Service and Training Perspectives on Cyber Training For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) AFCEA CERTS Marine Corps Service and Training Perspectives on Cyber Training Col Dom Ford Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Agenda The Strategic Environment and the MOC MAGTF Info Environment COE Marine Corps 06XX Force Modernization Curriculum Building Blocks Challenges USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

Strategic Transition Point For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

Future Operating Environment For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Complex Terrain. growth of crowded, poorly governed, or lawless areas, particularly in and around the world’s littorals, will confront future commanders. Complex terrain adds informational and human aspects of the battlespace to the traditional geo-physical factors. Our opponents have learned that fighting in complex terrain offers opportunities to undercut our advantages in technology, mounted maneuver, and firepower. Collateral damage in highly urbanized areas will be difficult to avoid. Densely populated areas with constricting topography and poor infrastructure will make vehicular and aerial movement readily observable and easily disrupted. Urban areas will also challenge our ability to find cover and concealment and achieve surprise. Mission demands in complex terrain will place a greater requirement to conduct sustained, foot-mobile operations in and among populations. We must also be prepared to simultaneously fight, keep the peace, and provide humanitarian assistance – the familiar “three-block war” – and on every block conduct information warfare to protect friendly forces and networks, deceive the enemy, and create a cognitive advantage. Technology Proliferation. Peer and near-peer state adversaries have and will continue to refine sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities that threaten our strategic reach and operational freedom of maneuver. Technology proliferation will ensure numerous non-state adversaries and individuals gain at least some capability at the tactical level. Many capabilities, cyber, UAS, standoff weapons that were once the province of only the most modern militaries – are becoming commonplace. Information as a Weapon. An ever-increasing part of people’s lives is taking place in the information space, adding informational and human dimensions to the battlespace. Marines must understand that controlling physical terrain is no longer a sufficient condition for battlefield success; we must also navigate the landscape of knowledge and perception. Operating in the information domain will not only require us to protect our networks but take actions that inform, promote, persuade, coerce, dissuade, convince, compel, deceive, mask, and intimidate. Battle of Signatures. Tomorrow’s fights will involve conditions in which “to be detected is to be targeted is to be killed.” No matter the means of detection, unmanaged signatures will increasingly become a critical vulnerability. Offensively, we need to up our game on detection and exploitation. Defensely we have much to do WRT EMCON and deception. Increasingly Contested Maritime Domain. We no longer enjoy presumptive sea control. Although the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Team remains powerful, its ability to control the seas and project power is increasingly in question. Near-peer competitors are now openly challenging previously unmatched U.S. Naval air, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Potential adversaries are currently striving to contest our ability to gain access to specific regions of the global commons. USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Our Marine Operating Concept (MOC) How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) The 21st century MAGTF conducts maneuver warfare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict to generate and exploit psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages over the adversary. The 21st century MAGTF executes maneuver warfare through a combined arms approach that embraces Information Warfare as indispensable for achieving complementary effects across five domains – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. The 21st century MAGTF avoids linear, sequential, and phased approaches to operations and blends maneuver warfare and combined arms to generate the combat power needed for simultaneity of action in its full range of missions. The 21st century MAGTF operates and fights at sea, from the sea, and ashore as an integrated part of the Naval force and the larger Combined/Joint force. The MOC is not only a framework for how we’ll fight, but also how we’ll develop capabilities to maintain and enhance effectiveness… These enhancements are realized through the: 1.Tasks inherent to the MOC 2.Teased out through the Campaign of Learning 3.Which is focused by the Marine Corps Warfighting Challenges USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

The MOC’s 5 Critical Tasks For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) The MOC identifies five critical tasks and associated issue areas to guide our effort to change how we organize, train, equip, and sustain the Marine Corps to operate, fight, and win in the 21st century. The scope and scale of the implied changes are not trivial; they cut across the Marine Corps as an institution. The tasks associated with these changes require us to come to terms with new missions, acquire and master new capabilities, and evolve or create organizations. The tasks are actions to achieve specific objectives. I want to focus on three of these tasks: Task 3. The future operating environment compels us to exhaust all possibilities to protect our C2 and information networks while simultaneously exploiting networking to put ourselves into position to gain all the possible advantages thereof. This includes operating with ruthless prioritization of information sharing between the various command echelons while being prepared to operate with imperfect information. We must take into account the role of signature in offense and defense to mitigate the enemy’s targeting of our network and exploit enemy C2 vulnerabilities. We must shorten the kill chain by networking for rapid/precise fires and pushing processing power to the tactical edge. Lastly, we must utilize an enhanced concept of intelligence to rapidly sense, make sense of, and act upon information. Task 4: Maneuver warfare remains our doctrine and requires action in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict. The 21st century MAGTF must be able to maneuver equally well in both dimensions to achieve psychological, technological, temporal, and spatial advantages. Maneuver warfare applies to both Naval and littoral maneuver and requires a broader concept of combined arms/information warfare that includes military information support operations (MISO), military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), physical attack, special technical operations (STO), information assurance (IA), computer network operations (CNO), public affairs (PA), and civil-military operations (CMO). The MAGTF must also be prepared to conduct urban operations in complex terrain. This requires maintaining infantry mobility and utilizing both light and heavy forces, as well as improving expeditionary logistics and operational energy to support the MAGTF. Task 5: Exploit the competence of the individual Marine. We need to recruit and retain the best people. From cyber training, we need to ensure that our training evolves to match the current operating environment. To that end we are modernizing the communications and cyber MOS fields. More on that later. Equally important, we must prepare our Marines to be leaders and to be pre prepared to operate in the harsh, chaotic, dynamic, complex battlefields of the future. The evolution of Marine Corps C4 and Cyber training and education is being driven by all of these tasks USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

