Maureen Stillman March 17, 2003

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Presentation transcript:

Maureen Stillman March 17, 2003 maureen.stillman@nokia.com Rserpool Security Maureen Stillman March 17, 2003 maureen.stillman@nokia.com

Design Team objectives Revisit i-d draft-ietf-rserpool-threats-00.txt Add directives from Transport Area Directors Secure Rserpool infrastructure does not include application (PU-PE data) Support client (PU) to ENRP server authentication PU authenticates ENRP server to prevent rogue ENRP servers

PE and ENRP security Mandatory to implement TLS OR IPsec security Choice is design decision left to the designers and network architects Using IPsec Must implement draft-ietf-ipsec-sctp-04 Using TLS MUST support TLS with SCTP as described in RFC 3436 or TLS over TCP as described in RFC 2246

PU Authenticates ENRP server Consensus reached by the security design team TLS would be used by the PU to authenticate the ENRP server (mandatory to implement) Other methods of authentication are optional TLS was deemed mandatory to implement for reasons of interoperability

Open Issue Even if the PU “trusts” the ENRP server, ENRP might have gotten registrations from rougue PEs Do we need to require that the PEs be authenticated to the ENRP server as well?

Threats to consider What are the threats? Rouge ENRP servers Rouge registrations from PEs or unauthorized PEs PE thinks it has registered with a “good” ENRP server, but it is really a rouge Corrupted data Sent from the ENRP server to the PU Sent from the PE to the ENRP server PU-PE authentication addresses only #1

Issues What I really want to know is that the addresses served up to the PU are “trusted” Want to know that all the PEs have registered with a “trusted” ENRP server Therefore, the real threat is the one of bogus addresses for PEs or no addresses for the PEs Do we need data integrity as well? (yes)

Security Architecture PU PU authentication, integrity authentication, integrity Mutual authentication, integrity ENRP Server PE PE Mutual authentication, integrity

The big question Do we need to make mandatory implementation of the previous architecture? If we don’t when PU queries the ENRP server and authenticates, it doesn’t necessarily mean anything about the data it gets

Still not done – control channel Need to define the control channel Need to secure the control channel as it is part of the Rserpool infrastructure

Next steps Design team should keep meeting When the control channel definition is complete, we will need to define the security for it Are we there yet? Are there other open issues? Join the security design team to help E-mail maureen.stillman@nokia.com