge Of Marketing Information Management To Understand Its Nature & Scope.
Malik Magdon-Ismail, Konstantin Mertsalov, Mark Goldberg
Chapter 1 Section 2: Economic Theory
Diffusion in Networks
By Carina Gonzalez A. Per 7 Economics Mr.Traeger
Instructor: Vincent Conitzer
Blockchain Mining Games
Presentation transcript:

Diffusion and Viral Marketing in Networks 3-31-2010

Theory - review

Diffusion through social networks: why things spread Fun: i.e., why do things get popular? Fashion, fads, internet memes, research ideas, … First-order approximation: preferential attachment in graphs Rational decisions: Decisions made publically with limited information Specifically, decisions where choice is public but some evidence used in the choice is private Decisions made about products (or behaviors, etc) that have “network effects” (aka “externalities”) Specifically, the benefits and costs of the behavior are not completely local to the decision-maker Start with some simple cases in a non-networked world

r(u) – max price user u would pay for some good. Sort all the users by r(u).

f(z) r(u) – intrinsic value f(z) – network “value inflation factor” if fraction z of users are purchasers Claim: r(z)*f(z) is max price user z would pay for some good, if fraction z of all users buy the good. …and z

r(z)*f(z) poor but happy “tipping point” rich but lonely Downward pressure Upward pressure r(z)*f(z) Downward pressure poor but happy “tipping point” rich but lonely Expect f(0)=0 and r(1)=0

“number who will attend” r(z)*f(z) Downward pressure Upward pressure “tipping point” “number who will attend” “number expected to attend”

Diffusion through social networks: why things spread Fun: i.e., why do things get popular? Fashion, fads, internet memes, research ideas, … First-order approximation: preferential attachment in graphs Rational decisions: Decisions made publically with limited information Specifically, decisions where choice is public but some evidence used in the choice is private Decisions made about products (or behaviors, etc) that have “network effects” (aka “externalities”) Specifically, the benefits and costs of the behavior are not completely local to the decision-maker Now look at a networked case….

The networked theory

What if v is playing the game with many w’s ? If v has d neighbors and p*d of them choose A, then v should chose A iff pda>-(1-p)db ie, iff p>=b/(a+b)

Threshold: switch if 40% of neighbors switched

Threshold: switch if 40% of neighbors switched

General claim: dense clusters are less susceptible to cascades.

Some simulations and more theory…

Richardson and Domingos “Mining the Network Value of Customers” – KDD 2001 “Mining Knowledge-Sharing Sites for Viral Marketing” – KDD 2002

Question: who do you target? Goal: simple theory that allows tractable predictions…

Notation Xi: did customer i buy it? (yes=1, no=0) Ni=neighbors of Xi Xk,Xu = known buyers, unknown buyers Y=attributes of product Mi=do you market to i? (yes=1, no=0) M=all marketing decisions

internal probability P0, self-reliance βi Model internal probability P0, self-reliance βi

PageRank-like recurrence Model PageRank-like recurrence

Model PageRank-like recurrence Definitions: c = cost of marketing to any i r0 = revenue without marketing to i r1 = revenue with marketing to I expected lift in profit from marketing to I is change Mi to 1, leave rest of M unchanged change Mi to 0…

Model Goal: If M0 is no marketing, maximize: Definitions: c = cost of marketing to any i r0 = revenue without marketing to i r1 = revenue with marketing to I expected lift in profit from marketing to I is

Model Goal: If M0 is no marketing, maximize: Extension: assume marketing actions are continuous and response is linear:

Model Goal: If M0 is no marketing, maximize: Key point: the network effect of marketing to Xi has a linear effect on the rest of the network….so you can prove: network P non-network i/P0 (Needs proof)

Model With linearity network effect doesn’t depend on M Network value depends on M, also susceptibility to marketing, cost of marketing to I, … With linearity we can estimate network effect quickly If we assume revenue doesn’t depend on M (advertising only, no discounts) then we can build on this to compute network value and ELP from marketing to I Without linearity: this story gets complicated fast (KDD 2001 paper)

Experiments Mine Epinions for network (trust ratings) Assume uniform wij weights, constant? self-reliance, and NB model of internal probability (estimated from “purchases” of products, equating review=purchase) Vary effectiveness of marketing strategy alpha, revenue, and cost of marketing

Sample result---network values

Sample result---profits

Sample result--robustness

Some real-world experiments

Opportunity Companies like AT&T sell products (e.g., data services, ringtones, ….) … and have (partial) network data Can you use network data to do better marketing?

Existing marketing approach actions

Opportunity Hypothesis: someone that has communicated with a current subscriber (of the new service) is more likely to adopt it model communication with an existing subscriber as a binary flag (network neighbor)

Opportunity? 0.3% are NN

Experiment 1: Use NN flag to predict “takes” for the offer for each segment

Experiment 1: Use NN flag to predict “takes” for the offer for each segment

Experiment 2: Market to “segment 22” (near-misses to segments 1-21 + NN)

It works…but we can’t tell you what the product was (does it have a network effect?) whether this was really worth bothering with (only 0.3% of original market) And….this isn’t really “viral” since there’s no iteration

“Big Seed” marketing and network multipliers

“Big Seed” marketing Suppose you sell a product to K people and each person sells it to R friends …and they sell it to R friends… What’s the size of the market? K*(1 + R + R2 + R3 +…)

“Big Seed” marketing Suppose you sell a product to K people and each person sells it to R friends …and they sell it to R friends…. What’s the size of the market? K*(1 + R + R2 + R3 +…) = K/(1-R) assuming R<1 For R=0.5, your marketing power is doubled For R=0.9, your marketing power is increased by 10x For R=0.1 your marketing power is increased by 10%

“Big Seed” marketing ForwardTrack designed to encourage viral campaigns participants can tell a friend and watch their “cascades” grow

“Big Seed” marketing

“Big Seed” marketing

“Big Seed” marketing

Analysis of marketing cascades

Analysis of marketing cascades Dataset: after s purchases product p, she can send recommendations to her friends n1,n2,… first recommendee ni to purchase p gets a 10% discount and sender x also gets 10% discount everything is tracked and timestamped products have types (DVDs, …) and categories Size: about 500k products, 4M people, 15M recommendations, 100k takes

Analysis of marketing cascades Lognormal/Power-law for number of recommendations

Analysis of marketing cascades LCC grows only to about 2.5% of all nodes

Analysis of marketing cascades Most recommendation edges are between small clusters

Sample recommendation CC’s

Probability of buying saturates quickly for that product

Probability of buying saturates quickly total

Probability of buying saturates quickly Some fraction of DVD purchases were from web sites where you solicit recommendations from past customers