MAGTF IE Ops Concept of Employment For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) MAGTF IE Ops Concept of Employment USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

From Concept to Realization For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) 7 Functions of IE Ops USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

Marine Corps Strategy for Assured C2 supports the MOC For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Marine Corps Strategy for Assured C2 supports the MOC Strategy has 3 Major Goals Transform MAGTF C2 Optimize the Workforce Practice Information Technology Stewardship Entails the following actions Synch military and civilian education and training for entire USMC IT workforce, adapting to challenging requirements, incorporating emerging technologies, and providing integrated solutions across the training and knowledge continuum. Provide MCCES main campus and CTC’s with appropriate resources (personnel, equipment, facilities, time, funding) to support current and future C2 training requirements Enhance MCCES main campus resources to support a state-of-the-art training center (e.g. access to classified networks) including traditional and non-traditional training venues Provide live and virtual training, hands-on lbs and realistic operational exercises Enable MCCES main campus and CTC’s to include qualification processes modeled after MATWS/MCTOG Establish/enforce standards and quals processes for USMC IM and IT requirements Consolidate training facilities (e.g. CTC’s/Regional Intel Training Centers) into Regional IEO Training Centers to integrate warfighting functions and adaptable, scalable and accessable C2-related training USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) USMC Communications and Cyber MOS Modernization Supports the MOC and Marine Corps Strategy for Assured C2 Pre-1 Oct 2017 MOS Structure OLD PARADIGM Stove piped structure; did not yield well rounded chiefs; not enough focus on IP and cyber security New 06xx MOS Structure – 1 Oct 2017 CURRENT REALITY Better Enables Expeditionary Force 21 /MOC Required new MOS’s/Structure rework across USMC USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018

06xx FMS Curriculum Development Building Blocks For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) 06xx FMS Curriculum Development Building Blocks Bottom-Up Approach to Integrated Officer/Enlisted Training USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

Cyber Security Integration For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Cyber Security Integration The Cyber Security track is being integrated into the 063x and 067x MOSs including experts in network security and application security. Expanding the Cyber Security workforce role and responsibilities: Active Duty Current 0689 Workforce MCCOG 063x 067x MAGTF Supporting Establishment MARFORCYBER The Future USMC Active Duty Cybersecurity Workforce will grow by a factor of 14 over the next five years USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Future 17xx Cyberspace Force (pre-decisional) Capt LtCol 2ndLt/1stLt Unrestricted Officer 1702- Cyberspace Officer Limited Duty Officer 1705-Cyberspace Warfare Development Officer MGySgt Enlisted Marines 1721-Cyberspace Defense Operator 1711 – Cyberspace Exploitation Operator Cpl SSgt Sgt GySgt MSgt LCpl 1799 – Cyberspace Operations Chief CWO3 Warrant Officer 1720-Defensive Cyberspace Warfare Officer 1710 – Offensive Cyberspace Warfare Officer CWO4 CWO5 WO/CWO2 Maj 0602/0206 Contract for 1702 We are looking at pipeline that potentially includes sending Marines through the Joint Cyber Analysis Course (JCAC) at Corry Station and then on to the Cyber Common Technical Core (CCTC) course at Fort Gordon. DOTMLPF analysis is ongoing to determine the feasibility/cost of such an approach. Another thing we are interested in is failure rates for these courses. MCCES is leaning forward and is poised to evolve our old 0689 course into a prep course for JCAC. You see that this tentative plan envisions entry level pathways to our cyber MOS’s – our most technical cyber MOS’s – 0689 – was not entry level so this is a fundamental shift. We are looking at lessons learned from the other services – especially failure rates – to determine if this is the right approach. Training Pipeline is TBD pending DOTMLPF assessment and MCCDC approval 13 USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Challenges Manpower Facilities Technologies/equipment Transition 17xx training – developing the right approach USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Questions / Comments USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)

For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5) Points of Contact MCCES Commanding Officer Col D.D. Ford (760) 830-7474 dom.ford@usmc.mil MCCES Force Modernization Team LtCol Barian A. Woodward (760) 830-1635 barian.wood@usmc.mil LtCol Rosa A. Clarke (760) 830-6531 rosa.clarke@usmc.mil Mr. Paul L. Stokes (760) 830-6367 paul.l.stokes@usmc.mil Capt Aaron Ellis (760) 830-8566 aaron.ellis@usmc.mil USMC AFCEA brief CERTS- 17 Jan 2018 For Official Use Only / FOIA(b)(5)